MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Executive Assistant, Chief of Naval Operations

Ref: (a) SECNAV M-5510.36, DON INFOSEC Programs

Encl: (1) CPF ltr 5720 Ser 013/1634 of 24 Jun 16
(2) CORTHIRDFLT ltr 5/20 Ser N00/215 of 26 Jun 16
(3) CORNECC ltr 5510 Ser N00/393 of 29 Jun 16
(4) Executive Summary (Breckenridge Supplement) to DESRON FIVE-ZERO ltr 5830 Ser N00/034 of 20 Feb 16
(5) VCN0 ltr 5830 Ser N00/160112913 of 31 Mar 16
(6) CPF ltr 5830 Ser N00/084 of 31 Mar 16
(7) CORNECCPAC ltr 5830 Ser N00/028 of 11 Apr 16
(8) CORTHIRDFLT ltr 5830 Ser N00/8003 of 15 Apr 16
(9) CPF ltr 5830 Ser N00/0100 of 20 Apr 16
(10) VCN0 ltr 5830 Ser N00/160113522 of 31 May 16

1. Enclosures (1) through (3) defer declassification authority of enclosures (6) through (9). NAVCENT and DNS-36 conducted a declassification review for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) proactive release of enclosures (4) through (10). As a result, information was redacted for those sections unable to be declassified and released in accordance with reference (a).

2. All other information is determined to be "UNCLASSIFIED."

3. The points of contact for this matter are: NAVCENT, and DNS-36. NAVCENT can be reached at or email: //your_email_address@navy.mil, and DNS-36 can be reached at or email: //your_email_address@navy.mil.

[Signature]

M. A. McCARTHY

Copy to: NAVCENT
DNS-36
FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN ltr 5830 Ser N00/034 of 28 Feb 16

From: Commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Pacific
To: Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Via: Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commander, U.S. Third Fleet

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE INCIDENT IN THE VICINITY OF Farsi ISLAND INVOLVING TWO RIVERINE COMMAND BOATS (RCB 802 AND RCB 805) ON OR ABOUT 12 JANUARY 2016

Encl: (Appendix I) NECC List of Additional References and Enclosures

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. (S//NF) I have reviewed in detail the Command Investigation into the incident in the vicinity of Farsi Island involving two Riverine Command Boats (RCB 802 and RCB 805) on or about 12 January 2016 as well as the FIRST ENDORSEMENT by Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. I concur with the opinions of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command that there was a failure to provide quality leadership at multiple levels; CTG 56.7 command lapses; an unprofessional detachment culture in Kuwait; inadequate CTF 56 oversight; and lack of sustainment training. The “admin move” mentality identified in the Command Investigation is unsatisfactory and indicated disregard of the Fleet Commander’s Intent regarding the potential Iranian threat, communicated in message traffic on 14 July 2015 and 17 December 2015. It is apparent that poor leadership and complacency while on deployment was the causal factor precipitating this incident which occurred in the final month of a six-month deployment. It included operational tasking for the RCB crews on 12 January 2016 that was not planned, evaluated or executed to reduce risk. However, after reviewing the investigation’s Findings of Fact and enclosures against training documentation available at CORIVGRU ONE and Expeditionary Warfighting Development Command (EXWDC), I find the opinion that “ineffective pre-deployment training set the stage for the 12 January 2016 incident off Farsi Island” unsubstantiated, and have documented the germane training events in this review/endorsement.

2. (S//NF) In addition to reviewing documentation from CRS-3’s training, assessment and certification, I reviewed the [b](1) E.O. 13926 1.4(a) and After Action Reports (AARs) from [b](1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a) [b](1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a). It is relevant that this mission tasking for the crews in question occurred after

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certification and just prior to their deployment to Fiefe. The tasking included: [b](1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a)

(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a) The CONOPS that was developed, briefed, and approved, and the mission executed by the crews of RCB 802 and 805 with oversight by [b](1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a)

(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a)

(b)(6) The demonstrated effectiveness of this unit, and specifically, these boat crews, just prior to deployment and documentation from their FRTP (addressed below) reinforce my opinion that poor leadership and complacency, from the boat crews up through CTF-56 level, while on deployment and not pre-deployment training shortfalls, led to a degradation of readiness. These deficiencies, coupled with the lack of adequate mission preparation and oversight, culminated in the incident IVO Farsi Island. [Encl (279)]

