



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

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Subj: AREA VISIT TO NAVY REGION HAWAII

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5040.3A
(b) SECNAVINST 5430.57G

1. The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducts Readiness and Quality of Life (QOL) Area Visits to naval installations worldwide as directed by references (a) and (b). Area visit reports provide senior Navy leadership with objective assessments of readiness, Fleet support, and QOL issues that cut across command levels and component lines to identify Navywide concerns. They also identify specific issues that can only be addressed enterprise-wide by senior Navy leadership.

2. NAVINSGEN conducted an Area Visit of Navy Region Hawaii (NRH) from 13 to 21 March 2014, focused on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPHH), its annexes on Oahu, and the Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands (PMRF), Kauai. Our last visit to Hawaii was in 2007. This report documents our findings.

3. This report contains an executive summary, our observations and findings, and documented deficiencies noted during the visit. Issue papers are included that highlight significant concerns that either point to a potentially broader Navy issue or, in our opinion, require coordination among multiple commands to fully address. Finally, a summary of survey and focus group data, as well as a complete listing of survey frequency data, is included.

4. During our visit we assessed overall mission readiness, facilities, safety, security, QOL, and foundational programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of home life and work life for Navy military and civilian personnel.

5. Our overall assessment is that NRH and JBPHH are working hard to execute their missions. NRH and JBPHH are faced with a number of infrastructure challenges as they facilitate

Subj: AREA VISIT TO NAVY REGION HAWAII

Department of Defense wide requests to accommodate additional units and personnel in Hawaii. Overall, NRH is supporting tenant commands and ensuring that QOL issues for Sailors, their families, and civilian employees are adequately addressed.

6. In the course of our inspection, we identified discrepancies in manpower analysis, Personnel Support Detachment Pearl Harbor operations, security, safety and occupational health, sexual assault prevention and response, and suicide prevention. Further details can be found in the Executive Summary and in the body of the report.

7. Corrective actions.

a. We identified 25 deficiencies during our visit that require corrective action. Commands that have deficiencies include:

- Commander, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPHH): 1, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16

- Commander, Navy Region Hawaii (CNRH): 2, 9, 11, 13

- Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit SIX (NEPMU-6): 3

- Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Hawaii (NAVFAC Hawaii): 5

- Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC): 8

- Commander, Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF): 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25

- Commander, Naval Health Clinic Hawaii (NHCH): 23

Correction of each discrepancy, and a description of action(s) taken, is to be reported via letter by the commands identified above, no later than 1 October 2014. Discrepancies not corrected by 1 October 2014 or requiring longer-term solutions will be updated quarterly until completed.


b. This report includes four issue papers that require actions by Commander, Navy Personnel Command, OPNAV N3/N5, N4,

Subj: AREA VISIT TO NAVY REGION HAWAII

CNIC, and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Summary of Actions (page 16 of this report) provides detailed guidance on how to report completion of recommendations identified in issue papers.

8. My point of contact is b7c

b7c



J. F. CALDWELL, JR.

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**NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL AREA VISIT OF
COMMANDER, NAVY REGION HAWAII
13 TO 21 MARCH 2014**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted a Readiness and Quality of Life (QOL) Area Visit to Navy Region Hawaii (NRH) from 13 to 21 March 2014. We visited Commander, Navy Region Hawaii (CNRH); Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPHH); Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station (NCTAMS) Annex and Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Hawaii at Wahiawa; Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNSY); Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay; Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Barking Sands; various shore commands; and several ships, submarines, and aircraft squadrons (Echelons 3 through 5).

Our overall assessment is that CNRH is working hard to accomplish their mission. NRH and JBPHH are faced with a number of infrastructure challenges as they facilitate Department of Defense (DoD) wide requests to accommodate additional units and personnel in Hawaii. Overall, NRH is supporting tenant commands and ensuring that QOL issues for Sailors, their families, and civilian employees are adequately addressed.

During our visit we assessed overall mission readiness, facilities, safety, security, QOL, and foundational programs under the purview of senior enlisted leadership. Additionally, we conducted surveys and focus group discussions to assess the quality of home life and quality of work life for Navy military and civilian personnel.

KEY FINDINGS

Electrical Rate Changes

Electrical rate changes at Public Private Venture housing are not understood by many Sailors and their families. There is a perceived lack of transparency in the process of calculating individual electric bills. Personnel reported via surveys and focus group discussions that they did not understand how their bills were calculated. A number of personnel reported that reduced electrical usage actually resulted in increased electric bills. While we were not able to confirm the accuracy of these statements, energy costs were a recurring comment in nearly all of our focus groups. CNRH and JPPHH have been proactive in communicating on this subject; however, it's clear that this will remain a hot topic for Oahu based families. We recommend the Region and base teams continue their communication and education on bill calculation methodologies and plans for electrical rate changes to ensure Sailors and their families understand the process, feel that the Navy is being transparent, and understand what to expect.

Joint Requirements

The impact of Joint requirements was surprising and places significant demand and challenges on the Joint Base and Region. Some of the issues we heard about include Pearl Harbor support to offload demobilizing Oahu based Army units, U.S. Air Force (USAF) rebalance to the Pacific initiatives, Special Operations Force (SOF) laydown on Ford Island, and U.S. Cyber Command

(USCYBERCOM) increased footprint on already stressed facilities at Wahiawa and Kunia. The Navy needs to fully understand these Joint demands in order to plan for required base support. In our view, the Navy process leaves much of this to the Region to determine, and does not provide a comprehensive process to scope the full demands on shore infrastructure. More details are provided within the body of the report.

Personnel Support Detachment (PSD) Hawaii

PSD Pearl Harbor support to Sailors is inadequate. This is a repeat finding from our last visit to Hawaii in 2007. Twenty-two percent of all PSD transactions are not completed within prescribed timeframes, resulting in delays in pay and benefits to Sailors. The root causes of this problem include: (1) manning shortfalls at PSD Pearl Harbor (currently manned at 78 percent), (2) poor communication by both PSD and area command administration personnel to coordinate administrative friction points, (3) delays in processing paperwork due to technical problems with Transaction Online Processing System (TOPS), and (4) the relative inexperience of entry level (GS-5) personnel at the PSD. We recommend that Navy Personnel Command conduct an assessment of PSD Pearl Harbor operations to identify additional challenges and correct accordingly.

JBPHH Manpower

A Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD) was last conducted for the base in 1997, before the Joint Base was established and all Navy installations on Oahu became part of JBPHH. JBPHH staff is faced with a number of significant Joint requirements and expanded installation responsibilities that have developed since the last SMRD. The staff is experienced and hardworking, but may be under-staffed in some critical areas (e.g., security and emergency management). We recommend that an SMRD be conducted to validate Joint Base manpower requirements.

Security Force Manpower Requirements

Security Force manpower requirements at JBPHH have not been properly validated and documented since becoming a Joint Navy/Air Force Base in 2010: there is no approved Mission Profile Validation-Protection (MPV-P) for the base that includes both Pearl Harbor-side and Hickam-side security requirements. JBPHH has merged the legacy Hickam Air Force Base Security Force requirements with the legacy Naval Station Pearl Harbor MPV-P to develop a “locally generated” manpower document, but this is all “unofficial” and not validated. An MPV-P verification is required by Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) to capture all Joint Base Security Force requirements.

Security Force manning at JBPHH is 88 percent of the “locally generated” manpower document requirement addressed above. We typically see Security Force manning levels below 80 percent during area visits, but the JBPHH percentage is higher overall because the Air Force fills 100 percent of its Security Force manning requirements at JBPHH. Without an approved MPV-P, JBPHH security manning is dependent on the USAF decision to fill 100 percent of its requirements creating a potential vulnerability if the USAF decided to reduce their contributions to the Force.

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Emergency Management (EM)

JBPHH has a number of EM requirements, driven by both Navy and Joint requirements, which appear to be beyond the capacity of the small EM staff to effectively plan and manage. With over 170 tenant commands, four historic landmarks, an imbedded Naval Shipyard, approximately 17 drills required to meet both Navy and USAF annual and short notice exercise or inspection requirements, and the large number of actual events requiring emergency planning (66 in FY12 including Presidential and other senior official visits, Pearl Harbor Day, and other base events), EM manpower requirements must be closely reviewed and validated during the SMRD recommended above.

Deficiencies with Enhanced 911 capability and computer notification for non-NMCI users as part of the Mass Warning Notification System (MWNS) on JBPHH require assistance from CNIC to resolve. Although the telephones on the base are 911 compliant they are not Enhanced 911 compliant (displaying caller location at the Dispatch Center) as required by DoDI 6055.17, DoD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program. The MWNS lacks the ability to notify non-NMCI users (such as USAF personnel) of an emergency on the base via their computer.

Operations Security (OPSEC)

Neither CNRH nor JBPHH have an OPSEC program as required by OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Operations Security.

Personally Protected Information (PPI)

In the course of the area visit we discovered that Department of Navy Chief Information Officer (DON CIO) was unaware of NAVADMIN 264/13 (FY14 General Military Training (GMT) Schedule) which no longer requires PPI training during GMT. This information was passed to DON CIO staff and they are currently coordinating with Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (OPNAV N1)) to review the requirements.

PMRF Medical Support

The support agreement between Commanding Officer (CO), PMRF and CO, Naval Health Clinic Hawaii (NHCH) requires updating and revision to reflect current roles and responsibilities for delivery of health care services at PMRF. Greater oversight by NHCH is necessary as PMRF has a single Independent Duty Corpsman managing the clinic at this remote location.

Processing of Joint Infrastructure Requests at JBPHH

Since 2013, CO, JBPHH has received 81 separate requests (totaling 7,186 personnel) from Army, Navy, USAF, Coast Guard, DoD Agency, and SOF units to either accommodate new missions on the base or to expand or relocate current tenant footprint. Some of these requests include support of Oahu based Army units demobilizing from deployments, USAF rebalance to the Pacific initiatives, SOF laydown and Pacific Aviation Museum expansion on Ford Island, and increased USCYBERCOM footprint on already stressed infrastructure at Wahiawa and Kunia. In contrast to the Air Force Strategic Basing Structure that governs all space requests involving more than 35 personnel on Air Force installations and the Navy Strategic Laydown and Dispersal (SLD) plan that governs “blue Navy” moves of ships and aviation squadrons, the Navy

has no written instruction to govern all other basing actions on Navy real property. A written instruction or formalized process at OPNAV or CNIC could facilitate coordination with other Services and Agencies for resource requirements and ensure that basing requests are appropriately prioritized, adjudicated, and resourced.

Oahu Sewage Capacity

Sewage capacity on Oahu is a limiting factor for bringing additional commands and personnel to the island. CNRH has developed five military construction projects (totaling \$181M; none are funded) to address these deficiencies and expand capacity in separate areas on the base. Of these five, NRH's top two projects total \$107M. Additional funds may be required to expand capacity at JBPHH Wahiawa Annex to support expansion of Navy, USAF, and Joint communications missions. Without some degree of sewage capacity expansion investment, few if any additional commands or personnel will be able to relocate to Oahu.

Red Hill Tank Number 5

We confirmed that CNRH has a solid team of subject matter experts (Legal, Public Affairs, Engineers, Environmental Health, etc.) and stakeholders in place to coordinate local Navy response and follow on actions related to the fuel leak from this recently refurbished fuel tank. Continued proactive action is required to manage risks related to potential contamination of drinking water sources in nearby aquifers. CNRH has a recurring battle rhythm that is effectively tracking and executing recovery actions for the leaking tank and executing mitigation strategies.

Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Oversight

CNRH is not providing SOH oversight of subordinate commands. Safety and Occupational Health Management Evaluations (SOHME) of subordinate commands are not being conducted, per OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual and DoDI 6055.1, DoD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program.

