OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5711.96C

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: UNITED STATES/RUSSIAN FEDERATION INCIDENTS AT SEA AND DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES AGREEMENTS

Ref: (a) Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the Waters Outside the Limits of the Territorial Sea, As Amended by the 1973 Protocol to the Agreement and the 1998 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes (NOTAL)
(b) Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (with annexes and agreed statements) Signed at Moscow on 12 June 1989; NO. 27309 (NOTAL)
(d) DOD Flight Information Publications, Flight Information Handbook (NOTAL)
(e) OPNAVINST 3100.6H, Special Incident Reporting Procedures (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Instructions for Use with the Supplementary Signals/Table of Signals

1. Purpose

   a. To provide information and to issue procedures concerning the agreements between the Governments of the United States and the Russian Federation (also referred to as "Russia") on the prevention of Incidents at Sea (INCSEAs) and the prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMAs) (references (a) and (b), respectively).

   b. To issue the Table of Supplementary Signals authorized for use during communications between the United States and the Russian Federation units under reference (a).
c. This instruction has been substantially revised and, therefore, should be reviewed in its entirety.

2. Cancellation. OPNAVINST 5711.96B.

3. Background

a. **INCSEA Agreement**

   (1) Prior to reference (a), numerous INCSEAs involving harassment or interference occurred between units of the Soviet and United States Naval surface and air forces. In April 1968, after a series of incidents in the Sea of Japan, the United States invited the Soviet Union to discuss procedures to reduce the number of INCSEAs. The Soviets replied in November 1970 with an invitation to open discussions in Moscow. Following an exploratory round of talks in October 1971, the agreement was concluded in May 1972 in Washington, D.C. As a measure of the importance with which this agreement was viewed, it was signed formally on 25 May 1972 in Moscow by the Secretary of the Navy for the United States and the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In May 1973, during the first annual review, a protocol to the agreement was negotiated which extends certain provisions of the agreement to include non-military ships. Refer to reference (a) for the actual agreement text, as modified by the 1973 Protocol and an Exchange of Diplomatic Notes in 1998. The Russian Federation has succeeded the USSR for all rights and obligations of this agreement.

   (2) Reference (a) is operational in nature and is applicable to U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Military Sealift Command (MSC), U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Army units when operating on and over waters beyond the territorial sea.

(a) U.S. Naval Ships (USNS) are U.S. Naval auxiliaries and, therefore, are subject to reference (a) as specified in article I. USNS do not fly a Naval auxiliary flag as Russian auxiliaries do. Rather, such ships are identified by blue and gold stack markings unique to USNS.

(b) The remainder of the MSC fleet consists of commercial ships under charter for various lengths of time.
These ships bear the usual commercial markings of their owners. They do not bear any markings to indicate their charter to MSC. All commercial, non-military U.S. ships are protected from harassment by Russian naval and naval auxiliary ships and military aircraft under the provisions of the 1973 Protocol to reference (a). The protocol requires the United States and the Russian Federation to take measures to notify non-military ships concerning provisions of the agreement, and is directed at securing mutual safety. No specific action, however, such as use of special signals, is required of non-military ships.

(c) Submarines are covered by reference (a) only when operating on the surface.

(d) On the Russian side, naval and naval auxiliary ships (ships authorized to fly a Russian naval auxiliary flag) are bound by reference (a). This includes Russian electronic reconnaissance ships.

(3) Reference (a) is intended to:

(a) reduce the risk of serious, unintended confrontation between U.S. and Russian forces on and over waters outside the limits of the territorial sea; and

(b) promote safety of operations where U.S. and Russian naval and air forces operate in proximity to each other.