3. (U//FOUO) In order to provide appropriate context for this review and comments on the Investigation, below is a summary of the COMNECC/COMNECCPAC FRTP utilized to train, assess, and certify units in preparation for deployments, including CRS-3 prior to their [b](1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a)

(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a)

4. (U//FOUO) FRTP: To meet the Global Maritime Strategy, NECC resources Combatant Commanders (COCOM)/Navy Fleet Commanders operational requirements with tactical forces supporting both the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) and Global Response Force (GRF), as well as urgent "Surge" Requests for Services (RFS) and Requests for Forces (RFF). The FRTP, aligned with the Fleet Response Plan, provides structured and sequenced training to accomplish readiness. The FRTP is subdivided into the maintenance phase, basic phase, and advanced phase. Individual training requirements are completed in the maintenance phase, unit training in the basic phase, and multi-unit training is integrated into the advanced phase. CRS-3’s basic phase was led by the Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training Evaluation Unit (CORIVGRU ONE TEU), and the advanced phase was led by EXWDC, both Echelon IV commands. [Encl (280)]

(S/NF) Units are trained to established standards and assessed on their capabilities to accomplish mission sets including: Command and Control (C2); Waterborne Security Operations; Landside Security Operations; Security Operations in Support of Aircraft; Embarked Security Operations; Land Convoy Operations; Maritime Expeditionary Communications; and Base Camp Operations in an Expeditionary Environment. Final certification recommendation

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for respective FTN is contingent upon achieving the number of trained and ready boat crews required for this deployment. (b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a)
(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a)
(b)(1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a)

(U//FOUO) At the commencement of CRS-3’s FRTP, CORIVGRU ONE TEU established a FRTP for CRS-3 based on aggregated requirements listed in CORIVFORINST 3502.1 (Coastal Riverine Force Training Instruction), the deployment Force Tracking Number (FTN) capability requirements and CRS-3’s troop-to-task assessment. [Ref (f)]

(U//FOUO) Basic Phase: In accordance with the NECC/NECCPAC Training Manual (COMNECC/COMNECCPACINST 3502.1B), the basic phase focuses on completion of Unit Level Training (ULT) requirements: team training, unit level exercises, evaluations and assessments. The goal of the basic phase is to maintain material readiness and achieve watch station and watch team proficiency in all common core and unit tactical mission areas. Successful completion of the basic phase ensures the unit/command meets phase transition criteria in all required Navy Mission Essential Task Lists (NMETL) based capabilities and are ready for more complex advanced training events with multiple responsible organizations (RESPORGs) or for deployment as an independent unit. Upon completion of all required sub-events, a Final Evaluation Problem (FEP) is conducted to provide a practical demonstration and assessment of all capabilities and performance. [Ref (c)]

(U//FOUO) Basic Phase Training: Coastal Riverine Maritime Operations Training in the basic phase is provided by the CORIVGRU TEU. It encompasses an estimated 130 hours of instructor contact time per student over four sequential weeks, it includes classroom and hands-on underway (field) instruction on Coastal Maritime Operations for maritime CRS Companies and Riverine Maritime Operations for riverine companies, to include mission planning, tactical boat handling, patrol operations, asset protection, contact prosecution, communications, tactical insertion/extraction (riverine elements only), patrolling and interdiction, and the use of force (UOF) continuum. This unit level training requires crews/watch sections to employ proper TTPs, SOPs, and watch standing fundamentals in the required Coastal Riverine Company (CRC) capabilities of: port security/harbor defense; riverine operations; harbor approach/defense; and vessel escort.

(U//FOUO) Final Evaluation Problem (FEP): FEP is a final evaluation for a CRS and marks completion of the basic phase. FEP is designed to evaluate for “most likely and most dangerous” combat scenarios and measure performance in mission planning, rehearsal, execution, and debrief. FEP is a scenario-driven, robust, performance-based evaluation of the unit’s ability to conduct multiple simultaneous naval capability areas and to survive complex casualty control situations under stressful conditions. This includes an evaluation of all conditions of readiness the unit is designed and manned/equipped to exercise. Units must demonstrate the tactical proficiency and warfare knowledge to progress to the advanced phase and integrated unit training.