Safety Instruction

JBPHH does not have a Safety Instruction in accordance with OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1 and CNICINST 5100.3A, Base Operating Support Safety Services.

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
Areas/Programs Assessed.....	1
Observations and Findings.....	2
MISSION PERFORMANCE	2
Overall Assessment.....	2
Personnel Support Detachment (PSD) Pearl Harbor	3
Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam (JBPHH) Manpower	4
FACILITIES, SAFETY, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE	4
Facilities	4
Facilities Condition.....	4
Oahu Sewage Capacity.....	4
Basing of Navy, Joint, DoD, and other Department Agency assets outside of the Strategic Laydown and Dispersal (SLD) process	5
Safety and Occupational Health	6
CNRH Safety and Occupational Health Oversight Evaluations (SOHMEs)	6
Incomplete Industrial Hygiene (IH) Surveys of Afloat Units	6
Base Operating Support (BOS) Safety Needs Assessments	7
Inadequate Lighting of Pedestrian Crosswalks	7
JBPHH Safety Instruction.....	8
Energy Conservation	8
Environmental Programs	8
Red Hill Tank Number 5	8
Housing	8
SECURITY PROGRAMS AND INFORMATION ASSURANCE	9
Information and Personnel Security Programs.....	9
Operations Security (OPSEC).....	10
Security Force Manning at JBPHH.....	10
Security Training	11
Personally Protected Information (PPI)	11
Emergency Management (EM)	12
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, QOL, AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT	12
SAPR JBPHH.....	13

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SAPR PMRF.....	13
PMRF Medical Services	14
PMRF Suicide Prevention Program	15
BRILLIANT ON THE BASICS	15
Appendix A: Summary of Actions	16
Appendix B: Issue Papers	18
Issue Paper B-1: PERSONNEL SUPPORT DIVISION (PSD) PEARL HARBOR.....	19
Issue Paper B-2: BASING OF COMMANDS AND ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF THE NAVY STRATEGIC LAYDOWN AND DISPERSAL (SLD) PROCESS	21
Issue Paper B-3: JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR HICKAM (JBPHH) MISSION PROVIDE VALIDATION - PROTECTION (MPV-P) DETERMINATION	24
Issue Paper B-4: HAWAII-BASED COMMANDS ARE NOT CONSISTENTLY SENDING THEIR SECURITY MANAGERS TO THE NAVAL SECURITY MANAGER COURSE	26
APPENDIX C: Summary of Key Survey Results	27
Pre-Event Survey.....	27
Quality of Life	27
Command Climate.....	29
Appendix D: Summary of Focus Group Perceptions.....	30
Focus Groups.....	30
Overall Quality of Life	30
Housing	30
Barracks.....	31
Public Private Venture (PPV).....	31
Facilities.....	32
Cost of Living.....	32
Manning/Manpower.....	32
Policies	32
Workload.....	33
Personnel Support Detachment (PSD).....	33
Medical.....	33
Leadership.....	33
Appendix E: Survey Frequency Report	34

Areas/Programs Assessed

- **Mission Performance**
 - Total Force Management
 - PSD Support
 - OCHR Support
 - Command Communications
 - Command Relationships
 - Reserve Forces
- **Facilities, Environmental, and Safety**
 - Facilities
 - Safety and Occupational Health
 - Energy Conservation
 - Environmental Management
 - Military Unaccompanied Housing
 - Family Housing
- **Security Programs and Information Assurance**
 - Information and Personnel Security
 - Operational Security
 - Physical Security
 - Personally Protected Information
 - Emergency Response
- **Resource Management/Compliance Programs**
 - Morale, Welfare and Recreation
 - Navy College/Education Programs
 - Military and Family Support Center
 - Religious Support
 - Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
 - Suicide Prevention
 - Equal Opportunity Advisor
 - Command Managed Equal Opportunity
 - Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention
 - Hazing Policy Training and Compliance
 - Legal and Ethics
 - Voting Assistance
 - Commissary
 - Navy Exchange
 - Child Development Center/Child Development Homes
 - Galley
 - Medical and Dental Support
- **Sailor Programs**
 - Career Development
 - Command Sponsorship
 - Command Indoctrination

Observations and Findings

MISSION PERFORMANCE

Commander, Navy Region Hawaii (CNRH) oversees an area that extends over 23,000 acres of land and water on Oahu and Kauai and serves as the host for the headquarters of seven major Navy commands, including Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPHH) is the primary installation on Oahu; Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands (PMRF) is located on Kauai.

Key tenant commands at JBPHH include:

- Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet
- Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility
- Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Hawaii
- Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station (NCTAMS) Pacific
- Navy Health Clinic Hawaii (NHCH)
- Commander, Submarine Force Pacific
- Commander, Naval Surface Group, Middle Pacific
- Commander, Pacific Air Forces (U.S. Air Force)
- 154th Wing, Hawaii Air National Guard (ANG)
- 15th Wing (U.S. Air Force)
- 692nd Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Group (U.S. Air Force)
- 647th Air Base Group (U.S. Air Force)
- Naval Special Warfare Group THREE
- National Security Agency
- National Oceanographic & Atmospheric Administration

Key tenant commands at PMRF include:

- Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Det Pacific
- Department of Energy, Sandia National Lab, Kauai Test Facility
- Croman (Target Recovery Helicopter support)
- 293rd Combat Communication Squadron, Hawaii ANG
- Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Lockheed Martin/Raytheon)
- M7 Aerospace (C-26 Maintenance)
- Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications, Missile Defense Agency

Overall Assessment

CNRH is executing its mission, and we found a hardworking team that clearly understands their responsibilities and challenges. CNRH and JBPHH are faced with a number of infrastructure challenges as they facilitate Department of Defense (DoD) wide requests to accommodate

additional units and personnel in Hawaii. Overall, CNRH is supporting tenant commands and ensuring that quality of life (QOL) issues for Sailors, their families, and civilian employees are adequately addressed.

Personnel Support Detachment (PSD) Pearl Harbor

PSD Pearl Harbor's support to Sailors is inadequate. This is a repeat finding from our last visit to Hawaii in 2007 (Naval Inspector General Area Visit to Navy Region Hawaii, Ser N3D/1466, 13 November 2007). Twenty-two percent of all PSD transactions are not completed within prescribed timeframes of four days for gains/receipts, 30 days for travel claims and 30 days for pay transactions, as required by MILPERSMAN 1000-025, Personnel Transaction Timeliness, and DoD 7000.14-R, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 9: "Travel Policy," resulting in delays in pay and benefits to Sailors. Issues include:

- Communication/Engagement by PSD, Area Command Leadership, and Administrative Personnel. Transaction processing delays primarily occur when personnel fail to correctly or completely submit required documentation to PSD. The feedback loop to commands and Sailors when their documentation is incorrect or incomplete is inadequate. Sailors reported that they are not informed when their documentation is incomplete and their "transaction" cannot be processed. NAVINSGEN notes that PSD Pearl Harbor does meet transaction timeliness guidelines once all required documentation for a transaction is turned in; however, a greater effort is required by PSD and serviced commands to ensure that Sailors are promptly notified when they have not turned in all required documentation, or when the documentation that has been turned in is incorrect.
- Processing Delays with Transaction Online Processing System (TOPS). The TOPS system was not operational at PSD Pearl Harbor from the mid-October to mid-December 2013. This resulted in a backlog in pay submissions including personnel gain entries. The effects of the Government furlough and the temporary shutdown of BUPERS Online, Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System, and Total Workforce Management System for security upgrades from August to December 2013 created a backlog of transactions for the PSD as well. PSD Pearl Harbor has eliminated the backlog.
- PSD Pearl Harbor Manning. Current manning is at 78 percent. PSD Pearl Harbor has experienced a 60 percent turnover in contracted employees over the past year. While the PSD Officer in Charge reports that the contractor has been able to fill all vacancies promptly and with competent employees, this level of turnover and the resulting relative inexperience of staff are likely contributing factors in delays in processing transactions.

Issue Paper 1 addresses PSD Pearl Harbor concerns and recommends that Navy Personnel Command conduct an assessment of PSD Pearl Harbor operations.

Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam (JBPHH) Manpower

JBPHH's Shore Manpower Requirements Determination (SMRD) is out of date and requires an update per OPNAVINST 1000.16K CH-1, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Policies and Procedures and COMPACFLT/COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5310.3D, Shore Manpower Requirements Determination Program, as significant changes impacting manpower requirements occurred when the base became a Joint Navy-Air Force base in 2010. The most recent SMRD was conducted in 1997. JBPHH now supports the activities of over 176 tenant commands including, among other things, a Combatant Commander, a Fleet staff, an Air Force Major Command (MAJCOM), a Type Commander, an airfield, port operations, and various other Joint and interagency commands.

Deficiency #1. An SMRD review for JBPHH has not been conducted since JBPHH was established, as required by OPNAVINST 1000.16K CH-1, Article 402, paragraph 3d and COMPACFLT/ COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5310.3D, paragraph 4b(3).

FACILITIES, SAFETY, ENERGY CONSERVATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

Facilities

Facilities and infrastructure in Navy Region Hawaii (NRH) are adequate to support assigned missions. However, many of these facilities are aging and are a challenge to maintain due to reduced sustainment (ST) and restoration & modernization (RM) funding levels. During the NAVINSGEN pre-inspection QOL survey, subsequent focus groups, and discussions with base leadership, personnel expressed concerns regarding the declining material condition of their facilities.

Facilities Condition

CNRH facilities have an overall condition rating of "fair" (76 on a 100 point scale) in the Facilities Readiness Evaluation System, second lowest of the Navy's twelve Regions (nine named Regions plus Naval District Washington, Singapore Area Coordinator, and Commander Naval Forces Korea). CNRH appropriately prioritizes limited funding for those facilities with the greatest mission impact. With the Region's combined ST and RM funds declining from 97 percent of the Facilities Sustainment Model in FY12 to 66 percent in FY13 and 53 percent in FY14, the deterioration of Hawaii's facilities is expected to continue.

Oahu Sewage Capacity

Sewage capacity on Oahu is a limiting factor for bringing additional commands and personnel to the island. CNRH has developed 5 military construction (MILCON) projects (totaling \$181M; none are funded) to address these deficiencies and expand capacity in separate areas on the base. Of these five, CNRH's top two projects total \$107M. Additional funds may be required to expand capacity at JBPHH Wahiawa Annex to support expansion of Navy, USAF, and Joint communications missions. Without some degree of sewage capacity expansion investment, few if any additional commands or personnel will be able to relocate to Oahu. CNRH is aware of this issue and is working through the MILCON approval process to get these projects funded.

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Basing of Navy, Joint, DoD, and other Department Agency assets outside of the Strategic Laydown and Dispersal (SLD) process

Since 2013, JBPHH has received 81 written basing requests accounting for 7,186 personnel in new, expanded, or relocated tenant loading on Oahu. These requests come directly to Commanding Officer (CO), JBPHH from the units and Agencies requesting the support and are not reviewed, prioritized, or approved by Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) or Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) as there is no formal Navy process in place, either at OPNAV or CNIC, to handle these requests. Without OPNAV or CNIC oversight and guidance on prioritizing these requests, identifying necessary infrastructure and support requirements, and identifying resources necessary to put these requirements in place, CO, JBPHH is left to make a number of decisions impacting Navy, Joint, and interagency basing that may be more appropriately made at the echelon 1 or 2 level.

Unlike ship, submarine, aircraft squadron, and other operational force basing actions that are governed by the Navy's SLD process in accordance with OPNAVINST 3111.17, Strategic Laydown and Dispersal Plan for the Operating Forces of the U.S. Navy, there is no formalized Navy process to govern basing requests on Navy real property from non-Navy activities or from Navy activities that fall outside the SLD process (do not meet the SLD definition of operating forces).

