NATIONAL POLICY AND COMMAND ORGANIZATION BRANCH
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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PAGE DETERMINED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED
Reviewed by DON/AA DRMD
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: JAN 03 2018
1. (U) The following background papers are provided for information to the Chief of Naval Operations for his use during the TENTH Inter American Naval Conference in Quito, Ecuador.

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION (U) .................................. TAB A

- Vice Admiral Jesus R. BERTORELLI Moreno, Navy Chief of Staff, (no current biographical information available)
- Captain Juan Argenis GARCIA, Chief of Second Section (Intelligence Navy Staff) ....................... TAB 1

NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY - VENEZUELA (G) ............. TAB B

- The eligibility of Venezuela to receive classified U.S. military information under the permissive limits of the National Disclosure Policy is set forth at the TAB.

U.S. VENEZUELA NAVY TO NAVY RELATIONS (G) .............. TAB C

- US-Venezuelan Navy-to-Navy relations are good; Venezuela relies on the USN as a source for training and material support.
- Bulk of Venezuelan naval procurements is from European sources due to US legislative restrictions.
- Maintenance is the Venezuelan Navy's major deficiency.

VENEZUELA POLITICO-MILITARY SUMMARY (G) ..................... TAB D

- Venezuela has a stable, democratic government. It is one of our closest allies in Latin America, and there are no major irritants in US-Venezuelan relations.
- Venezuela is one of the few major politically reliable petroleum sources for the U.S. It is currently ranked as the fourth largest exporter of Petroleum products to the U.S.
- The Venezuelan military is a professional and capable establishment. It is primarily U.S. trained and very pro-U.S. However, the Navy is having problems meeting the high cost of U.S. training and maintenance.
PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAM (PEP) WITH THE VENEZUELAN
NAVY AND AIR FORCE (FOUO) .......................... TAB E
- Status of the PEP with the Venezuelan Navy and Air Force is located at the TAB.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR REORGANIZATION OF VENEZUELAN
NAVY SUPPLY SYSTEM (U) ............................. TAB F
- Since August 1977, the Venezuelan Navy has periodically expressed a desire to receive U.S. Navy technical assistance in the reorganization of their supply system.
- The Venezuelan Navy has not made any new initiatives to obtain technical assistance through established FMS procedures and the periodic attempt to raise the issue elsewhere is viewed as an attempt to circumvent the FMS system in order to obtain assistance without cost, which is impossible under existing legislation.

USN - VENEZUELAN NAVY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
(S/NOFORN) ............................................ TAB G
- Prior to January 1980, USN/VEN intelligence cooperation was very limited. As a result of the Caracas visits by ADM TRAIN (Fall 79) and RADM SHAPIRO (JAN 80) and the March U.S. visit by key Venezuelan military personnel an active two-way exchange of valuable information is rapidly developing.

RECOMMENDATIONS (U)
- Express appreciation to VEN officials for their initiative and positive actions to re-vitalize and expand intelligence cooperation with the USN.

FMS PROGRAM FOR VENEZUELA (ST) .......................... TAB H
- Venezuelan Navy weaning from U.S. Navy support is evident in their 1975 contract for the purchase of six Italian - built Lupo class frigates at the cost of $500 million dollars.
- Given the increasing debility of the USN FMS program vis-a-vis Venezuela in recent years and current policies precluding the export of technology to Latin America and other regions of the third world, it is unlikely that Venezuela's turn to Europe and the subsequent loss of U.S. influence will be reversed in the near future.

RECENT CNO TO CNO CORRESPONDENCE - VENEZUELA (ST) ***** TAB I
- Highlights of the recent CNO to CNO correspondence with Venezuela is located at the TAB.
RECENT HIGH LEVEL VISITS TO VENEZUELA (G) .............. TAB J

VENEZUELA'S LAW OF THE SEA POSITION (G) .............. TAB K
- Venezuela has been a leader in LOS negotiation and hosted the first substantive session of Third UN LOS Conference in 1974.
- Venezuela claims a 12NM territorial sea, a 15 NM security zone and 200 NM fishery and economic zones.

POLITICAL - ECONOMIC SUMMARY - VENEZUELA (S/NOFORN) .. TAB L
- The political - economic summary is located at the TAB.

MILITARY SUMMARY - VENEZUELA (S/NOFORN) .............. TAB M
- The Venezuelan armed forces have a strong counterinsurgency posture and are capable of maintaining internal security.

NAVAL SUMMARY VENEZUELA (S/NO) ......................... TAB N
- The Venezuelan Navy has little capability as a military force either for defending Venezuela or for contributing to hemispheric defense.

US SECURITY INTERESTS IN VENEZUELA (G) .............. TAB O
- The US has significant security interests in Venezuela.

RECOMMENDATION (G)
- Support US JCS objectives.
- Improve Venezuelan/combined Caribbean Defense Operations.
- Emphasize defense as a common hemispheric concern.
- Promote pro-US sentiments among Venezuelan military.

VENEZUELAN PARTICIPATION IN UNITAS (G/NOFORN) ........ TAB P
- Venezuelan withdrew from post-UNITAS amphibious operations stating other commitments preclude participation.
- Venezuelan participation in UNITAS is located at the TAB.

US BIOGRAPHY (U) ................................................. TAB Q
- William H. Luers, Ambassador to Venezuela ...... TAB 1
BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

NAME: Captain Juan Argenis Garcia (gahr-SEE-ah), Navy.

POSITION: Chief, Second Section (Intelligence), Navy Staff, since December 1979. Captain Garcia succeeded Commander Edmundo Elpidio Casanova, Acting Chief.

SIGNIFICANCE: Captain Garcia is a line officer with extensive experience aboard destroyers. Staff duty since 1973 includes Chief of the Third Section (Operations and Plans), Navy Staff; a stint with the Third Division (Operations and Plans), Joint General Staff; Acting Organization Division Chief at the Naval War College; and Chief of the Second Section (Intelligence), Navy Staff, his present position. His date of rank is 5 July 1975.

POLITICS: Captain Garcia supports the ruling government of Venezuela.

PERSONAL DATA: Captain Garcia was born 13 August 1937 in Cauragua, State of Guarico, Venezuela. He is Caucasian, with a medium build (5'8" or 1.73 m, 154 lb or 70 kg), erect posture, light brown eyes and graying (salt and pepper) hair. He attended high school at Liceo Roscio in San Juan de los Morros, State of Guarico, Venezuela (1953-1956) and upon graduating, entered the Naval Academy.