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(U//FOUO) Advanced/Integrated Training: IAW COMNECC/COMNECCPACINST 3502.1B advanced/integrated training is defined as a two to six month period during which units from various commands participate in multi-unit training events. The advanced phase provides an opportunity for RESPORGs to conduct multi-unit planning and exercises with a primary focus on C2 and integrating RESPORG capabilities into a more complex, multi-unit organization. The advanced phase goal is to prepare and assess the unit/command’s ability to integrate and exercise capabilities into assigned OPLAN/CONPLAN/named operations within their assigned CTF/CTG/Combined Task Unit (CTU) organizational structure. This is accomplished through Naval Staff Planning phase I and II and NECC Integrated Exercise (NIEX). [Ref (c)]

(U//FOUO) NECC Staff Planning Training Phase I and II (21 hours of academics, and 27 hours of team training for the Command Center and watch floor): Provides the foundation for development of the CRS HQ staff training plan and introduces the staff to the fundamentals of Maritime Operations Center (MOC)/Tactical Operations Center (TOC) operations center procedures and the Navy Staff Planning process IAW NWP 5-01. The objectives include: knowledge and skills to use the Staff Planning Process; mission analysis principles in Course of Action (COA)/Concept of Operations (CONOPS) development; developing multiple options for the allocation of limited resources; and defining/mitigating risk in COA and CONOPS development. The MOC/TOC training focuses on the execution of Navy Standard Communications Procedures and command developed operating procedures. This is accomplished through practical application of these procedures in an academic environment which concludes with an integrated table top exercise. MOC/TOC team training is intended to provide base line fundamentals supporting successful watch station qualifications, and is not designed to result in a watch standing personnel qualification standard. [Ref (bc)]

(U//FOUO) NIEX Assessment Summary: IAW COMNECC/COMNECCPACINST 3502.1B, Expeditionary Warfighting Development Center (EXWDC) is responsible for advanced phase exercise coordination and development, staff organization, and final assessment in NECC Integrated Exercise (NIEX) of NCF, EODGRU, NAVALSG and CRG RESPORGs. EXWDC, with the assistance of ECH IVs, identifies training objectives and assessment events for participating RESPORGs within each advanced phase. During NIEX, CRS-3 was assessed to 11 Navy Tasks (NTAs), including the following C2 specific NTAs: Plan and Direct Intelligence Operations; Perform Collections Operation and Management; Acquire, Process Communicate Information, and Maintain Status; Determine and Plan Actions and Operations; Direct Lead and Coordinate Forces. [Ref (c); Encl (281)]

(S//NF) Certification Recommendation: Upon completion of the basic and advanced phases, CORIVGRU ONE forwarded certification of CRS-3, through COMNECCPAC to COMTHIRDFLT for CRS-3’s Calendar Year 2015-2016 deployment to areas of responsibility (CRG-1 R151949JUL2015). It is important to note at the
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end of basic/advanced phase training CRS-3 met mission capability and capacity in assigned theaters, to include FTN 1150C063552 that requested Riverine Command Boat (RCB) Crews. [Encls (133), (148)]

Capabilities/Capacity:

Specifically, FTN 1150C063552 requested [b](1) E.O. 13526 1.4(a)

(U//FOUO) COMCORIVGRU ONE recommended certification of CRS-3 in RMG 151949ZJUL2015 after CRS-3 had satisfactorily completed Measures of Performance (MOP) in line with NTA and completed assigned United States Fleet Force (USFF) NMETLS. [Encls (131), (133)]

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5. **(U//FOUO)** To ensure all relevant information not captured is this investigation is available moving forward, below is the COMNECCPAC response to specific Findings of Fact, Opinions and Recommendations in the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command investigation.

**(U//FOUO)** As stated in the Executive Summary, CRS-3 was trained and certified in preparation for their FIFTHFLT deployment. It is apparent the investigating officer did not capture all of the facets of the FRTP in his investigation, and therefore provided Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command an incomplete analysis of CRS-3’s FRTP. The following responses to the Findings of Fact, Opinions, and Recommendations support my judgment that the primary causal factors of this incident were poor leadership, complacency, and lack of oversight while CRS-3 was deployed and not “ineffective pre-deployment training.”