Without a formal process and OPNAV and/or CNIC oversight, the Installation Commander, by default, serves as the primary gatekeeper to manage Navy, Joint, DoD, and other Department Agency and private entity requests to establish a footprint on Navy real property.

As a point of comparison, the USAF governs all basing actions through Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-503, Strategic Basing. AFI 10-503 defines a "basing action" as any mission change on USAF property resulting in an increase of 35 or more positions. The AFI definition also includes any "non-AF entity requesting to move onto Air Force real property or change their current mission being executed at that location." All requests for basing actions are governed through a top-down Air Force Strategic Basing Structure (AFSBS) and managed by a Basing Request Review Panel and Strategic Basing Executive Steering Group at USAF headquarters, with AF/A8PB (HQ USAF Strategic Basing Division) as the entry point for all basing action requests. The stated intent of AFI 10-503 is to, "ensure the Air Force basing process is standardized, repeatable, transparent, and defensible."

Per NAVINSGEN staff discussions with personnel at OPNAV N46 (Ashore Readiness) and CNIC N5 (Strategy), some past requests by non-Navy entities to establish a footprint on Navy real property have been handled by requiring the requesting Service or Agency Chief to make their request by letter to the Chief of Naval Operations for routing to the OPNAV staff for feasibility and then to CNIC for further analysis, review and coordination. However, this process is not formalized by instruction and was not known to JBPHH staff.

CO, JBPHH has proactively developed a local instruction to help assess, prioritize, and coordinate basing requests. While this instruction provides some level of necessary coordination, the Installation Commander cannot properly prioritize and plan for these basing

requests without oversight and guidance from OPNAV and/or CNIC. Issue Paper 2 addresses this issue in detail.

Safety and Occupational Health

CNRH Safety and Occupational Health Oversight Evaluations (SOHMEs)

CNRH has not conducted SOHMEs of subordinate commands as required by DODI 6055.1, DoD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program and OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program Manual, Section 0904. SOHMEs are required at a minimum of every three years. CNIC policy delegates its responsibility to conduct headquarters SOHMEs to its Echelon 3 Regional Commanders. NRH has yet to conduct any SOHMEs at JBPHH and PMRF.

Deficiency #2. NRH has not conducted SOHME evaluations of subordinate commands.

References: DODI 6055.1, paragraph E3.11.2 and OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 0904.

Incomplete Industrial Hygiene (IH) Surveys of Afloat Units

The personal exposure monitoring components of IH surveys are not being completed for afloat units home-ported in JBPHH. OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1 requires biannual IH surveys for afloat activities. OPNAVINST 5100.19E, Navy Safety and Occupational (SOH) Program Manual for Forces Afloat, tasks Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) with providing command IH surveys and requires IH surveys to include a list of exposures that require monitoring and the monitoring plan. Additionally, OPNAVINST 5100.19E requires quantitative exposure monitoring as the primary means of assessing exposures. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit SIX (NEPMU-6) is the BUMED entity responsible for providing IH services to afloat commands located at JBPHH. NEPMU-6 has no record that any noise dosimetry and personal breathing zone time weighted average exposure monitoring were completed on afloat units. We observed three primary causes for the lack of performance:

- Afloat units do not contact NEPMU-6 when work requiring monitoring is scheduled to occur.
- Inadequate capacity. Three Industrial Hygiene Officers (IHOs) support all JBPHH afloat units and various shore units throughout the Pacific area of responsibility. As a result, demand from afloat units for this monitoring likely exceeds the capacity of NEPMU-6 IHOs.
- Lack of Enlisted Preventive Medicine Technician (PMT) training to support afloat demand. The Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center offers the Industrial Hygiene Techniques and Exposure Monitor course which is required for any non-IH/IHO performing exposure monitoring per OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1. However, this course is only offered four times per year and travel funding prohibits routine attendance by NEPMU-6 enlisted PMTs.

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Deficiency #3. NEPMU-6 is not completing IH survey report Exposure Monitoring Plans for afloat units. References: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Appendix 8B and Section 0802(f)(3); OPNAVINST 5100.19E, A0304(c), A0304(c)(4), and A0304(d)(2).

Base Operating Support (BOS) Safety Needs Assessments

BOS Safety service levels are not being negotiated between JBPHH and tenant commands. JBPHH is not aware of the totality of its BOS safety support requirements for tenant commands as 52 percent (134 of 259) of JBPHH tenant commands do not have a BOS Safety Needs Assessment in place. Action by both the tenant commands (receivers) and JBPHH (supplier) is necessary in order for JBPHH to verify and validate BOS safety support requirements. Per CNICINST 5100.3A, Base Operating Support Services, receiving activities are required to submit a BOS Safety Needs Assessment as part of their self-assessment. The supplying activity is required to identify and formally notify all receiving activities not requesting BOS Safety Services of the level and availability of those services. BOS Safety Needs Assessments are labor intensive evolutions that may take 1-5 days to complete and involve significant consultation between a tenant command and the JBPHH Safety staff. The consolidation of the Pearl Harbor and Hickam bases into the Joint Base created a marked increase in demand without a corresponding increase in JBPHH Safety staffing (currently 8 personnel).

Deficiency #4. Fifty-two percent of JBPHH tenant commands do not have a BOS Safety Needs Assessment on record with JBPHH. Reference: CNICINST 5100.3A, paragraph 3b(7)(a) and 3b(7)(b).

Inadequate Lighting of Pedestrian Crosswalks

Pedestrian lighting throughout the Pearl Harbor section of JBPHH is inadequate. A Pearl Harbor Pedestrian Safety Study released in May, 2012 found that only 2 of the 161 (1.2 percent) crosswalks studied had adequate lighting.

Six documented near misses of pedestrians occurred on the Pearl Harbor section of JBPHH in FY13 and there are several open Employee Reports of Unsafe/Unhealthful Conditions related to this issue. NAVINSGEN inspectors observed this safety risk firsthand while driving on the base at night. This issue was raised at two recent Traffic Safety Council meetings and is perceived as a QOL issue. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Hawaii plans to correct deficiencies on a piecemeal basis as part of larger MILCON efforts. However, the potential for a mishap remains and may merit a more aggressive effort. There are a range of options available to correct this safety hazard, including improved area lighting and/or installation of flashing lights at crosswalks.

Deficiency #5. Pedestrian lighting throughout the Pearl Harbor section of JBPHH is inadequate. References: UFC 3-530-01, FHWA-HRT-08-053, Pearl Harbor Pedestrian Safety Study (May 2012).

JBPHH Safety Instruction

JBPHH does not have a signed Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Instruction to implement, direct, and control safety functions across their domain. JBPHH does have a draft Safety Instruction in development.

Deficiency #6. JBPHH does not have a SOH instruction. References: OPNAVINST 5100.23G CH-1, Section 0303(a) and CNICINST 5100.3A.

Energy Conservation

CNRH has a strong Energy program that is meeting or exceeding a number of targets in mandated energy reductions and is actively developing plans to meet all targets.

Environmental Programs

CNRH, JBPHH, and PMRF are managing their environmental programs in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policy. There are currently no Notices of Violations pending with State and Federal regulatory agencies.

Red Hill Tank Number 5

NAVINSGEN confirmed that CNRH has a solid team of subject matter experts (Legal, Public Affairs, Engineers, Environmental Health, etc.) and stakeholders in place to coordinate local Navy response and follow on actions related to the fuel leak from this recently refurbished fuel tank. Continued proactive action is required to manage risks related to potential contamination of drinking water sources in nearby aquifers. CNRH has a recurring battle rhythm that is effectively tracking and executing recovery actions for the leaking tank and executing mitigation strategies.

Housing

Electrical rate changes at Public Private Venture (PPV) housing are not understood by many Sailors and their families. There is a perceived lack of transparency in the process of calculating individual electric bills. Service member duties, rights, and privileges with regard to utility payments are described in the lease agreement with Ohana Military Communities, LLC and the attached Resident Energy Conservation Program addendum. Personnel reported via surveys and in focus group discussions that they did not understand how their bills were calculated. In addition, a number of personnel reported that reduced electrical usage resulted in increased electric bills. While we were not able to independently confirm the validity of these statements, they are generally viewed as a fact in focus group discussions and personnel interviews. Continuous communication and education on bill calculation methodologies and the way ahead on electrical rate changes is required by Navy to ensure that Sailors and their families understand the process, feel that the Navy is being transparent on this issue, and understand what to expect in the future.

SECURITY PROGRAMS AND INFORMATION ASSURANCE

Information and Personnel Security Programs

JBPHH lacks its own Command Security instruction and Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for safeguarding classified material.

CNIC has not conducted required Command Security program oversight inspections on CNRH.

A number of specified security responsibilities at JBPHH are shared with the CNRH staff. JBPHH's designated collateral-duty Security Manager has attended the Naval Security Manager's course and performs some Information Security functions for roughly 350 military personnel assigned to JBPHH; primarily managing JBPHH military personnel check-in and checkout, as well as System Authorization Access Request forms. The JBPHH Security Manager is assisted by assigned Petty Officers with no formal security training. Personnel Security functions such as making notifications and initiating Preliminary Inquiries, as appropriate, are performed by the CNRH Security Manager.

In situations where security, economy, and efficiency are considerations, such an arrangement is authorized per SECNAV M-5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Program, and SECNAV M-5510.36, Department of the Navy Information Security Program, provided that a Security Servicing Agreement (SSA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is in place. An SSA or MOU gives higher headquarters authority to provide specific security services to subordinate commands and specifies which security responsibilities are retained by the subordinate commanding officer. No such SSA or MOU is in place for CNRH and JBPHH.

The CNRH Security Instruction does not specify how Security Manager support is provided to subordinate commands. For Industrial Security, the CNRH Security Instruction does not include procedures to ensure that each contract is reviewed for requirements, or that contracts are reviewed for Operational Security (OPSEC) requirements prior to contract award.

The EAP is a CNRH (Information Technology Command and Control (N6)) memo for safeguarding, evacuation, and/or destruction of Communications Security (COMSEC) material and other classified material. However, this CNRH N6 EAP memo does not apply to JBPHH, its annexes, and PMRF.

Deficiency #7. JBPHH does not have a Command Security Instruction. It is incorrectly using the CNRH Security Instruction as its own. References: SECNAV M-5510.36, Section 2-10, 5.a and SECNAV M-5510.30, Appendix C.

Deficiency #8. CNIC has not conducted a Command Security program oversight inspection on CNRH. References: SECNAV M-5510.36, Section 2-11 and SECNAV M-5510.30, Section 2-10.

Deficiency #9. CNRH staff provides some Security Manager duties for JBPHH, but does not have the required SSA or MOU in place. References: SECNAV M-5510.36, Chapter 2, Section 2-10 and SECNAV M-5510.30, Chapter 2, Section 2-11.

Deficiency #10. JBPHH does not have a local EAP for safeguarding of classified material. Reference: SECNAV M-5510.36, Exhibit 2B.

Operations Security (OPSEC)

CNRH and JBPHH do not have OPSEC programs as required by OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Operations Security. CNRH and JBPHH lack essential OPSEC program elements, including assigned OPSEC Officers, a command OPSEC instruction, self-assessments, identification of critical information, annual OPSEC surveys, and required OPSEC reviews of media publications and social media sites. CNRH is not providing oversight of lower echelon OPSEC programs as required by DoDM 5205.02-M, DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual.

Deficiency #11. CNRH does not have an OPSEC program. Reference: OPNAVINST 3432.1A, paragraph 5 and Enclosure (1), paragraph 5.

Deficiency #12. JBPHH does not have an OPSEC program. Reference: OPNAVINST 3432.1A paragraph 5 and Enclosure (1), paragraph 5 and DoDM 5205.02-M, Enclosure (2), paragraph 6a(9).

