

5510
Ser NOCA
29 Jun 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Executive Assistant, Chief of Naval Operations

Ref: (a) SECNAV M-5510.36, DON INFOSEC Programs

Encl: (1) CPF ltr 5720 Ser 01J/1634 of 24 Jun 16
(2) COMTHIRDFLT ltr 5720 Ser N00/215 of 28 Jun 16
(3) COMNECC ltr 5510 Ser N00/383 of 29 Jun 16
(4) Executive Summary (Breckenridge Supplement) to DESRON
FIVE-ZERO ltr 5830 Ser N00/034 of 28 Feb 16
(5) VCNO ltr 5830 Ser N09D/16U112919 of 31 Mar 16
(6) CPF ltr 5830 Ser N01/084 of 31 Mar 16
(7) COMNECCPAC ltr 5830 Ser N00/026 of 11 Apr 16
(8) COMTHIRDFLT ltr 5830 Ser N00/S003 of 15 Apr 16
(9) CPE ltr 5830 Ser N00/0100 of 20 Apr 16
(10) VCNO ltr 5830 Ser N09/16U100522 of 31 May 16

1. Enclosures (1) through (3) defer declassification authority of enclosures (6) through (9). NAVCENT and DNS-36 conducted a declassification review for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) proactive release of enclosures (4) through (10). As a result, information was redacted for those sections unable to be declassified and released in accordance with reference (a).

2. All other information is determined to be "UNCLASSIFIED."

3. The points of contact for this matter are (b) (6) (b) (6) NAVCENT, and (b) (6) DNS-36. (b) (6) can be reached at (b) (6) or email: (b) (6)@me.navy.mil, and (b) (6) can be reached at (b) (6) or email: (b) (6)@navy.mil.


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IN REPLY REFER:
5830
Ser N00/0100
20 Apr 16

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USN ltr 5830 Ser N00/034 of 28 Feb 16

From: Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces
(2) VADM Richard P. Breckenridge, USN

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE INCIDENT IN THE VICINITY OF FARSI ISLAND INVOLVING TWO RIVERINE COMMAND BOATS (RCB 802 AND 805) ON OR ABOUT 12 JANUARY 2016

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) In accordance with the second endorsement, I have reviewed those opinions and recommendations that concern issues within my purview and I concur with the opinions and recommendations as modified by intermediate endorsers, except as noted below in paragraph 4.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Leadership matters. We must inculcate in our Sailors the importance of strong, principled and positive leadership. The subject investigation revealed an operating environment and culture of complacency, indifference and lack of ownership from the junior enlisted onboard RCBs 802 and 805 through Commander, CTF-56 (more senior echelons of command were not considered in the subject investigation) – a mindset far astray of acceptable norms of behavior and conduct. Such culture is detrimental to good order and discipline and runs counter to established Navy standards and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) We failed one of the primary tenants of leadership – continuous preparation of our Sailors for mission success. I believe the pre-deployment process was sound and effective, yet a few months following the certification process, nearly every established norm for operational planning, navigation, maintenance and weapons proficiency was disregarded. Training and readiness do not end with deployment certification, but must continue throughout the deployment. This event highlights the importance of sustainment and in-theater training. The deployed operational Commander/ISIC has a responsibility to ensure deployed units are cognizant of changing operational environments and adhering to the basic and foundational principles learned during the pre-deployment training. Without this continued oversight, it has been historically demonstrated that some deployed units will deviate from established norms. Deviations, intentional or an oversight, risk the safety and security of our Sailors and mission accomplishment.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Evident throughout this event was a theme of ambiguous or unclear command and control. The command relationship between the two RCBs, the lack of oversight and forceful leadership from the OIC in Kuwait, the lack of forceful backup in mission planning and risk assessment by CTF-56 and inadequate support by the Tactical Operation Centers all point to a systemic command and control failure. Mission success requires our forces to possess a thorough understanding of the basic principles of command and control, which are foundational to all our operations. In particular, we must stress the

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importance of control – the act of monitoring and influencing decisions and actions throughout the evolution.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) The investigation, as amended by NECC PAC and COMTHIRDFLT, is lacking three critical areas.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) First, the investigation does not delve into the necessary detail to address the lack of leadership and complacency of the personnel; nor do the recommendations address how we prevent reoccurrence, whether through additional training or sustainment training to insure our forces are ready throughout the deployment for tasking by the Combatant Commanders and Naval Components.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Second, the investigation does not adequately assess the in-theater command and control. This assessment and any recommendations are valuable not only for COMFIFTHFLT but for other numbered fleet commanders employing similar command and control systems.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Third, although not identified as a causal factor in this investigation, I believe the breadth of mission sets for NECC PAC units should be reviewed to determine whether we can fully prepare our crews to meet such a wide-range of mission sets without sacrificing proficiency. I note the first two areas are not matters under my purview; however, in my opinion, these areas warrant further assessment. This third issue is a matter under my cognizance, and as such, I have addressed this issue in my below recommendation.

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) Additional Recommendation VLM.13: Within 60 days, NECC and NECC PAC should be directed to critically assess the training and certification for deployment process to determine if the end-product riverine boat squadron and crew are meeting the high expectations and standards necessary to safely and effectively complete deployed tasks in the various AORs. Additionally, NECC and NECC PAC should be directed to critically assess the required mission sets for NECC units. (b)(1) E.O. 13526 (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a) to ensure the mission sets are appropriate. Once these reviews are complete, NECC should brief results to CPF and CFFC.


S. H. SWIFT

Copy to:
COMTHIRDFLT
COMNECCPAC
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Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 20 April 2041

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