**(U//FOUO)** Note: The crews of RCB 802 and 805 were trained and assessed on RCB 1301 and 1302 during the FRTP and are henceforth referred as the crews of RCB 802 and 805.

### FINDINGS OF FACT

II.F.5. (U) The Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training and Evaluation Unit did not possess a written training plan specific to RCB operations. [Encls (6), (11), (12), (21), (39), (56), (75), (90), (222), (223)]

Reply: **(U//FOUO)** Non-Concur. There is no requirement for a RCB specific training plan. IAW NTTP 3-20 and CORIVFORINST 3502.1 CRF maritime tactics are not platform specific; therefore crews are trained and assessed to the mission capabilities and not platforms. NTTP 3-20.6.29M defines tactical boats as watercraft 65 FT or less, tactically maneuverable, armed with crew served weapons and capable of high speed maneuvers. Seven of 10 members of crews 802 and 805 trained on RCBs and 5 of 10 members trained on 34 FT PBs during the basic phase in route to certification. Crews 802 and 805 were trained and assessed as a Maritime Security and HVU crew on tactical boats. [Refs (f), (bd); Encls (225), (282)-(284)]

II.F.7. **(U//FOUO)** It did not appear to RCB 802 or RCB 805 crewmembers that there was a comprehensive plan for assessing the RCB crews. [Encls (6), (9), (11), (13)]

Reply: **(U//FOUO)** Non-concur. IAW NTTP 3-20 and CORIVFORINST 3502.1 CRF maritime tactics are not platform specific; therefore crews are trained and assessed to the mission capabilities and not platforms. CRS-3 Company Officers in Charge were provided a letter of instruction dated 18 December 2014 detailing prerequisites, deliverable dates, ammunition requirements, topics of instruction, and company breakdown for all boat crews, ground force, and C5I items. Crews received an estimated 130 hours of instruction from CORIVGRU ONE TEU instructors during the basic phase as detailed in FRTP summary above. They were then
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assessed during 48.5 hours of observation across 18 MOPs for basic phase certification. [Refs (f), (bd); Encls (282)-(285)]

II.F.8. (U//FOUO) During Unit Level Training, the crewmembers received approximately two hours of familiarization training on the Common Geospatial Navigation Toolkit (COGENT). [Encls (11), (223)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. Crewmembers of both RCB crews received an additional 26.5 hours of navigation specific underway hands-on training and 176 total hours of RCB underway training from March-June 2015. Eight of 10 participated in portions of the navigation specific training and 10 of 10 participated in portions of the total underway time. In addition to the two hours of familiarization training on COGENT, seven CRS-3 personnel received 24 hours of focused COGENT “train the trainer” training from 18-19 November 2014 (described in detail below). [Encls (282), (283), (286), (293)]

- From 18-19 November 2014, Wr Systems Ltd. provided training to 7 CRS-3 personnel that included 24 hours (12 hours of classroom instruction and 12 hours of underway instruction) of COGENT instruction for two days. The purpose of the Wr Systems Ltd. training was to train 7 CRS-3 trainers on COGENT. [Encls (286)-(288)]

(U//FOUO) Due to lack of training record documentation at CRS-3, we reviewed COVRIVGRU ONE's copies of CRS-3 RCB Deck Logs. The following navigational specific training was documented:

- On 6 March 2015, per Patrol Brief CORIVGRU ONE TEU conducted a 4.5 hour unit level training on short range “Navigation Exercise” aboard 34 FT PB to Mission Bay from San Diego Bay, a distance of approximately 20 nm. Training was delivered to 5 of the 10 RCB 802 and 805 crewmembers (including RCB 805 Boat Captain, RCB 805 Coxswain and RCB 802 Coxswain). [Encls (225), (229), (289)]
- On 23 April 2015, CORIVGRU ONE TEU conducted 1.5 hour RCB “Navigation Exercise” navigation check ride for 6 of the 10 CRS-3 RCB crew members (including RCB 805 Boat Captain, RCB 805 Coxswain and RCB 802 Coxswain). [Encls (282), (283), (293), (298)]
- On 27 April 2015, 6 of the 10 RCB crewmembers (including RCB 805 Boat Captain, RCB 805 Coxswain and RCB 802 Coxswain) conducted a 3 hour “Navigation Exercise” to Mission Bay, San Diego, a distance of approximately 20 nm. Event included chart verification, projected intended movement (PIM) verification, and verified COGENT use and operation IAW ref (g). [Encls (229), (282), (283), (293)]