He has a fair proficiency in the English language, and is the recipient of the following decorations: Military Order, General Rafael Urdaneta (Third Class); Navy Cross (Third Class); Naval Ribbon (for distinguished action during peacetime); Command Insignia; Order of Naval Merit (Third Class); and Order of the Liberator (Fifth Class), July 1976.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CAREER:

1956-1961 - Cadet, Naval Academy. Graduated 5 July 1961; commissioned an Ensign; assigned as Communications Officer, Operations Department, destroyer Almirante Brion, 1 August 1961.


1965 - Deck Department Officer, medium landing ship Los Monjes, from 27 July.

1966 - Gunnery Officer, destroyer escort Almirante Clemente, from 26 January.

1967 - Weapons Officer, destroyer Zulie, from 31 January. Promoted to Lieutenant, 5 July.

1968 - Operations Officer, destroyer escort Almirante Garcia, from 10 January.

1969 - Communications Officer, Communications Department, Third Section (Operations and Plans), Navy Staff, from 7 August.

1971 - Promoted to Lieutenant Commander, 5 July.

1971 - Commanding Officer, medium landing ship Los Monjes, from 11 August.

1972 - Executive Officer, destroyer escort General Jose de Austria, from 4 August.

1973 - Maritime Traffic Control Chief, Third Section (Operations and Plans), Navy Staff, from 2 November.

1973 - Chief, Third Section (Operations and Plans), Navy Staff, from 21 December.

1974 - Assigned to Third Division (Operations and Plans), Joint General Staff, from 6 November.

1979 - Promoted to Captain, 5 July.

1979-Present - Chief, Second Section (Intelligence), Navy Staff, from December 1979.
GENERAL SECURITY OF MILITARY INFORMATION AGREEMENT

1. All classified military information communicated directly or indirectly between our two governments shall be protected in accordance with the following principles:
   a. the recipient government will not release the information to a third government or any other party without the approval of the releasing government;
   b. the recipient government will afford the information a degree of protection equivalent to that afforded it by the releasing government;
   c. the recipient government will not use the information for other than the purpose for which it was given; and
   d. the recipient will respect private rights, such as patents, copyrights, or trade secrets which are involved in the information.

2. Classified military information and material shall be transferred only on a government-to-government basis and only to persons who have appropriate security clearance for access to it.

3. For the purpose of this agreement classified military information is that official military information or material which in the interests of national security of the releasing government, and in accordance with applicable national laws and regulations, requires protection against unauthorized disclosure and which has been designated as classified by appropriate security authority. This includes any classified information in any form, including written, oral, or visual. Material may be any document, product, or substance on, or in which, information may be recorded or embodied. Material shall encompass everything regardless of its physical character or makeup including, but not limited to, documents, writing, hardware, equipment, machinery, apparatus, devices, models, photographs, recordings, reproductions, notes, sketches, plans, prototypes, designs, configurations, maps, and letters, as well as all other products, substances, or items from which information can be derived.
(1) insure that such contractor or prospective contractor and his facility have the capability to protect the information adequately;

(2) grant to the facility an appropriate security clearance to this effect;

(3) grant appropriate security clearance for all personnel whose duties require access to the information;

(4) insure that all persons having access to the information are informed of their responsibilities to protect the information in accordance with applicable laws;

(5) carry out periodic security inspections of cleared facilities;

(6) assure that access to the military information is limited to those persons who have a need to know for official purposes. A request for authorization to visit a facility when access to the classified military information is involved will be submitted to the appropriate department or agency of the government of the country where the facility is located by an agency designated for this purpose by the other government; this request will include a statement of the security clearance, the official status of the visitor and the reason for the visit. Blanket authorizations for visits over extended periods may be arranged. The government to which the request is submitted will be responsible for advising the contractor of the proposed visit and for authorizing the visit to be made.

9. Costs incurred in conducting security investigations or inspections required hereunder will not be subject to reimbursement.

If the foregoing is agreeable to your government, I propose that this note and your reply to that effect shall constitute a General Security of Military Information Agreement between our two governments effective the date of your reply.
CONFIDENTIAL CARACAS 4407

120651 GDP 5/15/86 (GOLDSMITH, SYDNEY) DR-P

1. NPC SECURITY SURVEY AND GENERAL SECURITY OF
AGREEMENT

1. (A) STATE 121999 (B) CARACAS 1346 (C) STATE 57840

- ENTIRE TEXT -

AN NPC SURVEY TEAM VISIT HERE THIS SUMMER WOULD BE

TOO EARLY IN TERMS OF THE STATE OF PLAY LOCALLY ON THIS

HILY SENSITIVE ISSUE. WE WERE LAST ADVISED (REF B) THAT

COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENTS ON NEGOTIATING A GBIA

IL LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS WERE RESOLVED IN WASHINGTON.

ENT AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED WE HAD TO STAND MUTE SINCE
EZUELAN INTERESTS IS HIGHLY CAUTIOUS AND TENTATIVE IN THE
ST INSTANCE AND SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED TO THE POSSIBLE
ANTAGES OF REACHING A SECURITY OF INFORMATION AGREEMENT
THE SECOND INSTANCE WE NOW ARE ASKED (REF A) TO BEAR
AGAIN, IN A HURRY, THIS ISSUE IS SO SENSITIVE THAT IT

NOT LEAD ITSELF TO HASTE, RATHER MONTHS OF CAREFUL
BYING WILL BE NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO HAVE A CHANCE OF
OMPLISHING WHAT WE WANT.

CONFIDENTIAL 19810110
S. SHOULD WE RECEIVE AUTHORITY TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL FOR
A GSOIA AS A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION, WE WOULD HAVE THE SORT OF
PACKAGE WE NEED TO RE-OPEN OUR CAMPAIGN WITH THE VENEZUELANs.
ACCORDINGLY, PLEASE KEEP US INFORMED WHEN LEGAL AND
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS (REF C) ARE COMPLETED.

LUERS
BT
W4407
ANNOTE5
CEV

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Reviewed by DON/AA DRMD
Date: JAN 03 2018
U.S. Security Surveys of Foreign Governments

Policy Basis. By Presidential Directive, the U.S. Government treats classified military information (CMI) as a national asset that must be preserved and protected. US CMI may be shared with foreign countries only when there is a clear advantage to the U.S. and the recipient has demonstrated both an intent and a capability to provide adequate protection to the information. A country's intent is shown by a government-to-government General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA).

Objectives of a Security Survey.