(4) Reference (a) is consistent with and, in fact, requires compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (Rules of the Road). Reference (a) recognizes that surveillance activities are not fully accounted for by the Rules of the Road and prescribes guidance in these situations. Reference (a) also provides guidance in aircraft-to-ship and aircraft-to-aircraft situations for which there are no internationally recognized rules of conduct.

b. DMA Agreement

(1) Reference (a) provided procedures and a forum for discussion which greatly reduced friction between the U.S. and Soviet/Russian Navies. During 1987 discussions to increase U.S.-USSR military-to-military contacts, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Crowe, advanced the idea of
establishing a high level forum similar to the INCSEA forum to meet regularly and discuss ways of avoiding dangerous military confrontations over land and territorial waters. This idea was turned over to a joint U.S./Soviet working group to analyze and propose actions to prevent DMAs. Between October 1988 and May 1989, the joint military working group met six times, identifying specific situations where U.S. and Soviet military forces might interact with a potential for harm to personnel or damage to equipment, and negotiated a draft agreement using reference (a) as a model. The U.S. CJCS and the Chief of the Soviet General Staff signed reference (b) in Moscow on 12 June 1989 to enter into force on 1 January 1990. The Russian Federation has succeeded the USSR for all rights and obligations of reference (b).

(2) Reference (b) is operational in nature and is applicable to the armed forces of the United States when operating in proximity to units of the Russian armed forces. Naval forces covered by reference (b) include military aircraft and the ships and auxiliaries discussed in paragraphs 3a(2)(a) through 3a(2)(d).

(3) Reference (b) is intended to:

   (a) reduce the risk of serious, unintended confrontation between U.S. and Russian forces by preventing the specific DMAs defined in reference (b);

   (b) resolve expeditiously and peacefully, any incident between U.S. and Russian forces arising as a result of DMAs; and

   (c) promote safety of operations where U.S. and Russian armed forces operate in proximity to each other during peacetime.

     c. Table of Supplementary Signals

     (1) The Table of Supplementary Signals, per enclosure (1), which contains a local U.S.-USSR code adopted in 1974, and the International Code of Signals (ICS), per reference (c), that was adopted by the International Maritime Organization in 1965, are authorized for communications between U.S. and Russian units as a result of references (a) and (b).
(2) Reference (b) authorizes the use of reference (c) and (d), as appropriate, and enclosure (1) for communications between U.S. and Russian units. This is in addition to the signals provided in annex 1, section III of reference (b).

4. Discussion

a. INCSEA Agreement

(1) Reference (a) extends to military ships, non-military ships, and aircraft. U.S. commands should comply strictly with reference (a) in both letter and spirit. Aircraft should maintain a safe distance from Russian ships and aircraft, and especially from ships conducting air operations so as not to present a hazard. Any Naval or air unit assigned a mission requiring maneuvers in close proximity with Russian naval or air units must do so with due regard for the provisions of reference (a).

(2) The actions listed below are prohibited by reference (a):

(a) simulating attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes or other weapons in the direction of Russian ships and aircraft;

(b) launching objects or firing signal flares in the direction of Russian ships and aircraft so as to pose a danger, constitute a hazard, or interfere with navigation and flight;

(c) using searchlights or other powerful illumination devices to illuminate the navigation bridges of Russian ships or the cockpits of Russian aircraft;

(d) using lasers in such a manner so as to cause injury to personnel or damage to equipment aboard Russian ships or aircraft; and

(e) intentionally interfering with communication systems of Russian ships or aircraft.

(3) Reference (a) applies to U.S. armed forces on and over waters beyond the territorial sea even when under the
b. DMA Agreement

(1) Reference (b) addresses four specific DMAs which could occur when U.S. and Russian armed forces are operating in proximity to one another:

(a) unintentional or distress (force majeur) entry into the national territory of the other party;

(b) use of lasers in a manner hazardous to the other party;

(c) hampering operations in a manner hazardous to the other party in a "Special Caution Area"; and

(d) interference with command and control networks in a manner hazardous to the other party.

(2) Reference (b) applies to U.S. armed forces even when under the control of multinational organizations such as NATO.

(3) Reference (b) applies to only U.S. and Russian armed forces. In case of an incident occurring on or over the territory of an ally, each side has reserved the right to consult with its ally concerning measures to be taken.

(4) Reference (b) does not affect the rights and obligations of either side under other international agreements or arrangements in force between the United States and the Russian Federation, such as reference (a). Reference (b) does not affect the right to individual or collective self-defense, the right of assistance entry, or the rights of navigation and overflight per international law.