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- On 29 April 2015, 7 of the 10 RCB crewmembers (including RCB 802 Boat Captain, RCB 802 Coxswain, RCB 805 Boat Captain and RCB 805 Coxswain) conducted a 9.5-hour "Navigation Exercise", Puma operations and live fire event to FLETAHOT San Diego Operation Area, a distance of approximately 37 nm. Event included chart verification, PIM verification, and verified COGENT use and operation IAW ref (g). [Encls (282), (283), (293), (294)]

- On 13 May 2015, 7 of the 10 RCB crewmembers (including RCB 802 Boat Captain, RCB 802 Coxswain, RCB 805 Boat Captain and RCB 805 Coxswain) conducted an 8-hour "Navigation Exercise" and Puma operation in FLETAHOT San Diego Operation Area, a distance of approximately 37 nm. The RCB crews conducted Puma operations. Event included chart verification, PIM verification, and verified COGENT use and operation IAW ref (g). [Encls (282), (283), (290), (293)]

(U//FOUO) To summarize, throughout the FRTP, all 10 members of RCB crews 802 and 805 completed multiple navigation and COGENT training events from March-June 2015. Members of both RCB crews received an additional 26.5 hours of navigation specific underway hands-on training and 176 total hours of RCB underway training from March-June 2015. Eight of 10 participated in portions of the navigation specific training and 10 of 10 participated in portions of the total underway time.

II.F.9. (U) During Unit Level Training, the RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers did not train on RCBs, but instead trained on 34 FT PBs. [Encls (13), (39), (84), (100), (223)-(227)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. CRS-3 ULT was conducted from October 2014-May 2015. ULT maritime training for the RCB crews consisted of both RCB and 34 FT PB training which supports the HVA mission area IAW NTTP 3-20.6.29M. A thorough review of CRS-3 RCB deck logs indicate 9 of the 10 RCB 802 and 805 crewmembers participated in 36 RCB specific unit level training evolutions encompassing 176 hours on the following dates. [Ref (bd)]

- RCB-specific ULT 31 March-10 April 2015 [Encls (282), (283)]
- ULTRA 27 April-01 May 2015 [Encls (282), (283), (284)]
- FEP 11-15 May 2015 [Encls (282), (283), (284)]

(U//FOUO) In addition, to reinforce HVA mission training, RCB crews were cross-trained on 34 FT PB. 34 FT PB training was completed by 5 of the 10 RCB crew members 24 February-20 March 2015. [Encls (224), (226)]

Items of note:

- 34 FT PB and RCBs use the same COGENT navigation system.

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- Cross-training RCB crews to 34 FT PB supports the HVA deployed mission requirements in Bahrain conducted by both 34 FT PBs and RCBs and provides unit depth.
- Crew served weapons training and qualification requirements between platforms are identical IAW ref (be).

II.F.10. (U) None of the RCB 802 and 805 crews trained as a whole crew during the Unit Level Training phase. [Encls (224)-(226)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. RCB 805 certified together at ULT FEP as a whole crew. [Encls (200), (282), (284), (293)]

II.F.14. (U) Due to incomplete training records, it is unclear how many of the RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers participated in the RCB-specific Unit Level Training. [Encls (5)-(14), (90), (241)-(250)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. A review of CRS-3 RCB deck logs documents 7 of the 10 RCB 802 and 805 crewmembers trained together during Unit Level Training. [Encls (200), (282), (293)]

Restated II.F.9 response follows:
(U//FOUO) CRS-3 ULT was conducted from October 2014-May 2015. ULT maritime training for the RCB crews consisted of both RCB and 34ft PB training which supports the HVA mission area IAW NTTP 3-20.6.29M. A thorough review of CRS-3 RCB deck logs indicate 9 of the 10 RCB 802 and 805 crew members participated in 36 RCB specific unit level training evolutions encompassing 176 hours on the following dates. [Ref (bd)]