1. A Security Survey is designed to gauge a country's ability to protect classified information. There are no prescribed standards for making this assessment, although U.S. and NATO security practices are used for purposes of comparison.

2. Another objective is the satisfaction of NATO security requirements. For purposes of interoperability, NATO members utilize common tactical doctrine. This information is NATO classified and is released to non-NATO nations only with the approval of the NATO Military Committee. One of the criteria for the release of NATO classified information to non-member nations is adequate security protection. To secure the release of NATO information, the U.S. must attest to the adequacy of a country's security system. Completion of a security survey thus aids in satisfaction of this NATO requirement.

General.

1. A Security Survey team is tasked to review the host country's security practices and regulations and to observe their application. The team does not require access to the host's classified information. The officials, commands and activities visited by the team are determined by the host in coordination with the American Embassy.

2. Security surveys are reciprocal obligations. The United States is prepared to host reciprocal visits of security teams from friendly and allied countries.

Security Survey Procedures. The Security Survey team is formed by the National Disclosure Policy Committee. A team is normally comprised of four security specialists. In discussions with security officials of the host government, the team attempts to review the following:

1. General security environment.
a. Basic security legislation

(1) Basic laws/regulations providing for national security and national security organization.

(2) Espionage laws, "Official Secrets" laws or acts and other laws, acts/regulations pertaining to security such as industrial security legislation.

(3) Penalties which can be imposed under the above acts/laws/regulations.

b. Organization for security at the national, military and industrial level.

c. Security classification categories - The official security classification categories used to indicate their equivalent U.S. classification categories.

2. Security practices and procedures for the military departments of the government, the civil departments of the government and defense-related industry handling classified projects.

a. Personnel security

(1) Clearance procedures.

(2) Security policies and procedures pertaining to the granting of clearances and/or access involving classified information to foreign nationals, immigrant aliens and consultants, and updating security clearances.

(3) Criteria for access by an individual to classified information.

(4) Access to and control procedures for personnel security files.

b. National standards for physical security.

(1) Gate control, patrols and guards, entrance control.

(2) General security of locations where classified material is located.

(3) Physical security of building where classified material is discussed, used or stored.
(4) Types of containers used for stowage of classified material (vaults, safes, key and/or combination lock control).

(5) Use of special equipments for remote areas (cameras, microphones, etc.).

(6) Employment of double check systems for securing classified material, containers and areas.

c. Procedures for document control: logging, accountability and reporting, transmission, reproduction, receipt procedure, retirement, downgrading and declassification, classified material destruction procedures (method and by whom), handling under emergency conditions, control of working papers, handling of extracted U.S. classified information.

d. Procedures for reporting compromises and subsequent actions taken.

e. Industrial security - procedures for granting facility clearances (foreign controlled facilities also). Frequency of inspections to assure compliance with security procedures.

3. Following a Security Survey, the U.S. team may convey suggestions regarding improvements in security practices (as compared to U.S./NATO standards) to the host government. It is not uncommon for countries to send security specialists to the U.S. for follow-on discussions or training following a survey. Any such follow-on action is, of course, at the discretion of the host government.
US-Venezuela Navy-to-Navy Relations

HIGHLIGHTS

- US-Venezuela Navy-to-Navy relations are good; Venezuela relies on USN as source for limited training and material support.
- Bulk of Venezuelan naval procurement is from European sources due to US legislative restrictions.
- Maintenance is Venezuelan Navy's major deficiency.
- Venezuela desires to acquire LSTs and LVPs.

DISCUSSION

- Venezuela is an annual participant in UNITAS; VENAV interest led to invitation to participate in READEX 2-80 in bilateral amphibious operations, but GOV decision precludes VENAV participation.
- VENAV expected to participate in HALCON VISTA XV exercise 22-28 SEP 80.
- Participates regularly in IANC activities (Biannual Conference of Navy Chiefs, Naval Analysis Conference, Naval War Games, Intelligence Exchange, etc).
- Personnel Exchange Program/Summer Midshipman Exchange.
  -- U.S. has two officer exchange program with Venezuelan Navy, only one billet currently filled.
  -- U.S. has two officer exchange program with Venezuelen Air Force.
  -- Certain billets in programs are currently under review for possible realignment.
    --- May result in exchange of officers between Fleet Commander Staffs.
  -- Participates annually in Summer Midshipman Exchange Program.
  -- Recent series of high-level navy visits (SECNAV, ADM Train, VADM Johnson, RADM Shapiro, RADM Pulido) has highlighted VENAV interests:
    -- Increased participation in bilateral exercises.
    -- Increased officer exchange.
    -- Assistance in completion of S2E rework.
    -- US/NATO Tactical Pubs.
    -- Secure teletype terminal for IANTC.
    -- Naval Analysis Officer Training.
    -- Acquisition of LSTs/LVPs.
    -- Cooperation in Caribbean SLOC security.
- CNO invited VENAF aerobatic team to participate in NAS New Orleans Air Show in November 1980. VENAF declined because of shortage of trained pilots.
- VENAV is pursuing program with US civilian contractor for in-country ship and aircraft maintenance packages.
- Possible initiatives to strengthen relations:
  -- Recently expressed Venezuelan interest in acquiring US LSTs.
  -- Encourage VENAV participation in future READEX operations to foster increased contact/training.
  -- Develop OJT programs for junior officer training in US fleet units.
  -- Encourage security survey to facilitate release of tactical pubs and information.
  -- Invite key VENAV officers to US for orientation visits to USN maintenance/training facilities.

RECOMMENDATION (U)

- Provided for Information.
SUBJECT (U)

Venezuelan Politico-Military Summary

HIGHLIGHTS (U)

- President Luis Herrera Campins elected to a five-year term in Dec 78; inaugurated in March 79.
- President Herrera attempting to stake out a larger role for Venezuela in world and regional events.
- U.S. relations with Venezuela are excellent; no major irritants in U.S.-Venezuelan relations.

DISCUSSIONS (U)

- Venezuela continues to provide an example that a working democracy is capable of enduring in Latin America. Venezuela is one of our closest allies in Latin America and except for its oil policies which, by necessity, are OPEC-driven, closely follows and supports US policy in the international arena.
  -- Member of Rio Pact, IADB, OAS.
- U.S. interests:
  -- A stable, cooperative and democratic government.
  -- Access to Venezuelan petroleum and a responsible Venezuelan pricing position in OPEC.
  -- Protection of U.S. investments and access to Venezuelan markets for U.S. exports.
  -- Venezuelan participation in collective hemispheric efforts to foster peace, security and democracy.
- U.S.-Venezuelan relations are excellent with no major irritants.
  -- Venezuela is strongest supporter of democracy in Latin America, fourth largest exporter of petroleum products to U.S. and among twelve largest importers of U.S. goods.
  -- So long as Middle East remains volatile, Venezuela will remain one of few major politically reliable petroleum sources for U.S. This interdependence requires energy cooperation.
  -- Opposed U.S. formation by CJTF.
  -- Opposed U.S. Caribbean exercise "SOLID SHIELD."