5. Procedures

a. INCSEA

(1) When operating in the proximity of Russian ships or aircraft, commanding officers and aircraft commanders shall, to the maximum degree possible, use the appropriate signals from
references (c) and (d) and enclosure (1) to indicate maneuvering intentions to Russian commanding officers. At night, in conditions of reduced visibility, or under conditions of lighting and distance when signal flags are not distinct, flashing light, supplemented by radio communications, should be used to pass appropriate signals between U.S. and Russian units. Communication between military aircraft or between ships and military aircraft of the sides will utilize radio communication procedures set forth in reference (a). Communication between ships may also use the radio communication procedures of reference (a). In addition, procedures for aircraft interception, specific to the Russian Federation, outlined in reference (d) are to be used when necessary. In order to establish communications, use the call signs "U.S. WARSHIP," "RUSSIAN WARSHIP," "U.S. AIRCRAFT," and "RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT." Commanders of ships and military aircraft should use appropriate signals from enclosure (1) when they want to communicate information or describe an action which may constitute danger for ships and military aircraft of the sides. To ensure ship and aircraft safety, clear voice radio communications in English may also be used.

(2) Incidents evaluated as potentially violating the letter or spirit of reference (a) must be reported promptly by message per reference (e) or procedures specified by fleet commanders.

(3) Message reports may be used by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to discuss an INCSEA incident with the Russian Naval Attaché shortly after it occurs. Messages amplifying or evaluating the report of an INCSEA incident should not be delayed while collecting supplemental information and documentation for the detailed written report. The message reports should, however, provide sufficient detail (e.g., signals exchanged, position, course, speed, bearing, and range information on the units involved) to support timely discussions with the Russian Naval Attaché. These exchanges are not diplomatic protests and should not be characterized as such. If a diplomatic protest is appropriate, diplomatic channels are used. Detailed written reports, for both alleged Russian and U.S. violations of reference (a), serve as the basis for detailed discussions at the INCSEA review with the Russians.
b. DMAs

(1) Procedures for preventing and reporting DMA are the same as those outlined in paragraphs 5a(1) and 5a(2) above, with one exception: the communication procedures of reference (b) should be used.

(2) Reference (d) has instructions specific for aircraft in a section of the emergency procedures. It is titled "Procedures for the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities between the U.S. and Russia." This reference should be accessible for use by aircrews operating in the vicinity of Russian ships or aircraft.

(3) As per reference (b), "The parties shall exchange appropriate information on instances of DMA or incidents which may arise as a result of such activities. The CJCS shall convey such information through the Defense Attaché of the Russian Federation." Message reports may be used by CNO to discuss a DMA incident with the CJCS shortly after it occurs. Messages amplifying or evaluating the report of a DMA incident should not be delayed while collecting supplemental information and documentation for the detailed written report. The message reports should, however, provide sufficient detail (e.g., signals exchanged, position, course, speed, bearing, and range information on the units involved) to support timely discussions with the CNO and CJCS.

c. Reporting INCSEA and DMA Incidents

(1) In general, Operational Report (OPREP)-3 NAVY BLUE series messages from reference (e) are appropriate for reporting INCSEA and DMA incidents, except in cases of national level interest, when OPREP-3 PINNACLE series messages should be used. Amplifying message reports should follow as soon as information is available. Detailed written reports should be submitted within 15 working days via operational chain of command to CNO (Attn: Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5)) with advance copy to CNO. When notified of a Russian allegation of a U.S. violation, appropriate reports are required from the units involved.

(2) The following documentation has proven effective in presenting the U.S. view of an INCSEA incident, and should be
forwarded with the detailed written report. Similar information should be provided DMA incidents:

(a) A written chronology of events. Include signals used during the incident and whether or not both sides acknowledged signals. Provide appropriate position, course, speed, bearing, and range data. A voice cassette narrative recording is an effective tool for use in constructing an accurate chronology.