- RCB-specific ULT 31 March-10 April 2015 [Encls (282), (283)]
- ULTRA 27 April-01 May 2015 [Encls (282)-(284)]
- FEP 11-15 May 2015 [Encls (281)-(283)]

(U//FOUO) In addition, to reinforce HVA mission training, RCB crews were cross-trained on 34 FT PB. 34 FT PB training was completed by 5 of the 10 RCB crew members 24 February-20 March 2015. [Encls (224), (226)]

Items of note:
- 34 FT PB and RCBs use the same COGENT navigation system.
- Cross-training RCB crews to 34 FT PB supports the HVA deployed mission requirements in Bahrain conducted by both 34 FT PBs and RCBs and provides unit depth.
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- Crew served weapons training and qualification requirements between platforms are identical IAW ref (be).

II.G.5. (U) The only long-range navigation drill that the RCB 802 and RCB 805 crew participated in was a four hour (approximately 50 nautical miles) round trip voyage from San Diego to Mission Bay. [Encls (12), (84), (90), (228)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. See our reply to II.F.8 above (summarized below):

"...throughout the FRTP, all 10 members of RCB crews 802 and 805 completed multiple navigation and COGENT training events from March-June 2015. Members of both RCB crews received an additional 26.5 hours of navigation specific underway hands-on training and 176 total hours of RCB underway training from March-June 2015. Eight of 10 participated in portions of the navigation specific training and 10 of 10 participated in portions of the total underway time."

II.G.9. (U) Seven of the RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers participated in a single underway live fire exercise during Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment from RCBs. [Encls (7), (230)].

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. COVRIVGRU ONE TEU coordinated two live fire exercises including a 34 FT PB live fire exercise for M2, M240 and M203 weapons for 5 of 10 RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmen (RCB 805 Boat Captain, RCB 805 Coxswain, RCB 805 Engineer, RCB 805 Gunner #2, RCB 802 Coxswain) on 16-17 March 2015. The second live fire exercise included 7 of 10 RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmen (RCB 805 Boat Captain, RCB 805 Coxswain, RCB 805 Engineer, RCB 805 Gunner #2, RCB 802 Boat Captain, RCB 802 Coxswain, RCB 802 Engineer) and was executed on 29 April 2015. During these RCB live fire exercises crew trained on MK44 GAU, M2HB, and M240 weapons. [Encls (227), (294)]

II.H.4. (U) However, due to inconsistent RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmember statements and lack of documentation of the Final Evaluation Problem it is unclear what, if anything, the RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers participated in during the Final Evaluation Problem. [Encls (5)-(14), (39), (75), (84), (90), (100), (228)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. FEP Watch bill provided by CRS-3 on file at CORIVGRU ONE shows 7 of the 10 RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers were assessed in the events identified in the Master Scenario Event Listing (MSEL). [Encls (200), (295)]
II.I.4. (U) During the CRS-3’s Basic Phase training cycle, the Tactical and Maritime Operations center watchstanders received little to no formal training. [Encls (23), (33), (35)]

Reply: (U/FOUO) Non-concur. This Finding of Fact only addresses basic phase and implies this was the only training received, not the entire training continuum. During the basic phase of the FRTP, watchstanders received 2.5 hours of training to establish the fundamentals of watch standing. Additionally, during the advanced and integrated phases they received 48 hours of MOC watchstander training. [Encls (291)-(292)]

II.I.2. (U) At no time throughout the training cycle was the Remote Operated Small Arms Mount (ROSAM) weapon system employed in a live fire exercise. [Encls (5)-(14), (84), (221), (223), (227), (228), (230)]

Reply: (U/FOUO) Concur. On 29 April 2015 7 of 10 RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers conducted a live fire event at FLETAHOT San Diego Operation Area. During this event, the ROSAM suffered a “hard malfunction” casualty and did not fire. [Encls (227), (297)]

II.I.10. (U) Per reference (e) and the Advanced Skills Management program, “Tactical Craft Operations” qualifications applied to force protection and security operations, while it is unclear whether “Riverine” or “Riverine Command Boat” job qualification requirements applied to RCB watchstations. [Ref (e); Encls (12), (84)]

Reply: (U/FOUO) Concur. COMNECC has directed action to include the RCB JQR in ASM and add to ref (e).