- President Herrera is seeking a more dominant role for Venezuela in international as well as regional arena.

CLASSIFIED BY CNO (CP-61)
DECLASSIFIED ON 30 JUN 1986
-- Visited Costa Rica Jun 80. Sought to show support of fellow Christian Democratic government, enlist aid in stabilizing Central American politics, and discuss energy issues.
-- Challenge to Andean pact leadership may come from newly-elected Peruvian President.
-- Visited Paris in Apr 80. Discussed North-South issues; Caribbean/Central America instability, EEC/Andean Pact relations.
-- Leadership role in Hemispheric Energy Cooperation.

--- Purpose is to assist Caribbean/Central American nations finance oil imports.
   o Olade working group rejected Venezuelan proposal on energy cooperation May 80.
--- Seeking cooperation of, among others, US, Mexico, Ecuador, and Canada.
   o Venezuela to participate in U.S. Energy Assessment program (IEDP).

-- Seeking to constrain Cuban expansionism in region.
--- Increasing military attache assignments in Central America.
--- Herrera administration's relations with Cuba are strained - believes Cuban image in Latin America and in NAM hurt by refugee crisis.
--- Vigilant coastal surveillance for possible Cuban activities.

-- Proclaimed foreign policy aim of "democratic solidarity" in opposing extremism of left and right.
--- Necessity of bipartisan approach recently recognized by Venezuelan parties.

-- Herrera government and previous administration provided financial and moral support to anti-Somoza movement in Nicaragua.
-- Regional aid package.

--- $US 3.5 billion through 1985.

- Expanding petroleum-based economy permitted 1976-1980 public investment plan of $U.S. 27 billion that channels money into all levels of society, but have - have not gap is widening.
Declining oil revenues in 1979 plus domestic problems with public services, employment policies and inflation have affected economic and social progress.

Growing ministerial dissatisfaction with Herrera's failure to honor prior contracts for public works projects.

Military taking the brunt of belt-tightening.

Venezuelan military is a professional and capable establishment, primarily U.S.-trained and very pro-U.S.

Provides a stabilizing force for the region and has potential for contributing to defense of Caribbean Basin and critical Sea Lines of Communications.

Potential naval capability offset by serious maintenance deficiencies.

Major irritant is extremely high cost of training in the U.S. Training is desired but prices deemed unreasonable.

Navy is poorly organized and equipped for its Coast Guard role. Has requested USCG developmental assistance.

U.S.-Venezuelan Navy-to-navy relations are excellent.

Internal security: Communist-inspired insurgency is a problem in rural eastern Venezuela. Insurgents presently assessed as small in number and posing no immediate threat to national government or economic stability.

RECOMMENDATION (U)

Provided for information.
VATICAN CITY/ VENEZUELA

January 1979

VENEZUELA

LAND
911,680 km²; 4% cropland, 18% pasture, 21% forest, 57% urban, waste, and other
Land boundaries: 4,181 km

WATER
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 nm (economic including fishing 200 nm)
Coastline: 2,600 km

PEOPLE
Population: 14,541,000, excluding Indian jungle population (January 1979), average annual growth rate 2.2% (current)

Nationality: noun—Venezuelan(s); adjective—Venezuelan
Ethnic divisions: 67% mestizo, 21% white, 10% Negro, 2% Indian
Religion: 94% nominally Roman Catholic
Language: Spanish
Literacy: 74% (claimed, 1970 est.)
Labor force: 3.7 million (1975); 24% agriculture, 6% construction, 17% manufacturing, 6% transportation, 18% commerce, 25% services, 4% petroleum, utilities, and other
Organized labor: 45% of labor force

GOVERNMENT
Legal name: Republic of Venezuela
Type: republic
Capital: Caracas
Political subdivisions: 20 states, 1 federal district, 2 federal territories
Legal system: based on Spanish civil law system with influence of U.S. law; constitution promulgated 1961; judicial review of legislative acts in Cassation Court only; dual court system, state and federal; legal education at Central University of Venezuela; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
National holiday: Independence Day, 5 July
Branches: executive (President), bicameral legislature, judiciary
Government leader: President Carlos Andres Perez; new president, Luis Herrera Campins to be inaugurated March 1979
Suffrage: universal and compulsory over age 18
Elections: every 5 years; last held December 1978; next national election 1983
Political parties and leaders: Social Christian Party (COPEI), Luis Herrera Campins, Rafael Caldera; Accion Democratica (AD), Carlos Andres Perez, Romulo Betancourt; Movement to Socialism (MAS), Teodoro Petkoff,
Pompey Marquez; Partido Communista de Venezuela (PCV), Secretary-General, Jesus Faria

Voting strength (1976 election): 45% COFEM, 43% AD, 5% MAS, 6% others

Communists: 4,000-6,000 members (est.)

Other political or pressure groups: Fedecamaras (a conservative business group), PRO VENEZUELA (leftist, nationalist economic group); DESARROLLISTAS (group of wealthy, independent businessmen led by former finance minister Pedro Tinoco and historian Guillermo Moron)


ECONOMY

GNP: $33 billion (1977, in 1977 dollars), $2,590 per capita; 45% private consumption, 15% public consumption, 31% gross investment, 6% foreign sector (1976), real growth rate 6.5% (1974-77)

Agriculture: main crops—sugarcane, corn, coffee, rice; imports wheat (U.S.), sorghum (Argentina, U.S.); caloric intake 2,600 calories per day per capita (1972)

Fishing: catch 145,727 metric tons (1976); exports $28.4 million (1976), imports $2.0 million (1976)

Major industries: petroleum, iron-ore mining, construction, food processing, textiles

Crude steel: 750,000 metric tons produced (1976), 60 kg per capita

Electric power: 6,540,000 kW capacity (1978); 28 billion kWh produced (1978), 2,200 kWh per capita

Exports: $15 billion (f.o.b., 1977); petroleum $9.0 billion, iron ore, coffee

Imports: $8.9 billion (f.o.b., 1977); industrial machinery and equipment, chemicals, manufactures, wheat