Deficiency #13. CNRH is not providing OPSEC program oversight of lower echelon commands. Reference: OPNAVINST 3432.1A, Enclosure (1), paragraph 4d and DoDM 5205.02-M, Enclosure (2), paragraph 6a(9).

Security Force Manning at JBPHH

Security Force manpower requirements at JBPHH have not been properly validated and documented since becoming a Joint Navy-Air Force Base in 2010. There is no approved Mission Profile Validation-Protection (MPV-P) for the base that includes both Pearl Harbor-side and Hickam-side security requirements. JBPHH has merged the legacy Hickam Air Force Base Security Force requirements with the legacy Naval Station Pearl Harbor MPV-P to develop a "locally generated" manpower document, but this is "unofficial" and not validated. An MPV-P verification is required by CNIC to capture all Joint Base Security Force requirements. Issue Paper 3 addresses this issue in detail.

Security Force manning at JBPHH is 88 percent of the "locally generated" manpower document requirement of 748 personnel. JBPHH manning levels are higher than the overall Security Force manning shortfalls reported by U.S. Fleet Forces Command/U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command (USFFC/MARFORCOM) in their 31 October 2013 Navy Base, Station, and Installation Physical Security Assessment Report. We typically see Security Force manning levels below 80 percent during our area visits, but the JBPHH percentage is overall higher in part because the USAF fills 100 percent of its Security Force manning requirements, which constitutes nearly one-third of total Security Force manning at JBPHH. Without an approved MPV-P, however, JBPHH is at risk

of the USAF making unilateral Security Force requirement changes at the base, further reducing force size.

The USFFC/MARFORCOM report mentioned above also found that the MPV-P model was insufficient. The MPV-P model does not address required administrative functions, is focused on manning for security posts, and does not address the full spectrum of security responsibilities. Consequently, there are not sufficient personnel to meet other core security requirements such as physical security surveys, annual publication reviews, installation antiterrorism exercises, training, records keeping, and other routine administrative functions.

JBPHH hosts numerous special events which require augmenting regular Security Forces, or at a minimum, additional vetting of attendees. b7e

[REDACTED] JBPHH is activating approximately 20 Auxiliary Security Force personnel each month. This allows more security staff working at any given time to make up for the reduced manning but pushes the effectiveness of the Security Force.

Security Training

Availability of formal Naval Security Manager and Special Security Officer (SSO) training for units based in Hawaii needs to be improved. Many collateral duty SSOs, Special Security Representatives, and Command Security Managers lack sufficient training to effectively administer the Personnel Security and Information Security programs at their respective commands.

Several area Command Security Managers lacked the necessary accounts needed to request/initiate Personnel Security Investigations (PSIs) through Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing, the Office of Personnel Management's required system for requesting and submitting PSIs.

At one command, nearly one third of staff PSIs were expired or due to expire in the next six months.

The Naval Security Manager's course (Course Identification Number (CIN): S-3C-0001) is only taught in Norfolk and San Diego, but can be exported to other locations at the requesting command's expense. Issue paper 4 addresses this issue in detail.

Personally Protected Information (PPI)

During the course of our inspection, we identified that DON CIO was unaware of NAVADMIN 264/13, FY-14 General Military Training Schedule and its waiving of PPI Awareness Training for FY14. NAVINSGEN advised DON CIO of this issue and they are coordinating with OPNAV N1 to update NAVADMIN 264/13.

Emergency Management (EM)

A number of EM requirements, driven by both Navy and Joint requirements, appear to be beyond the capacity of the small JBPHH EM staff to effectively plan and manage. With over 170 tenant commands, four historic landmarks, an imbedded Naval Shipyard, approximately 17 drills required to meet both Navy and Air Force annual and short notice exercise requirements to support inspections, and the large number of actual events requiring emergency planning (66 in FY12 which included Presidential and other senior official visits, Pearl Harbor Day, and other base events), EM manpower requirements must be closely reviewed and validated during an SMRD identified as a requirement in the Mission Performance section of this report.

Enhanced 911 capabilities. Although the telephones on the base are 911 compliant they are not Enhanced 911 compliant (displaying caller location at the Dispatch Center) as required by DoDI 6055.17, DoD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program.

In accordance with OPNAVINST 3440.17, Navy Installation Emergency Management Program, and consistent with UFC 4-012-01, CH-1, Unified Facilities Criteria: Design and O&M: Mass Notification Systems, regional and installation commanders shall develop capabilities to rapidly warn and notify personnel in the event of an emergency. Computer notification is used as mitigation for lack of audible systems in older facilities. However, computer notification for non-NMCI users as part of the Mass Warning Notification System (MWNS) on JBPHH does not provide notification to all personnel working on the base as the system does not have the ability to notify non-NMCI users (such as Air Force personnel) of an emergency on the base via their computer.

Deficiency #14. JBPHH does not have Enhanced 911 telephone capabilities. Reference: DoDI 6055.17 Enclosure (4).

Deficiency #15. JBPHH computer notification system (as part of the MWNS) on JBPHH does not provide notification to non-NMCI accounts on the base. References: OPNAVINST 3440.17 Enclosure (1), paragraph 7c.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, QOL, AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT

The Resource Management, QOL, and Community Support Team assessed 19 programs and functions. The findings below reflect responses from survey respondents, onsite focus group participants, document review, facility site visits, and face-to-face personnel interviews.

The following programs and functions are well-administered and contribute to overall QOL:

- Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR)
- Navy College/Education Services
- Military and Family Support Centers (MFSC)
- Religious Support
- Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
- Suicide Prevention
- Equal Opportunity Advisor (EOA)

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- Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention
- Hazing Policy Training and Compliance
- Legal Support
- Voting Assistance

Commissaries, Navy Exchanges, Child Development Centers/Child Development Homes (CDC/CDH), galleys, and medical and dental activities at JBPHH adequately support their communities.

SAPR JBPHH

Commander, JBPHH does not personally host the Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG). The Chief Staff Officer attends in his place. The SACMG is required to be hosted by the Installation Commander, per governing instructions.

Deficiency #16. Commander, JBPHH does not personally host the SACMG. References: SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (5) and (9); DoDI 6495.02 CH-1, Enclosure (5) and (9).

SAPR PMRF

Due to sequestration and travel restrictions, Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) visits to PMRF were reduced to infrequent visits. While there is no prescribed periodicity for these visits, NAVINSGEN recommends that the SARC visit PMRF quarterly to ensure that this remote location has adequate SAPR support.

Memorandums of Understanding (MOU):

- The existing MOU between PMRF and the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) does not accurately reflect the services actually provided by the YWCA and requires modification to reflect the transportation services that they provide when needed.
- An MOU is required with Kauai Police Department Investigative Bureau (for Sexual Assault Forensic Examinations (SAFE)) and the Kauai Veterans Memorial Hospital (for emergency care) to document the actual victim's assistance provided by those two organizations.

PMRF has no SAPR Data Collection Coordinator (DCC).

PMRF SAPR Point of Contact (POC), Victim Advocate (VA) and Liaison are not assigned in writing.

SAPR Duty Phone Service Contract. The current Duty Phone service contract carrier (AT&T) does not provide reliable 24/7 phone coverage; SAPR duty personnel cannot reliably be reached when required.

PMRF webpage does not provide the required SAFE Help Line link

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Deficiency #17. The existing MOU between PMRF and the YWCA does not accurately reflect the services actually provided by the YWCA and requires modification to reflect the transportation services that they provide when needed.

Reference: DoDD 6495.01, paragraph 4g, j.

Deficiency #18. An MOU is required with Kauai Police Department Investigative Bureau (for SAFE) and the Kauai Veterans Memorial Hospital (for emergency care) to document the actual victim's assistance provided by those two organizations. Reference: DoDD 6495.01, paragraph 4g, j.

Deficiency #19. PMRF has no SAPR DCC. Reference: OPNAVINST 1752.1B, paragraph 9f(4).

Deficiency #20. The PMRF SAPR POC, VA, and Liaison are not assigned in writing. Reference: OPNAVINST 1752.1Bb, paragraph 9f(3).

Deficiency #21. The PMRF SAPR Duty Phone Service Contract (AT&T) does not provide reliable 24/7 phone coverage; recommend consideration of different service provider or supplemental procedures to ensure coverage. References: OPNAVINST 1752.1B, paragraph 8b(1); SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (3) paragraph 2c(1), Enclosure (5) paragraph 2.

Deficiency #22. The PMRF webpage does not provide the required SAFE Help Line link. Reference: SECNAVINST 1752.4B, Enclosure (3).

PMRF Medical Services

PMRF Medical Services are provided through a clinic staffed by an assigned Independent Duty Corpsman (IDC). The IDC billet, which belongs to PMRF, was gapped for over 30 days until just prior to our visit.

The support agreement between the CO, PMRF and CO, Naval Health Clinic Hawaii (NHCH) needs to be updated to reflect current roles and responsibilities for delivery of health care services at PMRF. The last support agreement expired February 2011 and is inaccurate.

PMRF Medical Services requires greater oversight by NHCH, which owns the clinic building and is responsible for consumable supplies, medical equipment, and quality oversight of the care provided by the IDC. The following observations were made during a clinic visit and interview with the IDC:

- Unsupervised and unsecured medical paraphernalia accessible in lobby and patient treatment room.
- Medical bio-hazard materials improperly stored on premises.

- The immunization refrigerator containing medical supplies and vaccines was not properly secured and its temperature was not properly documented, resulting in total medication loss amounting to \$3,047.

Deficiency #23. The support agreement between the CO, PMRF and CO, NHCH requires update and revision to reflect current roles and responsibilities for delivery of health care services, and greater oversight by NHCH at PMRF.

PMRF Suicide Prevention Program

PMRF does not have a formal Suicide Prevention Program in accordance with OPNAVINST 1720.4A, Suicide Prevention Program. NAVINSGEN observed the newly reported IDC actively involved in constructing a program to meet requirements.

PMRF is not conducting Suicide Prevention training for civilian personnel and full-time contractor personnel. Military completion rate is 89 percent as of March 2014.

Deficiency #24. PMRF does not have a Suicide Prevention Program. Reference: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraph 6h.

Deficiency #25. PMRF suicide prevention training is not being conducted for civilian personnel and full-time contractors. References: OPNAVINST 1720.4A, paragraphs 5a(1), 6h(3), and Enclosure (3)(1); CO's Suicide Prevention and Response Toolbox November 2011, Tab A, (www.suicide.navy.mil).

BRILLIANT ON THE BASICS

Brilliant on the Basics programs were reviewed and behavior associated with good order and discipline was closely observed. Inputs from survey respondents, onsite focus group participants, document review, and face-to-face personnel interviews were considered. Career Development, Sponsorship, and Command Indoctrination programs were reviewed. Awards/Recognition, Ombudsman, and Mentorship programs were evaluated through surveys, focus groups, and interviews.

Overall, command morale and perceptions of QOL were noted to be average. Enlisted Sailors displayed outstanding military bearing and maintained a professional appearance.

Most commands within the Region have effective Command Sponsorship, Command Indoctrination, and Career Development programs. Some teaching and training were conducted during program reviews, and administrative shortfalls were addressed in a roundtable setting. Although not a requirement, it was recommended to include new civilian employees in command indoctrination for commands with civilian personnel. No significant problems were identified regarding the Awards/Recognition, Ombudsman, or Mentorship programs.

Appendix A: Summary of Actions

If you are an Action Officer for a staff listed in Table A-1, please submit Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) as specified for each applicable recommendation, along with supporting documentation, such as plans of action and milestones and implementing directives.

