

PROGRAM REVIEW 4.9

Area of Review: Naval Support Activity Washington Access Control at Washington Navy Yard

Date: 23 Oct 2013

References:

1. DTM 09-012 - Directive Type Memorandum "Interim Policy Guidance for DoD Physical Access Control", 08 Dec 2009
2. CNICINST 5530.14A - CNIC Ashore Protection Program, 29 May 2013
3. NSAW 5560.1A - Naval Support Activity Washington Traffic Policy, 04 Mar 2009
4. NSAW 5530 Ser N00/126 - Access Control Changes Effective 01 Jul 2011, 14 Jun 2011
5. NSAWINST 5532.1 - Procedures for Vetting Visitors to Navy Museum on the Washington Navy Yard, 20 May 2009
6. NSAWINST 5530.14 - NSAW Installation Access Control, 04 Oct 2013
7. Chief of Naval Operations Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (CNOIVA), 11 May 2012
8. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Final Recommendations of the Fort Hood Follow-up Review, 18 Aug 2010

Method of Review/Summary:

The Investigation Team reviewed the Naval Support Activity Washington (NSAW) Access Control Program at the Washington Navy Yard (WNY) by conducting field inspections of Entry Control Points (ECPs) and pass office operations. In addition, administrative document reviews were conducted.

The DTM 09-012 (Directive Type Memorandum "Interim Policy Guidance for DoD Physical Access Control) and CNICINST 5530.14A (CNIC Ashore Protection Program), and compliance with local NSAW requirements in NSAW 5560.1A (Naval Support Activity Washington Traffic Policy); NSAW 5530 Ser N00/126 (Access Control Changes Effective 1 July 2011); NSAW 5532.1 (Procedures for Vetting Visitors to Navy Museum on the Washington Navy Yard); and NSAWINST 5530.14 (NSAW Installation Access Control) were used.

The Investigation Team identified deficiencies in NSAW local procedures, NSAW use of

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findings were identified during the 2011 CNOIVA (report dated 11 May 2012).

Specific findings were reviewed with the NSAW Security Director, the NSAW Chief of Police, and the NSAW Antiterrorism Officer on 23 Oct 2013.

1. NSAW Local Procedures: The following non compliance to DTM 09-012 requirements were identified in local procedures.

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2. Pass Office: The following deficiencies were identified during observations of pass office operations.

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3. Criminal Background Check Vetting Equipment: The following deficiencies were identified with criminal background check vetting equipment.


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¹ Summary of Field Observations (SFO) 4.4 - Field Inspection of the Washington Navy Yard Pass Office conducted on 08 Oct 2013.

² Id.

³ Id.

⁴ SFO 4.4 Field Inspection of the Washington Navy Yard Pass Office conducted on 08 Oct 2013; Defense Readiness Reporting System – Navy, Task NTA 6.3.1.2 updated 28 Aug 2013 (Classified); and Reference Document (RD) 4.13 CNIC Access Control Advisory – NCIC Checks dtd 23 Sep 2013.

⁵ SFO 4.4 Field Inspection of the Washington Navy Yard Pass Office conducted on 08 Oct 2013; Field Observation 3 Oct 2013 (Classified); RD 4.14 Shipment Receipt dtd 08 Aug 2013; RD 4.13 CNIC Access Control Advisory – NCIC Checks dtd 23 Sep 2013; and RD 4.15 Email from CNIC N3AT RE Shipping of Hand Held Scanners for Software Change Out and Testing dtd 02 Aug 2013.