Major trade partners: imports—39% U.S., 11% Japan, 12% West Germany; exports—36% U.S., 15% Canada

Aid: economic assistance—extensions from U.S. (FY64-76), $128 million loans; $73 million grants; from international organizations (FY64-75), $558 million; from Communist countries (1954-76), $10 million; military—assistance from U.S. (FY64-76), $153 million

Budget: 1978—revenues $10.7 billion; expenditures, $10.4 billion, capital $4.2 billion

Monetary conversion rate: 5.3207 bolivares=US$1 (selling rate), June 1978

Fiscal year: calendar year

COMMUNICATIONS

Railroads: 373 km standard gage (1.435 m) all single track; 171 km government owned, 202 km privately owned

Highways: 58,900 km total, 21,800 km paved, 21,900 km otherwise improved and 15,200 km unimproved earth

Inland waterways: 7,100 km; Orinoco River and Lake Maracaibo accept oceangoing vessels

Pipelines: 6,110 km crude oil, 400 km refined products, 2,495 km natural gas

Ports: 6 major, 17 minor

Merchant marine: 79 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 745,400 GRT, 1,040,700 DWT; includes 7 passenger, 43 cargo, 18 tanker, 7 bulk, 3 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 beach landing

Civil air: 70 major transport aircraft (including 4 leased in and 1 leased out)

Airfields: 292 total, 262 usable, 109 with permanent-surface runways, 8 with runways 2,440-3,659 m, 80 with runways 1,220-2,439 m; 2 seaplane stations

Telecommunications: modern expanding telecom system; satellite ground station, 649,000 telephones (5.3 per 100 pop.); 157 AM, 50 FM, and 43 TV stations; 2 submarine cables; 1 Atlantic Ocean satellite station

DEFENSE FORCES

Military manpower: males 15-49, 3,033,000; 2,156,000 fit for military service, 158,000 reach military age (18) annually

Personnel: 27,000 army, 8,600 navy (including 4,300 marines), 4,500 air force, 15,000 national guard

Major ground units: 3 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 1 armored brigade, 1 ranger brigade, and 15 separate battalions (2 headquarters, 1 infantry, 1 artillery, 1 air defense artillery, 1 airborne, 2 military police, 1 combat engineer, 2 construction engineer, 2 signal, 1 support, 1 ordnance), 3 infantry brigade headquarters and 36 battalions (11 infantry, 1 mechanized infantry, 10 ranger, 4 armored, 6 artillery, 3 combat engineer, 1 support) are organic to the 4 divisions, 1 armored brigade, 1 ranger brigade; national guard has 55 detachments (battalions)

Ships: 6 destroyers, 2 frigates, 4 submarines, 3 missile attack boats, 8 patrol craft, 4 river/roadstead patrol boats, 6 amphibious warfare ships, 6 auxiliary ships, 2 service craft

Aircraft: 270 (142 jet, 21 turboprop, 65 prop, 42 helicopters), including 43 F-5 E/F jets in redistribution and marketing status; (about 79 aircraft in the present inventory are scheduled for replacement under an aggressive modernization program)

Supply: produces portion of small arms and ammunition, small arms, and military explosives and propellants; dependent upon U.S. and Western Europe for all other materiel; 2 submarines purchased from West Germany, 6 fast patrol boats from the U.K. and 6 frigates ordered from Italy
Military budget: proposed for fiscal year ending December 1979, $708.4 million; about 6.7% of central government budget.

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

Directorate for Services of Intelligence and Preven (DISIP), domestic/foreign; Directorate of Military Intelligence (DIM), domestic/foreign; Department of Identification and Alien Control, domestic; Technical Corps of Judicial Police (PTJ), domestic; Municipal Police of Federal District, domestic; Unified Police Command, domestic; Armed Forces of Cooperation (FAC), domestic; Intelligence division of the Joint General Staff (J-2) of Armed Forces, domestic/foreign; General Staff Intelligence Sections, Second Sections of the Army, Navy, and Air General Staffs, domestic; Land Transit Police (CVTT), domestic.
SUBJECT (U)

U.S. Navy Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) with the Venezuelan Navy (VENNAV) and Venezuelan Air Force (VENAF).

HIGHLIGHTS (FOUO)

The USN has a negotiated two-officer exchange with the VENNAV. At present only one billet in each service is filled. A proposal to realign each services' second billet is in preparation.

A separate two-officer PEP exists between the USN and VENAF. The USN billets are for a T-2 pilot instructor and Supply Corps officer. The pilot position has been vacant since October 1979 and recent attempts to fill the billet were unsuccessful. The Chief, Navy Section, USMILGP has been requested to investigate the feasibility of realigning the Supply Corps billet to a position in the VENNAV.

DISCUSSION (FOUO)

In 1974 the VENNAV agreed to a USN proposal for a two-officer exchange program associated with the VENNAV purchase of the S-2E aircraft. The first USN personnel arrived on station in early 1975, but the VENNAV did not reciprocate until early 1976. Due to the subsequent USN phase-out of the S-2, one S-2 pilot billet with the VENNAV was realigned to an ASW helo pilot position. The first incumbent to this new position is scheduled to arrive in Venezuela in July 1980. The counterpart billet is filled by a VENNAV officer assigned to NAS Jacksonville as Assistant Aviation Safety Officer. The second S-2 billet has not been resolved. A VENNAV proposal to back train a USN officer in S-2 aviation was not considered a viable option due to the negative career impact. During an October 1979 meeting between CINCLANTFLT and the VENNAV CNO, Venezuela expressed a desire to have an exchange between CINCLANTFLT and the VENNAV CNO staff. CINCLANTFLT indicated support for such a PEP and is preparing a proposal to establish this exchange. Upon receipt of this proposal, current intentions are to offer this as the second officer exchange position.

The pilot instructor billet with the VENAF requires an officer with T-2 flying experience. A USN pilot meeting all other billet qualifications was nominated to this position, with the proposal that the officer receive T-2 training in-country. This proposal was necessitated by heavy student pilot loading which precluded the nominee from receiving T-2 training in the U.S. This arrangement was not acceptable to the VENAF and efforts continue to identify a nominee for this billet.

RECOMMENDATION (U)

Provided for background information
SUBJECT

Technical assistance for reorganization of Venezuelan Navy Supply System.

HIGHLIGHTS

- Since August 1977, the Venezuelan Navy has periodically expressed a desire to receive U.S. Navy technical assistance in the reorganization of their supply system. The question may possibly be raised during the SLCKAV visit.