- Submit initial ISRs using OPNAV Form 5040/2 no later than 1 October 2014. Each ISR should include an e-mail address for the action officer, where available. Electronic ISR submission to NAVIGInspections@navy.mil is preferred. An electronic version of OPNAV Form 5040/2 may be downloaded from the NAVINSGEN Web-site at www.ig.navy.mil in the Downloads and Publications Folder, titled Forms Folder, Implementation Status Report.
- Submit quarterly ISRs, including "no change" reports until the recommendation is closed by NAVINSGEN. When a long-term action is dependent upon prior completion of another action, the status report should indicate the governing action and its estimated completion date. Further status reports may be deferred, with NAVINSGEN concurrence.
- When action addressees consider required action accomplished, the status report submitted should contain the statement, "Action is considered complete." However, NAVINSGEN approval must be obtained before the designated action addressee is released from further reporting responsibilities on the recommendation.
- NAVINSGEN point of contact for ISRs is b7c 

Table A-1. Action Officer Listing for Implementation Status Reports

COMMAND	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER(S) XXX-14
OPNAV N3/N5	014
OPNAV N4	014-015
CPF	016
CNPC	013
CNIC	015

Appendix B: Issue Papers

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Issue Paper B-1: PERSONNEL SUPPORT DIVISION (PSD) PEARL HARBOR

- References:
- (a) NAVPERS 15560D CH-47, Naval Military Personnel Manual, MILPERSMAN 1000-025, Personnel Transaction Timeliness, 10 April 2014
 - (b) DoD 7000.14-R, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 9: "Travel Policy", Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), April 2014
 - (c) Naval Inspector General Area Visit to Navy Region Hawaii, Ser N3D/1466, 13 November 2007

Issue: PSD Pearl Harbor's support to Sailors is inadequate.

Background: Twenty-two percent of all PSD Pearl Harbor's transactions are not completed within prescribed timeframes of four days for gains/receipts, 30 days for travel claims, and 30 days for pay transactions in accordance with references (a) and (b), resulting in delays in pay and benefits to Sailors stationed in Hawaii.

Concerns regarding PSD Pearl Harbor's support to area Sailors were noted during NAVINSGEN's last visit to Hawaii, reference (c) refers. In 2007, we found "degraded and inconsistent customer service, non-responsiveness to customer commands' needs, and excessive delays in getting requested services (e.g., gains, award entries, identification cards, Page 4 entries, service record maintenance) processed in a timely manner.

Discussion: PSD Pearl Harbor personnel are hardworking and dedicated, but improvements by both PSD and area commands are required to fully support area customers. NAVINSGEN notes that PSD Pearl Harbor does meet transaction timeliness guidelines once all required documentation for a transaction is turned in and complete; however, a greater effort is required by PSD and serviced commands to ensure that Sailors with incomplete documentation are quickly informed to ensure required transactions can be accomplished in a timely manner.

During our area visit we observed the following issues:

Poor communication/engagement by PSD, area command leadership, and administrative personnel. Transaction processing delays primarily occur when personnel fail to correctly or completely submit required documentation to PSD. The feedback loop to commands and Sailors when their documentation is incorrect or incomplete is inadequate. Sailors reported that they are not informed when their documentation is incomplete and their "transaction" cannot be processed. A greater effort

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is required by PSD and serviced commands to ensure Sailors with incomplete documentation are made aware.

Delays in processing paperwork due to technical problems with Transaction Online Processing System (TOPS). The TOPS system was not operational at PSD Pearl Harbor from mid-October to mid-December 2013. This resulted in a backlog in pay submissions including personnel gain entries. The effects of the Government furlough and the temporary shutdown of BUPERS Online, Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System, and Total Workforce Management System for security upgrades from August to December 2013 created a backlog of transactions for the PSD as well. PSD Pearl Harbor has eliminated this backlog.

PSD Pearl Harbor manning shortfalls. Current manning is at 78 percent. PSD Pearl Harbor has experienced a 60 percent turnover in contractors over the past year. While the PSD Officer in Charge reports that the contractor has been able to fill all vacancies promptly and with competent employees, this level of turnover is likely a contributing factor in delays in processing transactions.

Recommendation: 013-14. That Commander, Navy Personnel Command conduct an assessment of PSD Pearl Harbor operations to determine which processes and practices at the PSD can be improved to better support Sailors in Hawaii.

NAVINGEN POC:

b7c
[Redacted]

Issue Paper B-2: BASING OF COMMANDS AND ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF THE NAVY STRATEGIC LAYDOWN AND DISPERSAL (SLD) PROCESS

- References:
- (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3111.17, Strategic Laydown and Dispersal Plan for the Operating Forces of the US Navy, 22 November 2013
 - (b) Government Accountability Office Report GAO 10-482, "Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy's Basing Decision Process and DoD Oversight", May 2010
 - (c) Air Force Instruction 10-503, Strategic Basing, 27 September 2010
 - (d) JBPHH Instruction 11100.1, Strategic Basing Program, 8 August 2013
 - (e) DoDI 4000.19 Support Agreements, 25 April 2013
 - (f) Memorandum from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, Subject: Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base - New Mission Stationing/Beddown, 13 April 2010

Issue: There is no formal Navy process that governs basing requests on Navy real property from non-Navy activities or from Navy activities that fall outside the SLD process (do not meet the SLD definition of operating forces).

Background: Reference (a) establishes policy and responsibilities for the SLD planning process, which guides and informs decisions regarding the assignment of Navy operating forces to homeports, homebases, and hubs.

Reference (b) is a report by the Government Accountability Office that studied Navy planning processes and DoD oversight of basing decisions by the individual Services.

Reference (c) establishes policy and responsibilities for basing actions on Air Force installations.

Reference (d) establishes policy and responsibilities for space requests aboard Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam (JBPHH) based on the principles in reference (c) and higher level guidance incorporated in references (e) and (f), which clarify DoD policy for roles of supporting and supported commands regarding installation support at Joint Bases.

Discussion: Since 2013, JBPHH has received 81 written basing requests accounting for 7,186 personnel in new, expanded, or relocated tenant loading on Oahu. These requests come directly to Commanding Officer (CO), JBPHH from the units and Agencies requesting the support and are not reviewed, prioritized, or approved by OPNAV or Commander, Navy Installation

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Command (CNIC) as there is no formal Navy process in place, either at OPNAV or CNIC, to handle these requests. Without OPNAV or CNIC oversight and guidance on prioritizing these requests, identifying necessary infrastructure and support requirements, and identifying resources necessary to put these requirements in place, CO, JBPHH is left to make a number of decisions impacting Navy, Joint, and interagency basing that may be more appropriately made by OPNAV and/or CNIC.

For instance, sewage capacity on Oahu is a limiting factor for bringing additional commands and personnel to the island. CNRH has developed 5 military construction (MILCON) projects (totaling \$181M; none are funded) to address these deficiencies and expand capacity in separate areas on the base. Additional funds may be required to expand capacity at JBPHH Wahiawa Annex to support expansion of Navy, USAF, and Joint communications missions, but funding responsibility for each of these expansion requirements is not yet resolved. A formal process to handle these concerns would provide a construct to resolve this and other similar basing issues.

However, unlike ship, submarine, aircraft squadron, and other operational force basing actions that are governed by the Navy's SLD process, there is no formalized Navy process to govern basing requests on Navy real property from non-Navy activities or from Navy activities that fall outside the SLD process (do not meet the SLD definition of operating forces).

Without a formal process and OPNAV and/or CNIC oversight, the Installation Commander, by default, serves as the primary gatekeeper to manage Navy, Joint, DoD, and other Department Agency and private entity requests to establish a footprint on Navy real property.

As a point of comparison, the Air Force governs all basing actions through Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-503, Strategic Basing. AFI 10-503 defines a "basing action" as any mission change on Air Force property resulting in an increase of 35 or more positions. The AFI definition also includes any "non-AF entity requesting to move onto Air Force real property or change their current mission being executed at that location." All requests for basing actions are governed through a top-down Air Force Strategic Basing Structure and managed by a Basing Request Review Panel and Strategic Basing Executive Steering Group at Air Force headquarters, with AF/A8PB (HQ USAF Strategic Basing Division) as the entry point for all basing action requests. The stated intent of AFI 10-503 is to, "ensure the Air Force basing process is standardized, repeatable, transparent, and defensible."

Per NAVINSGEN staff discussions with personnel at OPNAV N46 (Ashore Readiness) and CNIC N5 (Strategy), some past requests by non-Navy entities to establish a footprint on Navy real property have been handled by requiring the requesting Service or Agency Chief to make their request by letter to the Chief of Naval Operations for routing to the OPNAV staff for feasibility and then to CNIC for further analysis, review and coordination. However, this process is not formalized by instruction and was not known to JBPHH staff.

CO, JBPHH has developed a local instruction to help assess, prioritize, and coordinate basing requests. While this instruction provides some level of coordination, the installation commander cannot properly prioritize and plan for these basing requests without oversight and guidance from OPNAV and/or CNIC.

Recommendation: 014-14. That Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Information, Plans and Strategy) (OPNAV N3/N5), in coordination with Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Readiness and Logistics) (OPNAV N4), establish a formal Navy process to receive, prioritize, assess support requirements and approve non-SLD and non-Navy basing requests on Navy real property.

NAVINSGEN POC: b7c 

Issue Paper B-3: JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR HICKAM (JBPHH) MISSION PROVILLE VALIDATION - PROTECTION (MPV-P) DETERMINATION

Reference: (a) U.S. Fleet Forces Command/U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command (USFFC/MARFORCOM) Navy Base, Station, and Installation Physical Security Assessment Report, 31 October 2013

Issue: Security Force manpower requirements at JBPHH have not been properly validated and documented since becoming a Joint Navy-Air Force base in 2010. There is no approved MPV-P for the base that includes both Pearl Harbor-side and Hickam-side security requirements.

Background: Reference (a) is a report by USFFC/MARFORCOM assessing Navy Base, Station and Installation Physical Security.

Discussion: Security Force manpower requirements at JBPHH have not been properly validated and documented since it became a Joint Navy-Air Force base in 2010. JBPHH has merged the legacy Hickam Air Force base Security Force requirements with the legacy Naval Station Pearl Harbor MPV-P to develop a "locally generated" manpower document, but this is "unofficial" and not validated.

Security Force manning at JBPHH is 88 percent of the "locally generated" manpower document requirement of 748 personnel. JBPHH manning levels are higher than the overall Security Force manning shortfalls reported by U.S. Fleet Forces Command/U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command (USFFC/MARFORCOM) in their 31 October 2013 Navy Base, Station, and Installation Physical Security Assessment Report. We typically see Security Force manning levels below 80 percent during our area visits, but the JBPHH percentage is overall higher in part because the USAF fills 100 percent of its Security Force manning requirements, which constitutes nearly one-third of total Security Force manning at JBPHH. Without an approved MPV-P, however, JBPHH is at risk of the USAF making unilateral Security Force requirement changes at the base, further reducing force size.

The JBPHH Security Force may not be sufficiently manned to conduct its mission. This impacts not only routine security tasks and conditions, but also exacerbates Emergency Management manning shortfalls which are addressed separately in the body of the 2014 NAVINSGEN report of Area Visit to Navy Region Hawaii. JBPHH hosts numerous special events which require augmenting regular security forces or, at a minimum, additional vetting of attendees. b7e

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b7e

[REDACTED] JBPHH is activating approximately 20 auxiliary security force personnel each month. These actions allow more security staff to work at any given time to make up for the reduced manning, but stress the effectiveness of the security force.

Recommendation: 015-14. That Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Readiness and Logistics) (OPNAV N4) coordinate with Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) to conduct a MPV-P determination for JBPHH and adjust manning levels appropriately.