(b) Narrated video, motion pictures, and/or sequence of photographs. Video, which present an interaction clearly, is by far the most convincing evidence of a violation. A portion of the reporting ship/aircraft in foreground is desired to provide perspective. Pictures taken for intelligence purposes (i.e., close-ups) are of limited value, but are desired to supplement other visual documentation that presents the overall perspective. Indication of ship’s wake can be effective in showing history for hazardous maneuvering situations. In order for a report of a gun-training incident to be effective, video or a series of photographs which document weapons movement and relative motion of own unit is considered necessary to substantiate a violation. Visual documentation of flashing light sequences, flag hoists, hull numbers or names of ships is also desired. Annotate documents as necessary to permit correlation with geographic reconstruction and chronology (e.g., time taken and location of the camera for pictures).

(c) A geographic reconstruction. Ensure sufficient history is presented to answer probable questions. Multiple charts may be required for complex hazardous maneuvering incidents (ship-to-ship, air-to-ship, air-to-air).

(d) Clarifying comments. For example, disparities that exist with previously submitted reports should be resolved.

6. Classification Guidance. Details of an incident or event between U.S. or Russian units do not merit classification unless operational aspects surrounding the incident require classification for national security reasons.
7. **Action**

   a. **Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)**

      (1) Ensure that requirements which may result in close proximity between U.S. Naval forces and Russian naval and air units are as explicit as possible, so as to permit operations within the intent and purpose of references (a) and (b).

      (2) Analyze reports of INCSEA and DMA incidents and provide guidance, as necessary, in cases of possible violations of references (a) and (b) by U.S. units.

      (3) Forward reports of alleged U.S. violations to the appropriate fleet commander.

      (4) When appropriate, discuss alleged INCSEA with the Russian Navy using a Navy-to-Navy communication channel. In addition, discuss alleged DMA incidents with the CJCS who will communicate with the Defense Attaché of the Russian Federation.

   b. **Fleet Commanders**

      (1) Ensure units are familiar with the provisions of references (a) and (b) and the procedures for their implementation. Deployed units should have this instruction readily accessible.

      (2) Require strict compliance with references (a) and (b) in both letter and spirit.

      (3) Issue guidance concerning adherence to references (a) and (b) for operations involving close proximity to Russian units and Russian territory, e.g., surveillance missions.

      (4) Ensure units are properly prepared to report and document encounters with Russian units.

      (5) Ensure potential INCSEA and DMA incidents are reported by message per paragraph 5c(1), including:
(a) initial report by OPREP-3;

(b) amplifying reports, including initial evaluation by fleet commander;

(c) detailed written reports with supporting documentation within 15 days, including follow-up evaluation by fleet commander; and

(d) when notified of a Russian allegation of a U.S. violation, obtain reports from involved units and prepare a detailed evaluation for submission to the CNO.

(6) Retain documentation on encounters with Russian units until the results of an INCSEA review or a Joint Military Commission Review of DMA covering the time period of the incident are received.

(7) Submit recommendations for improvement of enclosure (1) and this instruction to the CNO (Attn: N3/N5).

8. Records Management. Records created as a result of this instruction, regardless of media and format, shall be managed in accordance with Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Manual 5210.1.

9. Reports. The reports required by this instruction are exempt from reports control per SECNAV Manual 5214.1.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE WITH THE SUPPLEMENTARY SIGNALS

1. General

   a. The signals in the attached table supplement those in the ICS, issued by reference (c).

   b. Although these supplementary signals are also entered in reference (c) as appendix 6, the signals in the attached table are considered to be a local code for use between U.S. and Russian units and are not part of the ICS.

   c. In situations where units of a third country are present, these supplementary signals may still be used unless the potential for confusing the third country outweighs the advantage of communicating with the Russian unit(s).

   d. Since NATO and other allies are aware of the arrangement between the U.S. and Russia for use of these supplementary signals, these signals may also be used when U.S. units are operating within a NATO formation, or in other allied formations.

   e. As a result of bilateral INCSSEA agreements with Russia, signals like those in the attached table may also be used by allied navies when their units encounter Russian units. There are, however, no assurances that each country's INCSSEA signals table is identical to the U.S.-Russia agreed signals.