DISCUSSION

- On 4 January 1978, the Venezuelan Navy accepted case VE-F-GAP (cost $21,282) for a three-man Technical Assistance Team (TAT) to conduct a three week review of the Venezuelan Navy Supply System and recommend changes required for improved efficiency and organization. The case was cancelled at the Venezuelan Navy's request in July 1978 when they were unable to fund it. The visit of the TAT, therefore, never took place.

- In April 1979, reference material was provided to assist the Venezuelan Navy in conducting its own supply system review.

- In February 1980, the Venezuelans requested data concerning supply system codification and were referred to the Defense Logistics Service Center, Battle Creek, Michigan, which is the cognizant agency for all codification services.

- The Venezuelan Navy has not made any new initiatives to obtain technical assistance through established FMS procedures and the periodic attempt to raise the issue elsewhere is viewed as an attempt to circumvent the FMS system in order to obtain assistance without cost, which is impossible under existing legislation.

RECOMMENDATION

None. Provided for information only.
SECRET--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SUBJECT (U)

USN - Venezuelan Navy (VEN) Intelligence Cooperation

HIGHLIGHTS (C/NOPORN)

(C/NOPORN) Prior to January 1980, USN/VEN intelligence cooperation was very limited. As a result of the Caracas visits by ADM Train (Fall 1979) and RADM Shapiro (January 1980) and the March U.S. visit by key Venezuelan military personnel, an active two-way exchange of valuable information is rapidly developing.

DISCUSSION (C/NOPORN)

(C/NOPORN) While planning the January 1980 visit to Venezuela by the USN DNI, the VEN reaction was one of reserve and skepticism. A rapid turn around has occurred as a result of the USN visit, plus the Washington and Norfolk intelligence facility visits by RADM Pulido, VEN, Joint Staff J-2, BG Uzcategui, VEA, Joint Staff J-3, and CAPT Garcia, VEN, DNI (equivalent).

(C/NOPORN) The USN is currently providing:
The VEN contributes:

(U) The VEN has participated in past INICs (Inter-American Naval Intelligence Conferences).

RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

(U) Express appreciation to VEN officials for their initiative and positive actions to re-vitalize and expand intelligence cooperation with the USN.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Reviewed by DON/AA DRMD
Date: JAN 03 2018
SUBJECT
FMS Program: VENEZUELA

HIGHLIGHTS

During the period 1974-1979 Venezuela was Latin America's fourth largest purchaser of military hardware, spending $41.4 million in the free world market, exclusive of the U.S., during 1979 alone. In contrast, Venezuelan purchases from the U.S. have been minimal. The Venezuelan Navy has concluded only one purchase (S-2 aircraft - $242,163) during FY80 and, in actuality, support of the Venezuelan Air Force has become the dominant feature of the U.S. Navy FMS program in Venezuela.

DISCUSSION

The Venezuelan Navy is anxious to acquire excess amphibious ships of the LST type and conventional submarines from the U.S. Navy. They have been advised that amphibious ships are not available, but that there are two inactive submarines (USS SALMON and USS SAILFISH) available "as is, where is," for FMS sale. They are priced at $400,000 each and the cost of reactivation would be a separate, additional expense. Additionally, USS WAHOO, which was part of the Iranian program, is available at $35 million with the cost of overhaul included. A Venezuelan response to the foregoing has not been received.

The Venezuelan Navy operates S-2 aircraft which are no longer supportable from the U.S. Navy supply system. Completion of a contract they negotiated with a private U.S. firm for the overhaul of these aircraft was delayed due to difficulties experienced in obtaining necessary repair parts. To alleviate this difficulty, the U.S. Navy offered to sell two excess S-2 aircraft for spare parts cannibalization. The offer originally expired in November 1979 and was extended three times before being finally accepted in June 1980. Venezuela now intends to utilize the new S-2's as operational aircraft and the supply problem remains unsolved.

The Venezuelan Navy failed to participate in a last time buy of MK 44 torpedo components. As a consequence, they should anticipate difficulty in supporting this weapon system in the future.

RECOMMENDATION
None. Provided for information only.
SUBJECT (U)
Recent CNO-to-CNO Correspondence - Venezuela

HIGHLIGHTS

- January 1979 CNO sent ADM La Grave a message to inaugurate planning for 1979 UNITAS exercise.
- January 1979 CNO sent letter to ADM La Grave inviting Venezuelan participation in 1979 Midshipman Summer Exchange Program.
- February 1979 CNO sent ADM La Grave a message inviting Venezuelan Navy to 1st Inter-American Naval Analysis Conference in Annapolis.
- April 1979 CNO sent a letter to ADM La Grave inviting Venezuelan Navy Rep to V ISS in Newport, RI.
- May 1979 CNO sent ADM La Grave a letter declining invitation offered during ADM La Grave’s April visit to US to visit Venezuela in July 1979.
- July 1979 CNO sent to ADM La Grave a congratulatory message on his retirement and to ADM Reyes Leal a congratulatory message on assuming duties as Venezuelan Navy Commander.
- July 1979 CNO sent a congratulatory message to ADM Reyes Leal on Venezuelan Navy Day.
- September 1979 ADM Reyes sent CNO a letter regretting being unable to attend V ISS and requesting USN assistance in obtaining repair parts for VENAV S2E aircraft undergoing commercial overhaul in U.S.
- November 1979 CNO sent a letter to ADM Reyes stating USN would offer to sell USN excess S2Es for cannibalization, offered to sell any repair parts still available in USN supply channels, and suggested direct purchase from Grumman Aircraft.
- February 1980 CNO sent a letter to ADM Reyes inviting Venezuelan participation 1980 Midshipman Summer Exchange Program.
- March 1980 CNO sent a message to ADM Reyes to inaugurate planning for 1980 UNITAS exercise.
- March 1980 ADM Reyes sent a letter advising that Venezuelan Navy would participate in 1980 UNITAS.
- May 1980 CNO sent a message to Venezuelan Air Force Chief of Staff inviting Venezuelan aerobatic team to participate in 980 NAS New Orleans Air Show.
- May 1980 ADM Reyes sent a letter to CNO advising that Venezuelan Navy would participate in Amphibious phase of READEX 2-80.

RECOMMENDATION (U)
- Provided for information.
SUBJECT (U)
Recent High Level Visits to Venezuela

HIGHLIGHTS (U)

- ADM Train, VADM Johnson, and RADM Shapiro have visited Venezuela since Oct 79.
- RADM Pulido (VENAV DNI) visited Norfolk, Washington in Mar-Apr 80.
- ADM Reyes (VENAV CNO) visited Newport for V ISS in Sep 79.

