

**Naval District of Washington
Fire & Emergency Services**

**Emergency Incident
Critique Package**

Incident Type: **Active Shooter**

Incident Number: **1166**

Location: **Building 197**

Date: **September 16, 2013**

Package Prepared by: **Battalion Chief** (b) (6), (b) (7)(F)
Captain (b) (6), (b) (7)(F)

Date Prepared: **September 25, 2013**

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Incident Overview

Brief description of the incident:

At 0823hrs NDW Fire & Emergency Services was dispatched for the report of an "Active Shooter" at Building 197 on the Washington Navy Yard. The initial report was for several people shot and injured, and the shooter still on the loose.

Weather conditions affecting the operation:

Cloudy with a few Rain Showers

Main hazard encountered:

Unknown Situation – Discrepancies in the number of shooters, the number of victims and the location of the victims.

INCIDENT DIAGRAM SHEET

Basic drawing of structure and/or area involved: (any unusual features, topographical features which influenced operations, type of vehicle involved, access problems, etc.)

Incident Location - (b) (6), (b) (7)

Unified Command Post - (b) (6), (b) (7)

Triage and Treatment Area - (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

Regional Operations Center - (b) (6), (b) (7)

Emergency Operations Center - (b) (6), (b) (7)

Shot & Injured Individuals - (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

Other Medical Emergencies - (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

Apparatus Placement

Description of obstacles or problems gaining access to the scene: (if applicable)

Extreme Caution had to be used while approaching the scene due to the large amount of Emergency Vehicles (Fire & Police) that were coming into the area. There was also a lot of pedestrian traffic as people were initially evacuating the Navy Yard until the gates were secured.

Battalion 41 – In front of Building 183

Engine 41 / Tower 21 – Initially at the 6th / M St Gate, moved to O St Gate when assigned to work with the Triage Group.

Ambulance 41 – Maintained a Position at the 6th / M St Gate with the DC FEMS Medical Bus

Engine 42 – Maintained a Position in quarters, until being re-located to the O St Gate to assist with triage and treatment

Engine 43 – Remained in service at JBAB to run other emergency calls

FIRST ARRIVING UNIT

Describe the conditions found upon arrival:

First Arriving Units arrived to find the 6th Street Gate secured, and were initially unable to gain entry to the base. Numerous Fire, EMS, and Police Units were rushing towards to area of the base. Units were still unsure of the condition or location of the shooter, or the number and severity of the injured

What were the initial actions of the first arriving unit? (Problems encountered and resolved).

First Arriving Battalion Chief 1 established the Navy Yard Command at the 6th Street Gate, until being allowed access to the area by Building 183. Mutual Aid with the District of Columbia was requested via the DCFEMS Radio, and upon arrival of the Special Ops Deputy and the Deputy Fire Chief and Unified Command Post was established.

Additional Arriving Units, staged on M Street until being given assignments by command.

Incident Command

Location of Command Post

In front of Building 183, moved to 1st Floor Conference Room in Building 183

Incident Management:

Unified Command: Battalion Chief (b) (6),
Captain (b) (6) (Command Aide)
DCFEMS Special Ops Chief (b) (6)
DCFEMS Deputy Fire Chief (b) (6),
FBI Agent (b) (6),
MPD Officer (b) (6)

Safety: DCFEMS Battalion Chief 3

Accountability: Captain (b) (6) maintained NDW F&ES Unit Accountability

EMS Group: DCFEMS Medical Director Miramontes
NDW F&ES FF/Paramedic Page

Triage Group: DCFEMS EMS 8 (E41, E42, and Tower 21 Operated in this Group)

Treatment Group: DCFEMS Medic 1

ROC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(E),
(b) (6), (b) (7)

EOC: (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

JBAB Command: (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)
(Command of Additional Routine Emergencies throughout the NDW Central Region)

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio Channels Used:

BAFB NPFDISP – (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

BAFB NPFTAC1 – (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

DCFEMS Channel A3 – (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

DCFEMS Channel A7 – (b) (6), (b) (7)

DCFEMS & NDW F&ES operated seamlessly throughout the incident, communications between the two agencies was nearly flawless, and the Incident Management Team worked very well together. Additional EMS resources were requested from Prince Georges County, MD and Montgomery County, MD and communication between those agencies was also without incident.