2. Use

   a. The general instructions for use of the ICS apply to the use of the supplementary signals as amplified below.

   b. The "CODE" or answering pennant is not used with signals from the table of supplementary signals. Use of the code or answering pennant with the ICS signals is specified in reference (c), chapter 1, section 5, paragraphs 3, 4, and 8.

   c. The signal "YVI" - which means "the groups that follow are from the local code" - should precede the supplementary signals in order to avoid misunderstanding as to the source of the signal code (i.e., Table of Supplementary Signals vice ICS).

   d. The supplementary signals may be communicated by the same methods used when signaling with the ICS, i.e., flag hoist, flashing light, voice, Morse, or hand (semaphore) flags.
The following guidelines apply when using radio communications to pass supplementary signals under reference (a):

(1) Use radio communications as backup for flag hoist or flashing light when limited visibility exists, or when in extremis and danger of collision or other hazard is imminent (i.e., time is essential and use of all means of communication is prudent).

(2) For ship to ship communications, use bridge-to-bridge Very High Frequency (VHF radio) channel 16 (156.8 Megahertz (MHz)) or high frequency band frequency 2182.0 kilohertz. For communications with or between aircraft, use VHF band frequency 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz; after initial contact is made, the working frequency 130 MHz or 278.0 MHz may be used. In order to establish these communications, use the call signs "U.S.WARSHIP," "RUSSIAN WARSHIP," "U.S. AIRCRAFT," and "RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT" instead of the call signs contained in reference (d).

(3) Use radio communications procedures established for use with the ICS, including the use of international phonetic English letters and numbers.

(4) Use the signal "YANKEE VICTOR ONE" (The groups that follow are from the local code) preceding each supplementary signal.

(5) The following selected supplementary signals may be used during radio communications between military aircraft or ships and military aircraft: PP8, RT7, RT8, UY1, UY2, iJY3, UY4, UY9, UY10, UY12, ZL1, ZL2, and 2L3. These signals are noted in the Table of Signals by a pound sign (#). These signals are intended for transmission to aircraft over voice circuits since it is extremely difficult for aircraft to identify and understand flag signals.

(6) To ensure ship and aircraft safety, clear voice radio communications in English may also be used.

EXAMPLE:

Situation: U.S. Warship intends to conduct a gunnery exercise to the east. Russian aircraft is in the area.
Call up:
Russian Aircraft, Russian Aircraft, Russian Aircraft delta echo U.S. Warship.

Response:

After comms established:
Russian Aircraft delta echo U.S. Warship UNIFORM YANKEE THREE TACK TWO.

Russian aircraft acknowledges:
U.S. Warship delta echo Russian Aircraft ZULU LIMA ONE.

f. The following guidelines apply when using radio communications to pass supplementary signals under reference (b):

(1) Use bridge-to-bridge VHF radio channel 16 (156.8 MHz) or other communication equipment and frequencies specified in reference (d).

(2) Use the radio communications procedures established for use with the ICS, including the use of international phonetic English letters and numbers, supplemented by call signs and phrases in reference (d).

(3) Use the signal “YANKEE VICTOR ONE” (The groups that follow are from the local code) preceding each supplementary signal.

g. Certain supplementary signals require an amplification to indicate distance, course or time. Since the meaning of each supplementary signal is precise, and in order to avoid confusion, the amplifying section should not be preceded by the signal code designators “R” (distance); “C” (course); “T” (time).

EXAMPLES:
“RT9 - 6” means “I shall cross astern at a distance of 600 meters.”

“UYl - 120” means “I am preparing to launch/recover aircraft on true course 120.”

“RU2 - 5” means “I am beginning a port turn in approximately 5 minutes.”
h. Certain supplementary signals may be amplified to show a direction of danger indicated with respect to the signaler. The direction is indicated using directional compliments listed in the ICS (reference (c), chapter 2, section 10, table 3).

EXAMPLES:

"UY3 - 2" means "I am preparing to conduct gunnery exercises. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated ... East."