NAVINGEN POC:

b7c

[REDACTED]

Issue Paper B-4: HAWAII-BASED COMMANDS ARE NOT CONSISTENTLY SENDING THEIR SECURITY MANAGERS TO THE NAVAL SECURITY MANAGER COURSE

- References: (a) SECNAV M-5510.36, Department of the Navy Information Security Program
(b) SECNAV 5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Program

Issue: Security Managers and Security Assistants at Hawaii-based commands have limited opportunity to attend the Naval Security Manager Course (CIN: S-3C-0001), as the course is only taught at San Diego, CA and Norfolk, VA. As a result, many of these Hawaii-based personnel are conducting security management duties delineated in references (a) and (b), but are not properly trained to do so.

Background: While the Naval Security Manager Course is taught at San Diego, CA and Norfolk, VA, it can also be exported to other areas if the requesting command funds the cost.

Discussion: During our area visit, we found that a number of Security Managers and Security Assistants in the Hawaii area have not attended the Naval Security Manager Course as their commands could not afford to send them to San Diego, CA for the course. As a result, a number of commands in Hawaii have Security Managers and Security Assistants who are not properly trained for their security duties. NAVINSGEN was unable to verify the scope of this problem across all Hawaii-based commands.

The Naval Security Manager Course can be exported out of San Diego, CA and Norfolk, VA if the requesting command funds the cost.

Recommendation: 016-14. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet determine the scope of this security training shortfall for Hawaii-based commands and, if appropriate, periodically fund the export of this training from San Diego, CA to Hawaii to ensure Hawaii-based Security Managers and Security Assistants are properly trained.

NAVINSGEN POC:

b7c

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APPENDIX C: Summary of Key Survey Results

Pre-Event Survey

In support of the Navy Region Hawaii (NRH) Area Visit held 13-21 March 2014, the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) conducted an anonymous online survey of active duty military and Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel from 16 January to 18 February 2014. The survey produced 1,418 respondents (787 military, 631 civilian). Based on the reported population, the sample was representative and achieved target statistical parameters.

- The survey queried both military and civilians to identify positive, neutral, or negative impacts on suspected factors that affect quality of work and home life (QOWL and QOHL, respectively).
- The survey queried active duty military members questions regarding physical readiness, performance counseling, and various base services and amenities.
- The survey queried civilians regarding their position description, performance counseling, human resource service center, and human resource office.
- The survey queried both military and civilians regarding topics such as working hours, resources, facilities, communication, travel, safety, training, command climate, and leadership.
- The survey included open-ended questions regarding various topics such as supplies purchased with personal money, facilities in need of repair, and any additional comments or concerns regarding quality of life.

Quality of Life

Quality of life is assessed using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is worst and 10 is best. The NRH average QOHL, 7.38 was higher than the 5-year area visit average, 7.16 (Figure C-1). The overall NRH average QOWL, 6.21 was comparable to the area visit average, 6.32 (Figure C-2). Differences were observed in average quality of life ratings between respondents indicating that they worked on or near Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPHH), Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), and Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF). Average QOHL at MCBH (6.99) was lower than the other two subregions (JBPHH: 7.54; PMRF: 7.42), and average QOWL at JBPHH (6.03) was lower than the other two subregions (MCBH: 6.59; PMRF: 6.47).




Figure C-1. Distribution of QOHL ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for each rating are shown at the base of each bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.




Figure C-2. Distribution of QOWL ratings from the pre-event survey. The x-axis lists the rating scale and the y-axis represents the number of survey respondents. Response percentages for each rating are shown at the base of each bar. Counts for each rating are shown above each bar. The most frequent rating is shown in blue.

Command Climate

Table C-1 lists strongly agree and agree response percentages to survey questions addressing perceived job importance, and whether fraternization, favoritism, gender/sex discrimination, sexual harassment, or hazing occurs within the Region. Overall NAVINSGEN area visit percentages over a 5-year period are shown for comparison. Excepting job importance, lower values are “better.”

- Perceived job importance within NRH was statistically lower than our area visit average; however, 80 percent of NRH respondents strongly agreed or agreed that their job is important and makes a contribution.
- Perceived occurrence of fraternization, gender/sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and race discrimination within the Region was lower than other Navy Regions assessed during NAVINSGEN area visits over a 5-year period.
- Perceived occurrence of favoritism and hazing within the Region were comparable to other Navy Regions assessed during NAVINSGEN area visits over a 5-year period.

Table C-1. Perceived Job Importance and Occurrence of Behaviors Assumed to Impact Command Climate

Question Topic	NRH	AV
Job Importance	80%	88%
Fraternization	19%	22%
Favoritism	36%	39%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	11%	21%
Sexual Harassment	7%	10%
Race Discrimination	7%	20%
Hazing	5%	5%

Notes: Aggregate strongly agree and agree response percentages for selected command climate topics. Area Visit (AV) percentages from FY09-14. Excepting Job Importance, lower percentages are “better.” Bold values indicate a significantly higher or lower percentage than AV.

Appendix D: Summary of Focus Group Perceptions

Focus Groups

On various days during 6-18 March 2014 the NAVINSGEN conducted a total of 41 focus groups at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPHH), Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH), and Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), 22 with various groupings of active duty military ranks, 15 with various groupings of civilian grades, and 4 with a combination of ombudsmen and either enlisted or officer spouses. There were a total of 571 focus group participants; 374 military, 166 civilians, 30 ombudsmen/spouses. Each focus group was scheduled for one hour and consisted of one facilitator and two note takers. The facilitator followed a protocol script: (a) focus group personnel introductions, (b) brief introduction to the NAVINSGEN mission, (c) privacy, Whistleblower protection, and basic ground rules, (d) a quantitative verbal assessment of overall quality of life (QOL), (e) participant-derived list of QOL topics, and (f) subsequent discussion on the list of QOL topics. Note taker data sheets were transcribed into a spreadsheet and response codes applied to determine the most frequent QOL topics across all groups.

Overall Quality of Life

Overall QOL is verbally assessed in focus groups using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is worst and 10 is best. The distribution of QOL ratings from Navy Region Hawaii (NRH) is displayed in Figure D-1. The NRH average overall QOL (7.46) from the 41 focus groups was higher than the 5-year area visit average, 6.99. Average overall QOL at PMRF (7.17) was lower than the other two subregions (JBPHH: 7.51; MCBH: 7.48).




Figure D-1. Most frequent QOL topics discussed during the DON civilian (15), active duty military (22), and spouse (4) focus groups.

Housing

A majority of military focus groups, all spouse focus groups, and one civilian focus group sympathetic to active duty enlisted mentioned housing as having a negative impact on QOL. Comments specific to barracks, although coded separately, are also addressed under this topic. Focus group participants at MCBH reported different servicing points of contact based on

marital status; bachelors serviced at MCBH, while married members go to JBPHH. Participants felt there should be a one-stop shop for all members seeking housing in the Region. Junior personnel in particular feel that they are “bounced around.”

Barracks

- Most commentary related to barracks was made during MCBH focus groups. Participants voiced general displeasure with maintenance services—some noted that they were without shower water or air conditioning for extended periods of time, along with comments regarding the inability to control mold. Participants also desired a kitchenette or general cooking area, and thought that infrequently used common areas could be converted to kitchen space.
- Focus groups at MCBH were disappointed that E-4s are doubled-up in the barracks and not permitted to have their own room as they would be entitled to in Navy barracks.
- Focus groups at JBPHH and PMRF also expressed some disappointment in the length of time required to get issues (e.g., mold, pest control, malfunctioning appliances) resolved.

Public Private Venture (PPV)

- Essentially all focus groups offering comments regarding PPV thought the housing in the Pearl City Peninsula and Halsey Terrace were unsafe. Participants either reported knowledge of housing goods and car thefts or were themselves victims of crime. Participants felt that there was insufficient patrolling of these housing areas. “Families should not have to worry about security.” Some active duty members and spouses noted that they do not permit their children to play outside in the aforementioned housing areas, “It’s nice to have a child, but I’m a bit worried about theft, safety, break-ins. It’s huge because our husbands will be gone [on deployment].”
- Members and spouses living in PPV homes were also disappointed in maintenance services. They reported that they are unable to make a request in person—must log by phone.
- Participants on Oahu want to understand how the electric bill is calculated, a reported 123 percent increase. One participant noted that he is unable to read his meter. Many participants reported that they took drastic measures to reduce their bill to no avail. One participant claimed that his bill was higher when away on travel than when living in his house. Participants reported no benefit in solar panels that feed the Forrest City grid.
- Lack of trust in Forrest City on Oahu. “They [Forrest City] offer you a house to avoid TLA [Temporary Lodging Allowance]...They are very secretive about everything...They tell

you that only Pearl City Peninsula is available—don't want to say what is truly available...If you tell them that you are going somewhere else then all of a sudden there are other options.”

- Participants at PMRF noted a much better relationship with Forrest City, but thought that the maintenance personnel onsite are overworked and at times are unable to provide timely service.

Facilities

- MCBH. Comments regarding facilities at MCBH were focused on the poor condition of aircraft hangers, in particular the hanger doors and “filthy heads.” Most participants who offered such commentary thought that these conditions were both safety and health risks. A majority of participants were unaware of the timeline for MILCON projects to address these issues.
- JBPHH. Comments regarding facilities at JBPHH were focused on the seemingly constant battle with Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) to provide general services and maintenance of aging and historical structures. One focus group was concerned with the perceived dilapidated state of the piers. “None of [the cranes] provide full service. We have more ships coming here. We have three piers for DDG that do not have power! We had a pier collapse last year under a crane. This is a nightmare for ship maintenance planning.”

Cost of Living

Comments across all Oahu focus groups associated with cost of living were centered on high electricity rates. Participants reported electricity bills from \$400 to over \$1,000. Higher costs of food and gas were also mentioned as QOL issues.

Manning/Manpower

Comparable to more recent NAVINSGEN focus groups (Echelon 2 command inspections and area visits), personnel working within NRH are struggling to make good on what is perceived as increased requirements with reductions in manning/manpower. “We are doing more with less.” A number of civilian and military focus groups reported increased workload and work hours. Echoing the pre-event survey findings, some civilian participants informed us that they often perform work without compensation. Even if they receive compensatory time, they are unable to use it.

Policies

- Some military focus groups on Oahu thought that Temporary Lodging Allowance extensions beyond the 60-day limit should be granted in applicable circumstances (e.g., when personal goods cannot be shipped to housing at the 60-day mark).

- Three military focus groups at MCBH thought that clothing restrictions (e.g., yoga pants, PT gear, basketball shorts) monitored at the entrance of the commissary are a bit extreme.
- Some of the focus groups comments at PMRF related to policies were similar to other command inspections and area visits where there is a greater focus on science, technology, and evaluation. Example: “There used to be 3 people in the procurement approval chain, now 23! COMPACFLT can permit approval authority...A \$4 item ultimately costs a great deal more going through the process...I think that it is intentional—to make it so hard to buy things that people give up...So many things are centralized that it becomes hard to get things done.”

Workload

At least 10 focus groups specifically mentioned workload as a negative QOL topic.

- “Requirements are increasing, not decreasing, despite manning. Do more with less.”
- “We are asking younger and less qualified/experienced personnel with families to take on responsibilities that they cannot manage...Many people are doing more work than is stated in their [position description], mostly on the down side.”

Personnel Support Detachment (PSD)

Nine of 22 military focus groups directly called out PSD Pearl Harbor as a negative QOL topic. Many military participants perceive that PSD provides poor customer service and that it takes too long to receive entitlements. Some focus group participants suggested that PSD would benefit from having more military personnel assigned to PSD.

Medical

Focus groups comments regarding medical services were generally positive in nature in terms of care with some anticipated disappointments in scheduling and availability of services.

Leadership

Six of 15 civilian focus groups and three military focus groups discussed both positive and negative leadership topics; however, there were no common themes.