Communications/radio problems encountered: (Explain)

1) Once the Unified Command Post was moved into the (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) we lost the ability to transmit on the NDW ELMR Radios. We could receive, but in order to transmit we had to walk into the lobby entrance area. The DCFEMS Motorola XTS5000 radios did not have this issue and maintained communication.

2) Utility 2 with 2 NDW Firefighters and 2 FBI Swat Medics went to Building 104 for a Diabetic Emergency as a result of the shelter in place order. While in Building 104, Utility 2 could not transmit or receive radio transmissions.

3) Approximately 4 hours into the incident several of the ELMR Batteries were dying on the radios. All of the batteries were fresh as they were changed during morning checkouts between 7 & 8 am. Fresh batteries had to be brought to the scene. All of our ELMR Batteries are less than 6 months old, and are regularly ran through the battery conditioner at the station.

Rescue

Life safety Hazards: (Explain)

Active Shooter – It took a long time due to the size of the building for law enforcement officials to complete an entire walk through to determine the status of the shooter. There were also numerous other conflicting reports of the possibility of their being more than one shooter on the Navy Yard.

Were any rescues made?:

Yes, Utility 2 with NDW Fire & ES personnel and FBI Swat Medics went to several buildings on the yard during the incident to extract shot, injury, and sick people. (Buildings 201, 175, 22, 211, 210, 76)

Steps taken to ensure life safety: (Explain)

NDW F & ES personnel were grouped together with FBI Swat Medics for Safety and travelled designated paths that kept them the most secure.

Health hazards to emergency personnel:

None

What safety precautions were taken to protect emergency personnel?

All NDW F & ES and DCFEMS personnel were staged outside the gate of the WNY, with the exception of those operating at the Unified Command Post, ROC, and EOC.

Lessons Learned

- * Request Mutual Aid early in Incident, preparing for the worst.
- * Ensure representation from all agencies at the Unified Command Post.
- * Police Agencies cannot talk to each other like FD Agencies, ensure that all Police Agencies are reporting the same conditions to ensure personnel safety before sending in personnel.
- * A Rehab/Canteen Unit needs to be started early in the incident for personnel safety
- * NDW F & ES needs to purchase additional Triage Equipment to include Tags, Tape, Flags, etc
- * NDW F & ES needs to purchase Mass Casualty Equipment (Disposable backboards, head blocks, white goods, etc) to become less reliant on mutual aid or in the event of two incidents
- * Need to Validate the ID's of people seeking entry into buildings like Fire Station, Over 100 People ran to the firehouse seeking shelter, how did we know one was not the shooter.
- * Need for additional DCFEMS Portables (maybe solved with new multiband ELMR Radios)

Items Moving Forward

- * Explore sending NDW F & ES Paramedics to CONTOMS or Tactical Medic School
- * Continue to pursue converting 2 F/F positions to Paramedic positions, bringing total to 6
- * Explore raising the daily staffing level at NDW Central to 22, No Cross Staffing on E41/A41 Extra staffing at Station 1 due to a scheduled Meeting, led to all apparatus being fully staffed.
- * Work with N6 on Reporting ELMR Radio Problems, and finding solutions
- * Explore enhanced use of Regional NDW F & ES Units to respond on these types of events
- * Communications should explore the possibility of dedicated call takers, dispatchers could not provide responding FD units updated information, due to answering emergency calls
- * Continue to build working relationships with mutual aid agencies
- * Additional Training on Active Shooter, and Mass Casualty Incidents.

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Chronological Order of Events (Times are Estimated, as they were not logged at UCP)

0827 Initial call received for an active shooter with multiple victims at building 197 WNY

0836 Engine 42 (WNY) sheltered in place in fire station, Battalion 41, Engine 41, Ambulance 41 and Tower21 responded to staging at 6th & M St. B41 requested mutual aid from DCFD, Mass Casualty Task (MCI) force

0836 B41 Established WNY Command (ICP) at (b) (6), (b) (7)(E). Multiple radio transmissions from the RDC advising the IC of multiple gunshots in building 197.