DISCUSSION (U)

- MGEN Marin, Commander of Venezuelan Army, has been invited to visit U.S. 17-27 Aug 80.
- ADM Train visited Venezuelan CNO, MINDEF, FLTCMDR in Oct 79.

-- ADM Train described Soviets' increasing ability to influence events politically, economically and militarily in Africa and along SLOCs in South America and Caribbean. Emphasized need to be sensitive to Soviet influence and Cuban adventurism as a Soviet surrogate in the Caribbean.

-- Venezuelans indicated interest in:

--- Increasing bilateral ops with USN
--- Increased officer exchange
--- US assistance in completing rework of S2E aircraft
--- Obtaining US/NATO tactical publications
--- Advice on acquiring surveillance aircraft
--- Greater intelligence exchange

- VADM Johnson visit - in connection with READEX 1-80 port visit program.
- RADM Shapiro visited Caracas in Jan 80 in connection with visits to DNI's of Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela on Naval Intelligence matters. Resulted in return visit by RADM Pulido (VENAV DNI) in 1980.
- RADM Pulido (VENAV DNI) visited Norfolk and Washington in Mar-Apr 80.

-- Stated USG should support Venezuelan initiatives to oppose Cuban/Soviet expansionism in Caribbean area, and should make military material, training, and know-how available at reasonable prices.
-- Resulted in closing loop on expanding Naval Intelligence cooperation with VENAV.
SECRET

--- USN will provide night observation device for coastal surveillance.
--- USN will initiate action to provided crypto equipment for Venezuelan IANTC terminal.
--- VENAV will provide Soviet/Cuban Naval information.

- Other visits:

  -- President Carter visited during Perez Administration in 78.
  -- VADM La Grave (then VENAV CNO) visited Washington for appointment at Bethesda and courtesy call on CNO in Apr 79.
  -- VADM Orta, Director of Venezuelan National Security Council, visited NSC for orientation visit in Sep 79.
  -- ADM Hayward was invited to Venezuela by VENAV CNO in 79 but declined.


  -- Venezuelans stressed need for training, MK 37 torpedos, LSTs/LVPs.
  -- Venezuela supportive of U.S. security leadership in Caribbean and willing to cooperate on regional basis.

RECOMMENDATION (U)

- Provided for information.
- Venezuela's Law of the Sea (LOS) Position

**HIGHLIGHTS (£)**

- Venezuela has been a leader in LOS negotiations and hosted the first substantive session of Third UN LOS Conference in 1974.

**DISCUSSION (£)**

- Venezuela claims a 12 nm territorial sea, a 15 nm security zone, and 200 nm fishery and economic zones.

  -- Venezuela has taken a more moderate stand on LOS issues than most other Latin American nations.

  -- Venezuela's LOS delegation is led by Ambassador Andres Aguilar, also a member of the 5 man UN Commission to Iran, who chairs Committee I on seabed matters and is one of the most influential members at the Conference.

- Principal differences between U.S. and Venezuela concern scientific research within proposed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and functions of proposed Deep Seabed Authority.

- During LOS negotiations, Venezuela has favored concept of the patrimonial sea, which allows an EEZ to extend up to 200 nm seaward of baselines used to measure territorial sea.

  -- In this zone, coastal state would have exclusive rights over resources, scientific research and pollution control, while the ships and aircraft of all states would enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight.

  --- U.S. opposes coastal state control over scientific research and has favored international standards for pollution control.

- Venezuela supports the principle of "transit passage" through international straits between 6 and 24 nm wide.

  -- Venezuela borders on three straits in that category - Dragon's Mouth, Serpent's Mouth and the Aruba-Paraguana passage.

- Venezuela advocates an International Seabed Authority with broad powers over resources and the water column.
-- U.S. advocates a Seabed Authority with carefully circumscribed powers over deep seabed only.

- Venezuela's major concerns are provisions in the draft convention regarding dispute settlement related to maritime zones between adjacent states, opposite coasts, bays, and historic titles.

RECOMMENDATION (U)

- For information.
SUBJECT (U)
Political-Economic Summary - Venezuela

HIGHLIGHTS (S/NOPFORN)
Venezuela has had stable civilian rule since 1958. The government of President Herrera faces no serious internal problems, although there is a noticeable increase in the activities of Venezuela's small insurgency movement. Venezuela's economy has generated the highest per capita income in South America, primarily as a consequence of oil exports. Herrera places a high priority on good relations with the U.S., which buys 50% of Venezuela's oil.

DISCUSSION (S/NOPFORN)
Government: President: Luis Herrera Campins
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco
Minister of National Defense: MG Fernando Paredes Bello

Domestic Politics:
-Herrera, inaugurated in March 1979 for a 5 year term, has been stressing domestic issues, primarily those of inflation, corruption, and the upgrading of Venezuela's economic infrastructure.

-Venezuela's insurgent movements are small, but have recently shown signs of increasing activity. Armed guerrillas, estimated to number less than 100, are capable of conducting occasional small-scale attacks in remote areas, but pose no threat to the security of the government.

The Economy:
-As a result of its position as a major oil exporter, Venezuela enjoys the highest per capita income in South America. Though experiencing rising domestic inflation, Venezuela has good near term economic prospects.
Foreign Relations:

-Venezuela has relatively minor border disputes with Colombia and Guyana, neither of which are assessed as having a significant potential for armed conflict.

-Herrera has stressed positive relations with the U.S., which buys 50% of Venezuela's oil.

-Herrera is less favorably disposed toward Cuba than was his predecessor, Carlos Andres Perez. Herrera has become increasingly concerned about the expansion of Cuban influence in the Caribbean, and he recently expanded Venezuela's economic assistance to Caribbean states.
The Venezuelan armed forces have a strong counterinsurgency posture and are capable of maintaining internal security. The armed forces enjoy an advantage in military equipment over the forces of Columbia and Guyana; the Navy however, remains one of the most inefficient of the principal South American navies.

DISCUSSION

Total Armed Forces: 40,600 (8th largest in Latin America)
Military Budget: $703 million (5th largest in Latin America)

Army: Commander: MG Arnaldo Castro Hurtado
- Personnel Strength: 27,000
- Organization: The Army has four divisions, an armored brigade and a ranger brigade, but these lack sufficient support elements to function as effective combat units in the field. As a result, the basic tactical element is the battalion. The Army is currently in the process of organizing its divisional/brigade units as territorial commands.
- Equipment: Major equipment is of U.S. and French origin. The Army has greatly increased its capabilities through the procurement of French AMX-30 medium tanks and 155 mm self-propelled howitzers.