Appendix E: Survey Frequency Report

Numerical values represent counts or percentages (%) for respondents who indicated that they were active duty military or DON civilian and their gender.

Response Codes:

SD	D	N	A	SA
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither...	Agree	Strongly Agree
N	R	S	F	A
Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	Always

I am assigned to or near:

Region/Subregion	Total	Military		Civilian	
		Male	Female	Male	Female
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	888	291	75	316	206
Barking Sands	154	44	12	55	43
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	364	286	69	6	3

Marital Status:

	Single	Married	Separated	Divorced
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	21.73%	70.27%	1.01%	6.98%
Barking Sands	19.48%	74.03%	0.65%	5.84%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	35.16%	59.34%	1.92%	3.57%

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On a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best) please rate your current Quality of Home Life (QOHL) at your location. QOHL is the degree to which you enjoy where you live, and the opportunities available for housing, recreation, etc.

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Navy Region Hawaii	2%	1%	3%	5%	8%	9%	14%	27%	14%	17%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	2%	1%	4%	5%	8%	10%	16%	28%	13%	15%
Barking Sands	0%	0%	3%	7%	7%	11%	13%	28%	18%	13%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	2%	2%	4%	8%	9%	10%	16%	25%	11%	13%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOHL rating.

	+	N	-
Quality of your home	65.11%	24.59%	10.30%
Quality of the school for dependent children	26.92%	57.08%	16.00%
Quality of the childcare available	24.34%	66.71%	8.95%
Shopping & dining opportunities	62.06%	25.54%	12.40%
Recreational opportunities	76.15%	19.31%	4.54%
Access to spouse employment	27.93%	55.12%	16.95%
Access to quality medical/dental care	56.14%	31.05%	12.81%
Cost of living	14.03%	27.53%	58.44%

On a scale of 1 (worst) to (best) please rate your Quality of Work Life (QOWL). QOWL is the degree to which you enjoy where you work and available opportunities for professional growth.

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Navy Region Hawaii	7%	5%	7%	6%	11%	9%	15%	19%	10%	9%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	8%	4%	5%	7%	9%	11%	17%	17%	11%	10%
Barking Sands	5%	3%	8%	5%	14%	6%	19%	23%	8%	10%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	4%	5%	4%	7%	11%	9%	16%	21%	12%	10%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your QOWL rating.

	+	N	-
Job satisfaction	55.37%	27.55%	17.09%
Leadership support	49.27%	27.22%	23.52%
Leadership opportunities	42.29%	36.43%	21.28%
Length of workday	50.59%	30.77%	18.63%
Advancement opportunities	33.43%	37.96%	28.61%
Training opportunities	35.73%	33.98%	30.29%
Awards and recognition	28.68%	36.71%	34.61%
Command morale	36.85%	34.61%	28.54%
Command climate	39.50%	36.85%	23.66%
Quality of workplace facilities	36.15%	35.59%	28.26%

My job affords me a reasonable amount of quality time with my family while ashore.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	6%	9%	25%	39%	21%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	14%	14%	21%	28%	23%
Barking Sands	0%	3%	19%	54%	24%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	4%	12%	26%	38%	20%

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Paygrade:

Region/Subregion	E1-E3	E4-E6	E7-E9	CWO-O3	O4-O5	O6+
Navy Region Hawaii	5%	53%	17%	13%	10%	2%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	3%	47%	21%	12%	13%	4%
Barking Sands	2%	64%	7%	18%	7%	2%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	7%	58%	15%	12%	8%	0%

My command gives me sufficient time during working hours to participate in a physical readiness exercise program.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	8%	11%	11%	34%	36%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	10%	9%	11%	31%	39%
Barking Sands	2%	13%	9%	33%	44%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	6%	13%	12%	37%	32%

My current work week affords enough time to complete mission tasks in a timely manner while maintaining an acceptable work-home life balance.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	10%	16%	15%	39%	20%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	16%	19%	13%	32%	21%
Barking Sands	0%	4%	9%	58%	29%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	5%	16%	17%	43%	18%

During the last performance evaluation cycle, my supervisor provided me with feedback that enabled me to improve my performance before my formal performance appraisal/EVAL/FITREP.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	7%	9%	18%	42%	24%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	7%	9%	18%	41%	26%
Barking Sands	9%	9%	9%	41%	33%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	5%	10%	20%	44%	21%

My sponsor was helpful in my transition.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	11%	12%	17%	36%	23%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	13%	13%	18%	35%	21%
Barking Sands	10%	12%	10%	42%	27%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	9%	13%	17%	37%	25%

In my professional development I am being mentored by someone.

Region/Subregion	Yes	No
Navy Region Hawaii	58%	42%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	56%	44%
Barking Sands	60%	40%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	60%	40%

I am mentoring others.

Region/Subregion	Yes	No
Navy Region Hawaii	75%	25%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	76%	24%
Barking Sands	65%	35%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	75%	25%

Rate your overall satisfaction with the Fleet Family Support Center (FFSC) services on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best).

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
Navy Region Hawaii	16	8	15	22	48	28	63	114	49	59	422	7.01
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	3	0	3	9	19	12	33	74	28	34	215	7.58
Barking Sands	8	3	5	1	2	1	4	1	1	1	27	3.85
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	5	5	7	12	27	15	26	38	17	24	176	6.75

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your FFSC rating.

	+	N	-
Family/Social Services available	54.61%	38.06%	7.33%
Quality of services	52.84%	38.15%	9.00%
Appointment availability	40.28%	48.58%	11.14%
Staff's customer service	51.18%	39.81%	9.00%
Hours of operation	41.23%	49.29%	9.48%

Rate your overall satisfaction with the Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) services on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best).

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
Navy Region Hawaii	6	6	14	21	33	35	109	180	121	115	640	7.75
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	1	1	6	8	11	15	52	93	64	58	309	7.97
Barking Sands	0	0	0	2	0	5	9	12	12	13	53	8.21
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	5	5	7	11	22	15	48	72	41	44	270	7.41

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your MWR rating.

	+	N	-
Variety of MWR services available	76.64%	18.07%	5.30%
Quality of services	70.40%	24.92%	4.67%
Cost	59.50%	31.00%	9.50%
Staff's customer service	63.24%	31.62%	5.14%
Hours of operation	54.36%	35.67%	9.97%

Rate your overall satisfaction with the Navy Exchange (NEX) on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best).

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
Navy Region Hawaii	18	13	20	29	53	48	100	191	141	148	761	7.56
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	2	1	3	9	15	18	38	94	88	87	355	8.20
Barking Sands	8	6	9	7	7	5	8	3	1	0	54	4.24
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	8	6	8	13	31	24	54	91	49	59	343	7.38

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your NEX rating.

	+	N	-
Variety of merchandise selections	62.32%	21.87%	15.81%
Quality of merchandise selections	68.91%	21.74%	9.35%
Cost	50.20%	31.09%	18.71%
Staff's customer service	61.92%	29.12%	8.96%
Hours of operation	70.49%	23.19%	6.32%

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Rate your overall satisfaction with the Commissary on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best).

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
Navy Region Hawaii	38	11	27	27	52	60	102	167	105	127	716	7.17
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	3	4	12	10	21	26	56	84	52	68	336	7.62
Barking Sands	27	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	30	1.50
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	8	7	15	16	29	33	45	82	50	56	341	7.20

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your Commissary rating.

	+	N	-
Variety of products/produce/meats selection	62.29%	20.95%	16.76%
Quality of products/produce/meats selection	57.82%	22.07%	20.11%
Cost	55.45%	27.51%	17.04%
Staff's customer service	55.73%	29.33%	14.94%
Hours of operation	58.10%	24.02%	17.88%

Rate your overall satisfaction with your healthcare benefits on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best).

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
Navy Region Hawaii	18	12	32	39	83	68	136	156	99	123	766	7.10
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	7	5	16	18	32	29	64	69	56	57	353	7.21
Barking Sands	2	2	4	4	5	3	11	12	5	7	55	6.64
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	8	4	11	17	45	34	60	74	37	58	348	7.10

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your healthcare benefits rating.

	+	N	-
Types of healthcare services available	62.40%	27.42%	10.18%
Appointment availability	43.08%	30.16%	26.76%
Waiting time	39.56%	34.33%	26.11%
Time with staff or care provider	50.39%	33.81%	15.80%
Hours of operation	47.65%	34.73%	17.62%

Rate your overall satisfaction with your family's healthcare benefit on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best).

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
Navy Region Hawaii	32	12	34	32	120	81	118	136	86	114	765	6.80
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	15	5	15	13	53	37	60	59	48	48	353	6.84
Barking Sands	4	2	5	2	6	4	8	13	4	7	55	6.38
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	12	5	14	16	60	37	49	63	33	58	347	6.84

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your family's healthcare benefits rating.

	+	N	-
Types of healthcare services available	51.24%	36.60%	12.16%
Appointment availability	37.65%	38.04%	24.31%
Waiting time	33.73%	44.31%	21.96%
Time with staff or care provider	44.84%	39.87%	15.29%
Hours of operation	42.22%	44.84%	12.94%

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Rate your satisfaction with your Child Development Center (CDC) on a scale of 1 (worst to 10 (best)).

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
Navy Region Hawaii	5	1	6	5	8	1	11	19	15	9	80	6.81
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	1	0	2	1	3	1	1	11	8	5	33	7.55
Barking Sands	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	3	0	1	9	6.33
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	4	1	2	2	3	0	9	5	7	3	36	6.42

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your CDC rating.

	+	N	-
Availability of childcare services (regular &/or drop off)	52.50%	17.50%	30.00%
Quality of childcare services (regular &/or drop off)	63.75%	27.50%	8.75%
Cost of childcare services	42.50%	31.25%	26.25%
Staff's customer service	60.00%	28.75%	11.25%
Hours of operation	58.75%	27.50%	13.75%

Rate your satisfaction with your Child Development Home (CDH) Program on a scale of 1 (worst to 10 (best)).

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
Navy Region Hawaii	3	1	1	1	1	3	2	2	5	5	24	6.67
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	3	2	9	7.22
Barking Sands	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	-
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	2	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	3	14	6.29

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your CDH rating.

	+	N	-
Travel distance from home to local approved CDH	70.83%	16.67%	12.50%
Availability of childcare services (regular &/or drop off)	50.00%	37.50%	12.50%
Quality of childcare services (regular &/or drop off)	54.17%	33.33%	12.50%
Cost	41.67%	37.50%	20.83%
Staff	62.50%	29.17%	8.33%
Hours of operation	62.50%	29.17%	8.33%

I currently reside:

Region/Subregion	GOVB	GOVF	PPV	Home 1	Home 2
Navy Region Hawaii	64	192	138	69	297
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	21	88	76	41	126
Barking Sands	5	14	14	0	22
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	38	89	46	27	143

Rate your overall satisfaction with your (housing) on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best).

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
Navy Region Hawaii	55	38	49	56	79	75	137	131	67	71	758	6.16
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	21	18	18	23	32	40	65	64	34	36	351	6.37
Barking Sands	3	4	7	3	7	7	10	8	5	1	55	5.64
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	31	16	23	30	39	28	59	55	28	33	342	5.99

Rate your overall satisfaction with your (housing) on a scale of 1 (worst) to 10 (best).

Housing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
GOVB	55	38	49	56	79	75	137	131	67	71	758	6.16
GOVF	27	18	13	17	17	15	38	28	13	6	192	5.27
PPV	18	8	22	13	12	14	20	11	8	10	136	5.12
Home 1	2	1	0	1	1	4	13	16	15	16	69	7.99
Home 2	4	8	10	18	36	32	58	68	26	37	297	6.90

GOVB=Government Bachelor Housing, GOVF=Government Family Housing, PPV=Public/Private Venture Housing , Home 1=Purchased home, Home 2 = Rented/Leased home

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your (PPV housing) rating.