IC receiving calls from the RDC – victim on the roof of B197 and in room's 4E-2023, 3W-2820, 4W-2068 and 4E-2118

0850 Unified Command/Unified Command Post (UCP) established between NDWFD IC, DCFD BC3, DCFD Special Ops Chief and the DCFD Operations Chief

DC Hendley Arrives at UCP, assumed the UCP Command Liaison element

0855 DCFD units were in staging at 6th & M St. – A30, M1, EMS3, PMEng18, A15, Mass Casualty Bus, EMS8, BC3

0900 UCP relocated to interior of (b) (6), (b) (7) (due to possible additional shooters). UCP personnel were B41, (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) (E42 OIC as the IC Support), (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) (DCFD Operations Deputy), (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) (DCFD Special Operations), (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) (DCFD), (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) (MPD), (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) (FBI).

0903 RDC confirmed (4) victims- (Identified above)

0903 RDC advised the UCP of (4) priority 4 (deceased) patients located in 4W-2604

0915 Unified CP established the triage location, (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

RDC advised the UCP of shooting victim, S/E Corner B197 in alley

RDC advised the UCP of shooting victim, B28

RDC advised the UCP of shooting victim 1st floor B197

RDC advised the UCP of shooting victim at New Jersey & M St.

RDC advised the UCP of shooting victim, 1st floor B175

Confirmed by FBI and NDW Police (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) (NAVFAC Security) confirmed DOA

RDC advised the UCP of shooting victim (head), B175 (patient stable per Clinic Staff)

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RDC advised the UCP that occupant of B197 were being relocated to B200, 1st floor

0945 UCP (based on initial reports) 13 victims and 6 confirmed DOA

1018 (3) victims (uninjured) removed from roofs of 197 & 212 (via Park Police Helo), taken to Park Police Hanger

1038 NDW Utility 2 (With FD Personnel and FBI Medics) used to extract several victims from the hot zone to the triage area

UCP Requested an EMS Strike Task Force (5 EMS Transport units, from PGFD & MCFD)

RDC advised the UCP, (b) (6), (b) (7)(E), 2 patients

Hospital Status/Availability requested and received by the UCP

Regional Fire Chief Arrives at UCP, established direct link with EOC and ROC.

1239 Injured MPD officer at 9th & M (Treated by EMS). NDW Utility 2 (With FD Personnel and FBI Medics) to area near B101 and B405 for injured Park Police Officer (head injury)

1400 UCP reports 10 (DOA) and (17) victims transported and/or treated and released Multiple other patient (indirect/not actual shooting victims) treated and released/walked away/refused treatment (medical conditions due to lack of access to personnel medications or food, i.e. diabetic etc...)

1546 E201 (NDW Indian Head) released from Fire Station 1

1658 Command Terminated, E42 and Reserve AMB remaining on the scene supporting FBI/NCIS Investigation

1730 Received update advised (3) more of the victims that were transported to various local hospitals have expired due to their injuries, for a total now of (13) DOA's

1800 ALL NDWFD & DCFD personnel involved in the incident have been through CISM, and NDWFD personnel have been relieved.

** Exact times of above events not established as of this time.

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TOTAL Victims

7 confirmed DOA (based on MPD Primary search B197)
1 confirmed DOA (via NDW Police Officer B28)
1 confirmed DOA (B116, outside next to an SUV)
1 confirmed DOA (at GW Hospital)

* 3 additional confirmed DOA's (from those transported to medical facilities)

4 EMS transports (air and ground) to GW Trauma Center
2 EMS transports (air and ground) to Med star Hospital
1 EMS transport (ground) to Washington Hospital Center
5 Patients Triage, Signed Released

Multiple other patient (indirect/not actual shooting victims) treated and released/walked away/refused treatment (medical conditions due to lack of access to personnel medications or food, i.e. diabetic etc...)

Miscellaneous Incident Information

All Regional NDWFD personnel notified of incident, required to remain in quarters until further, and all 56 hour personnel on standby.

E201 (Indian Head) arrived at Station 1 JBAB, 4 personnel

All NSAW/JBAB/WNY Fire Personnel directly involved in the incident have been relieved of duty and required to attend mandatory CSIM (Per Regional Fire Chief)

Reserve Ambulance placed in service at JBAB

Remaining NDW Fire units (B41, E41, T21, A41) have been relieved by new personnel.

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(E)