"NB1 - 8" means "I have my unattached hydrographic survey equipment bearing in a direction from me as indicated ... North."

i. In order to reduce the opportunity for confusion, receipt of supplementary signals should be acknowledged by using "ZL1" from the supplementary table or, if not understood, by "ZL3" from the supplementary table, rather than "ZL" or "ZQ" from the ICS.
## TABLE OF SIGNALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNAL</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IR1</td>
<td>I am engaged in oceanographic operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR2(...)</td>
<td>I am streaming/towing hydrographic survey equipment _______ meters astern.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR3</td>
<td>I am recovering hydrographic survey equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR4</td>
<td>I am conducting salvage operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JH1</td>
<td>I am attempting to retract a grounded vessel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MH1</td>
<td>Request you not cross my course ahead of me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB1(...)</td>
<td>I have my unattached hydrographic survey equipment bearing in a direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ1</td>
<td>I am unable to alter course to my starboard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ2</td>
<td>I am unable to alter course to port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ3</td>
<td>Caution, I have a steering casualty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP8(...)#</td>
<td>Dangerous operations in progress. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS2</td>
<td>I am engaged in hot pursuit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QF1</td>
<td>Caution, I have stopped my engines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QG5</td>
<td>You are located in an area declared a danger zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QS6(...)</td>
<td>I am proceeding on course _____.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QV2</td>
<td>I am in a fixed multiple leg moor using two or more anchors or buoys fore and aft. Request you remain clear.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SIGNAL**  | **MEANING**  
---|---
QV3 | I am anchored in deep water with hydrographic survey equipment streamed.  
RT2 | I intend to pass you on your port side.  
RT3 | I intend to pass you on your starboard side.  
RT4 | I will overtake you on your port side.  
RT5 | I will overtake you on your starboard side.  
RT6(...) | I am [formation is] maneuvering. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).  
RT7(...)# | I shall approach your ship on starboard side to a distance of _____ 100’s of meters (yards).  
RT8(...)# | I shall approach your ship on port side to a distance of _____ 100’s of meters (yards).  
RT9(...) | I shall cross astern at a distance of _____ 100’s of meters (yards).  
RU2(...) | I am beginning a port turn in approximately _____ minutes.  
RU3(...) | I am beginning a starboard turn in approximately _____ minutes.  
RU4 | The formation is preparing to alter course to port.  
RU5 | The formation is preparing to alter course to starboard.  
RU6 | I am engaged in maneuvering exercises. It is dangerous to be inside the formation.  
RU7 | I am preparing to submerge.  
RU8 | A submarine will surface within two miles of me within 30 minutes. Request you remain clear.  
SL2 | Request your course, speed and passing intention.
TX1  I am engaged in fisheries patrol.

TX 2  I am engaged in monitoring sea pollution.

UY1(…)# I am preparing to launch/recover aircraft on course.

UY2(…)# I am preparing to conduct missile exercises. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated (Table 3 of ICS).

UY3(…)# I am preparing to conduct gunnery exercises. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated (Table 3 of ICS).

UY4 # I am preparing to conduct/am conducting operations employing explosive charges.

UY5(…) I am maneuvering in preparation for torpedo launching exercises. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated (Table 3 of ICS).

UY6(…) I am preparing to conduct/am conducting underway replenishment on course (Table 3 of ICS).

UY7(…) I am preparing to conduct extensive small boat and ship to shore amphibious training operations. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated (Table 3 of ICS).

UY8(…) I am maneuvering to launch/recover amphibious landing craft/boats. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction from me as indicated (Table 3 of ICS).

UY9 # I am preparing to conduct/am conducting helicopter operations over my stern.

UY10 *# I am testing my gun systems.

UY11 * I am testing my missile systems.
**SIGNAL** | **MEANING**
---|---
UY12(...)# | I am preparing to conduct/am conducting gunnery (bombing) exercises from aircraft on a towed target. Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the direction of me as indicated _____ (Table 3 of ICS).

YY1 | I would like to establish communications with you on the 16th USW channel.

ZF1 | I intend to conduct training with you exchanging Special Signals per the Agreement.

ZF2 | Exercises exchanging Special Signals complete.

ZL1 # | I have received and understood your signal.

ZL2 # | Do you understand? Request acknowledgment.

ZL3 # | Your signal has been received but not understood.

* Compliance with article III, paragraph 6 of reference (a) (i.e., do not train armament at Russian ships and aircraft) is required while conducting gun or missile system checks.

# These selected supplementary signals may be used during radio communications between military aircraft or ships and military aircraft. These signals are intended for transmission over voice circuits since it is extremely difficult for aircraft to identify and understand flag signals.