PPV at Joint Base Pearl-Hickam

	+	N	-
Location of dwelling	73.33%	14.67%	12.00%
Quality of dwelling	61.33%	22.67%	16.00%
Affordability of the dwelling	29.33%	25.33%	45.33%
Within Basic Allowance for Housing amount	34.67%	30.67%	34.67%
Affordability of insurance	38.67%	57.33%	4.00%
Quality of neighborhood	61.33%	25.33%	13.33%
Safety and security	44.00%	13.33%	42.67%
School system	22.67%	46.67%	30.67%

PPV at Barking Sands

	+	N	-
Location of dwelling	78.57%	21.43%	0.00%
Quality of dwelling	7.14%	35.71%	57.14%
Affordability of the dwelling	7.14%	42.86%	50.00%
Within Basic Allowance for Housing amount	21.43%	50.00%	28.57%
Affordability of insurance	14.29%	71.43%	14.29%
Quality of neighborhood	64.29%	14.29%	21.43%
Safety and security	85.71%	14.29%	0.00%
School system	0.00%	35.71%	64.29%

PPV at Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay

	+	N	-
Location of dwelling	86.67%	8.89%	4.44%
Quality of dwelling	62.22%	24.44%	13.33%
Affordability of the dwelling	15.56%	44.44%	40.00%
Within Basic Allowance for Housing amount	35.56%	28.89%	35.56%
Affordability of insurance	37.78%	55.56%	6.67%
Quality of neighborhood	62.22%	24.44%	13.33%
Safety and security	53.33%	24.44%	22.22%
School system	22.22%	42.22%	35.56%

For each of the factors below, please indicate whether they have a positive, neutral, or negative impact on your (Government Family Housing) rating.

GOVF at Joint Base Pearl-Hickam

	+	N	-
Location of dwelling	87.50%	7.95%	4.55%
Quality of dwelling	54.55%	20.45%	25.00%
Affordability of the dwelling	23.86%	22.73%	53.41%
Within Basic Allowance for Housing amount	30.68%	28.41%	40.91%
Affordability of insurance	38.64%	52.27%	9.09%
Quality of neighborhood	57.95%	26.14%	15.91%
Safety and security	36.36%	27.27%	36.36%
School system	26.14%	51.14%	22.73%

GOVF at Barking Sands

	+	N	-
Location of dwelling	85.71%	7.14%	7.14%
Quality of dwelling	42.86%	50.00%	7.14%
Affordability of the dwelling	28.57%	35.71%	35.71%
Within Basic Allowance for Housing amount	42.86%	21.43%	35.71%
Affordability of insurance	42.86%	35.71%	21.43%
Quality of neighborhood	85.71%	14.29%	0.00%
Safety and security	85.71%	14.29%	0.00%
School system	21.43%	57.14%	21.43%

GOVF at Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay

	+	N	-
Location of dwelling	68.54%	20.22%	11.24%
Quality of dwelling	47.19%	32.58%	20.22%
Affordability of the dwelling	23.60%	30.34%	46.07%
Within Basic Allowance for Housing amount	29.21%	29.21%	41.57%
Affordability of insurance	35.96%	55.06%	8.99%
Quality of neighborhood	56.18%	23.60%	20.22%
Safety and security	50.56%	16.85%	32.58%
School system	19.10%	57.30%	23.60%

	GS1-8	GS9-12	GS13-14	GS15	SES	WG...	NAF	Other	Total
Count	317	105	94	16	1	49	34	17	633
%	50 %	17%	15%	3%	-%	8%	5%	3%	

GS/NSPS equivalent.

My position description is current and accurately describes my functions, tasks, and responsibilities.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	15%	28%	0%	44%	13%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	16%	29%	0%	42%	12%
Barking Sands	10%	20%	0%	55%	14%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	0%	22%	0%	56%	22%

I work more hours than I report in a pay period because I cannot complete all assigned tasks during scheduled work hours.

Region/Subregion	N	R	S	F	A
Navy Region Hawaii	20%	22%	28%	17%	12%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	19%	21%	28%	18%	14%
Barking Sands	26%	26%	28%	16%	4%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	33%	22%	33%	11%	0%

The Human Resource Service Center provides timely, accurate response to my queries.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	DK	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	13%	15%	40%	27%	5%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	13%	16%	40%	26%	5%
Barking Sands	10%	13%	44%	30%	2%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	0%	0%	11%	78%	11%

My (local) Human Resource Office provides timely, accurate response to my queries.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	DK	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	12%	15%	32%	33%	7%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	14%	15%	32%	32%	8%
Barking Sands	6%	18%	32%	38%	6%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	0%	11%	33%	44%	11%

I understand how to apply for a job vacancy and where to submit an application for positions within this region.

Region/Subregion	Yes	No
Navy Region Hawaii	89%	11%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	90%	10%
Barking Sands	87%	13%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	78%	22%

My command /organization conducts recruitment actions fairly and fill job vacancies with the best-qualified candidate.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	DK	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	17%	23%	26%	26%	8%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	19%	24%	24%	24%	9%
Barking Sands	8%	18%	35%	35%	4%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	0%	0%	22%	44%	33%

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I have the tools and resources needed to do my job properly.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	9%	19%	18%	42%	13%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	11%	20%	18%	39%	12%
Barking Sands	8%	20%	18%	43%	12%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	3%	17%	16%	49%	14%

I have adequate guidance from command leadership to perform my job successfully.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	8%	13%	21%	41%	17%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	10%	15%	19%	39%	16%
Barking Sands	3%	13%	23%	43%	18%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	3%	6%	22%	49%	20%

The DON civilian recruitment process is responsive to my command's civilian personnel requirements.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	8%	9%	60%	18%	6%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	10%	12%	55%	18%	5%
Barking Sands	7%	11%	52%	26%	4%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	2%	1%	75%	14%	8%

I have the tools and resources needed to do my job properly.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	9%	19%	18%	42%	13%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	11%	20%	18%	39%	12%
Barking Sands	8%	20%	18%	43%	12%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	3%	17%	16%	49%	14%

Do you have adequate time at work to complete required Military training Navy Knowledge Online via (NKO) training?

Region/Subregion	Yes	No
Navy Region Hawaii	68%	32%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	67%	33%
Barking Sands	75%	25%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	69%	31%

Are you able to access NKO at work?

Region/Subregion	Yes	No
Navy Region Hawaii	94%	6%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	93%	7%
Barking Sands	94%	6%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	94%	6%

How would you rate your access to the Internet from work?

Region/Subregion	Limited	Unlimited
Navy Region Hawaii	42%	58%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	37%	63%
Barking Sands	39%	61%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	53%	47%

I am satisfied with the overall quality of my workplace facilities.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	9%	18%	20%	43%	10%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	10%	18%	18%	44%	10%
Barking Sands	2%	16%	21%	50%	12%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	8%	20%	26%	35%	11%

My command is concerned about my safety.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	2%	4%	12%	45%	37%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	3%	4%	13%	45%	35%
Barking Sands	1%	1%	16%	53%	29%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	1%	3%	8%	44%	44%

My command has a program in place to address potential safety issues.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	1%	3%	12%	51%	34%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	2%	3%	12%	51%	31%
Barking Sands	0%	1%	17%	59%	23%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	1%	1%	7%	46%	44%

I have adequate guidance from command leadership to perform my job successfully.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	8%	13%	21%	41%	17%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	10%	15%	19%	39%	16%
Barking Sands	3%	13%	23%	43%	18%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	3%	6%	22%	49%	20%

My job is important and makes a real contribution to my command.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	3%	4%	13%	43%	37%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	3%	3%	13%	42%	39%
Barking Sands	1%	1%	13%	52%	32%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	2%	4%	15%	45%	34%

_____ is occurring at my command.

	SD	D	N	A	SA
Fraternization	13.40%	23.54%	43.97%	11.18%	7.92%
Favoritism	11.10%	19.02%	33.38%	22.28%	14.21%
Gender/Sex Discrimination	20.52%	32.81%	36.00%	6.74%	3.93%
Sexual Harassment	23.78%	34.96%	34.30%	4.44%	2.52%
Race Discrimination	23.78%	34.96%	34.30%	4.44%	2.52%
Hazing	29.20%	35.88%	30.08%	3.37%	1.47%

My performance evaluations have been fair.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	4%	7%	22%	44%	22%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	4%	8%	22%	43%	24%
Barking Sands	5%	7%	18%	47%	22%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	4%	6%	26%	46%	18%

The awards and recognition program is fair and equitable.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	11%	16%	32%	28%	13%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	13%	18%	32%	24%	12%
Barking Sands	11%	11%	35%	30%	13%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	6%	13%	28%	38%	15%

Military and civilian personnel work well together at my command.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	4%	6%	25%	46%	19%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	5%	7%	23%	47%	18%
Barking Sands	1%	5%	28%	48%	17%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	1%	3%	30%	43%	23%

My command's Equal Opportunity Program (EO - to include Equal Employment Opportunity & Command Equal Opportunity) is effective.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	4%	6%	33%	39%	18%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	4%	6%	36%	37%	17%
Barking Sands	1%	7%	33%	45%	13%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	3%	3%	28%	42%	25%

I know who to contact with an EEO/EO question or complaint.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	3%	7%	14%	50%	26%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	4%	8%	13%	49%	26%
Barking Sands	1%	7%	17%	59%	16%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	1%	4%	16%	48%	32%

I am aware or know how to find my local IG hotline number.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	7%	13%	19%	42%	19%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	7%	14%	17%	42%	20%
Barking Sands	3%	8%	20%	55%	15%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	8%	11%	24%	37%	20%

A grievance/complaint in my command will be handled in a fair, timely, and just manner.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	6%	9%	34%	34%	18%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	8%	9%	35%	30%	17%
Barking Sands	3%	9%	34%	40%	13%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	2%	6%	29%	40%	23%

My command adequately protects my Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	3%	4%	19%	51%	24%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	3%	4%	18%	50%	25%
Barking Sands	4%	5%	19%	56%	17%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	2%	1%	20%	50%	26%

I know who the command Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) representative is?

Region/Subregion	Yes	No
Navy Region Hawaii	77%	23%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	70%	30%
Barking Sands	81%	19%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	92%	8%

My command's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program is effective.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	1%	1%	36%	39%	22%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	1%	1%	42%	36%	19%
Barking Sands	0%	1%	33%	47%	19%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	1%	1%	23%	43%	32%

A sexual assault report/complaint in my command will be handled in a fair, timely, and just manner.

Region/Subregion	SD	D	N	A	SA
Navy Region Hawaii	2%	2%	33%	38%	25%
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	2%	3%	37%	36%	22%
Barking Sands	1%	1%	27%	52%	19%
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	1%	1%	25%	36%	37%

Are you currently serving in a command leadership position (e.g. Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Officer -in-Charge, Chief of Staff, Executive Assistant, Deputy, Executive Director, Command Master chief, or Senior Enlisted Advisor)?

Region/Subregion	Yes	No
Navy Region Hawaii	130	1207
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	74	764
Barking Sands	13	135
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	42	297

On a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best) please rate your command's quality of work life (QOWL) as to the degree in which they enjoy their workplace, the work they do, and available opportunities they have for professional growth.

Region/Subregion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Count	Avg
Navy Region Hawaii	4	4	0	1	12	10	21	37	21	21	131	7.47
Joint Base Pearl-Hickam	3	1	0	1	5	5	15	18	16	10	74	7.53
Barking Sands	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	4	1	3	13	8.00
Marine Corps Base Kaneohe	1	3	0	0	5	5	2	15	4	8	43	7.26

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