Air Force: Commander: MG Luis Alberto Leon Aranguren
- Personnel Strength: 4,500
- AOB: 22 Bombers (CANBERRA)
  30 Fighters (F-5A/D, MIRAGE)
  14 Recon/Attack (OV-10)
  17 Recon/Utility
  56 Trainers
  30 Helicopters (Utility)
  191 Total
- **Equipment:** Aircraft are primarily of U.S. origin. The Air Force has expressed great dissatisfaction with their MIRAGE fighters and have an interest in procuring F-5Es.

**Navy:** Commander: VADM Magin LaGrave Fry

- **Personnel Strength:** 9,000 (includes 4,400 Marines)

- **NOB:**
  2 Destroyers (DD)
  3 Frigates (FF)
  4 Submarines (SS)
  3 Missile Attack Boats (PTG)
  7 Patrol Craft (PC/PBR)
  6 Amphibious Warfare Ships (LSM/LST)
  8 Auxiliaries
  **33 Total**

- **Equipment:** Ships are primarily from U.S., U.K., Italy and West Germany. As a result of a recent modernization program, the Venezuelan Navy suffers from obsolescent equipment less than the majority of South American navies.
Naval Summary - Venezuela

HIGHLIGHTS (S/NOPORN)

The Venezuelan Navy has little capability as a military force either for defending Venezuela or for contributing to hemispheric defense. The Navy suffers from a lack of at-sea training and substantial maintenance and material readiness deficiencies. As a result, the Navy is at best capable of limited coastal operations of short duration. The small naval air arm provides a limited surveillance/ASW capability.

DISCUSSION (S/NOPORN)

Organization: Commander of the Navy: VADM Magin LaGrave Fry

The Minister of National Defense exercises operational control through the Commander of the Navy (HQ Caracas). Day-to-day command of operating forces is exercised by the Naval Fleet Commander (HQ, Puerto Cabello). Naval ships normally operate out of Puerto Cabello or La Guaira.

NBO:

2 Destroyers (DD) (2 SUMNER (FRAM-II) class)
3 Frigates (FF)
4 Submarines (SS) (2 GUPPY types)
3 Missile Attack Boats (PTG) (VOSPER THORNEYCROFT with OTOMAT SSM)
7 Patrol Craft (PC/PBR)
6 Amphibious Warfare ships (ex-U.S. LSM/LST)
8 Auxiliaries
Total

Naval Air: 13 aircraft (6 S-2E, 2 C-47, 5 Utility)

Personnel: 9,000 (includes 4,400 Marines)

Current Developments:

-A new construction LUPO-class frigate from Italy was commissioned in November 1979. Five more are scheduled for delivery between 1980-1982.
US Security Interests in Venezuela

HIGHLIGHTS

- US has significant security interests in Venezuela.

- Geographic security interest.
  -- Venezuela on southwestern flank of Caribbean and Panama Canal SLOCs.
  -- Potential for bases/facilities for SLOC protection/sea control forces.

- Political security interests.
  -- Venezuela one of few LATAM nations with an established tradition of an elected constitutional government.
  -- Member of OPEC.
  -- Venezuela attempts to exert leadership and influence in Latin America.
  -- Considers itself in forefront of Third World Countries.

- Economic security interests.
  -- Exporter of petroleum and iron ore.

- Venezuelan Navy small but relatively modern.
  -- Not capable of sustained operations.
  -- Has potential for becoming "blue water" navy if financial resources are devoted to revitalization.

DISCUSSION

- Security arrangements.
  -- Member of Rio Treaty.
  -- Member of Inter-American Defense Board.

- Relations between US and Venezuela Governments considered amicable.

RECOMMENDATION

- Support US JCS objectives.
  -- Improve Venezuelan/Combined Caribbean defense operations.

- Emphasize defense as common hemispheric concern.

- Promote pro-US sentiments among Venezuelan military.
SUBJECT (U)
Venezuelan Participation in UNITAS

DISCUSSION (CAND)

- UNITAS XX (1979)
  -- Phase One - Venezuela (26 June - 7 Jul)
    --- Venezuelan Navy (VENAV) participation: 2 DD, 2 FF, 1 SS, 1 light transport, 4 F-5, 2 S2E.
    --- Highlights: Operating days and number of exercises doubled from previous years. AAW and EW introduced for first time.
    --- Evaluation: Although potential for improvement exists, VENAV currently cannot participate in sustained at-sea operations, nor operate effectively as a unit, and cannot contribute significantly to any combined naval force in hemispheric defense.
  -- Phase Two - Colombia/Venezuela (8 - 9 Jul)
    --- Colombian Navy (COLNAV) participation: 1 DD, 1 DE, 1 SS.
    --- VENAV participation: 2 DD, 2 FF, 1 SS.
    --- Highlights: Consisted almost entirely of ASW exercises.

- UNITAS XXI (1980)
  -- Phase One - Venezuela (8 - 17 Jul)
    --- Venezuelan Navy participation: 4 DD, 1 SS, 2 FPB, 1 AUX, 2 ASW A/C, 8 attack A/C.
  - Note: Venezuela withdrew from post-UNITAS amphibious operations stating other commitments preclude participation.

RECOMMENDATION (U)
- Provided for information.
William H. Luers of Illinois was sworn in September 21, 1978 as United States Ambassador to Venezuela. He succeeds Viron P. Vaky, who has been appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Mr. Luers served from 1975 to 1977 as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. Since 1977, he has been Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

A career Foreign Service Officer, he entered the Service in 1957 as Consular Officer in Naples. He was International Relations Officer in the State Department from 1960 to 1962. In 1962 and 1963 he attended Russian language and area studies, and from 1963 to 1965 he was Political Officer in Moscow. He returned to the State Department from 1965 to 1969, serving first as Intelligence Research Specialist and then as International Relations Officer.

From 1969 to 1973 he was Political Officer and then Counselor for Political Affairs in Caracas. In 1973, he served as Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs at the State Department, and from 1973 to 1975 he was Deputy Executive Secretary of the Executive Secretariat. He received the Superior Honor Award in 1973.

Mr. Luers was born May 15, 1929 in Springfield, Illinois. He received a B.A. in 1951 from Hamilton College and an M.A. in 1957 from Columbia University. He served in the United States Navy as a Lieutenant from 1952 to 1956.

Mr. Luers is married to the former Jane Fuller. They have four children.