II.I.12 (U) On 13 July 2015, the following personnel passed a Coastal Riverine Group ONE “Rules of Engagement/Law of Armed Conflict Exam:” RCB 802 Boat Captain, RCB 802 Coxswain, RCB 802 Engineer, RCB 805 Boat Captain, RCB 805 Gunner #1, and RCB 805 Gunner #2. Coastal Riverine Group ONE did not provide test results for the following people: RCB 802 Gunner #1, RCB 802 Gunner #2, RCB 805 Coxswain, and RCB 805 Engineer. [Encls (251)-(256)]

Reply: (U/FOUO) Concur. CORIVGRU ONE has test results for 6 of 10 crew members of RCB 802 and RCB 805. Of note: RCB 802 Boat Captain and RCB 805 Boat Captain both scored 100%. [Encls (251)-(256)]

II.K.9. (U) The deployment certification message does not reflect the mission sets described in the Force Tracking Numbers. [Encls (130), (133), (142), (146)-(148)]
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Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-Concur. FTNs were listed as references in all request for certification message traffic from the Echelon V up through Echelon III, including final certification to deploy. [Encls (133), (146), (148)]

IV.A.33 (U) In the almost three years since being assigned to CRS-3, the RCB 805 Boat Captain only had a total of two hours of training on the COGENT system. [Encl (11)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-Concur. Deck logs reviewed state the RCB 805 Boat Captain conducted 34 missions and 162 hours of RCB underway training, to include five “Navigation Exercise” specific underway training periods totaling 26.5 hours of navigation underway training between 24 March-18 June 2015. RCB 805 Boat Captain was onboard a boat for every one of these navigation specific training events. Every time a boat gets underway, the crew is required to operate their navigation equipment. He was also the Boat Captain aboard RCB 1301 assessed using COGENT during the 2.5 hour navigation check ride on 23 April 2015. MOP N004 score sheet recorded no deficiencies noted on his watchstation. [Encls (225), (282), (283), (293), (298)]

IV.A.42. (U) The Patrol Leader/RCB 805 Boat Captain failed his most recent navigation “Rules of the Road” exam and had not taken an exam since February 2015. [Encl (124)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-Concur: RCB 805 Boat Captain passed his most recent test prior to deployment with a score of 92% on 03 March 2015. CRS-3 did not administer quarterly ROTR as directed in CORIVFORINST 3530.1. TYCOM has for ISIC action to conduct no-notice administrative and training inspections to ensure accountability including periodic testing requirements. [Ref (g); Encls (116), (299), (300)]

IV.A.43. (U) Based on the qualification and training documentation provided to the inspection team by the Coastal Riverine Group, the RCB 802 Boat Captain had never taken a navigation “Rules of the Road” exam while stationed at Coastal Riverine Squadron Three. [Encl (124)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur: RCB 802 Boat Captain was TAD during the timeframe in which ROTR exams were administered by CRS-3 N7 department. CRS-3 did not administer quarterly ROTR as directed in CORIVFORINST 3530.1. TYCOM has for ISIC action to conduct no-notice administrative and training inspections to ensure accountability including periodic testing requirements. [Ref (g); Encl (116)]

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IV.A.44. (U) The RCB 805 Coxswain failed his most recent navigation “Rules of the Road” exam and had not taken an exam since February 2015. [Encl (124)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-Concur: RCB 805 Coxswain passed his most recent test prior to deployment with a score of 96% on 03 March 2015. CRS-3 did not administer quarterly ROTR as directed in CORIVFORINST 3530.1. TYCOM has for ISIC action to conduct no-notice administrative and training inspections to ensure accountability including periodic testing requirements. [Ref (g); Encls (116), (299), (301)]

IV.A.45. (U) The RCB 802 Coxswain failed his most recent navigation “Rules of the Road” exam and had not taken an exam since February 2015. [Encl (124)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-Concur: RCB 802 Coxswain passed his most recent test prior to deployment with a score of 96% on 03 March 2015. CRS-3 did not administer quarterly ROTR as directed in CORIVFORINST 3530.1. TYCOM has for ISIC action to conduct no-notice administrative and training inspections to ensure accountability including periodic testing requirements. [Ref (g); Encls (116), (299), (302)]

IV.B.8. (U) Cannibalization is a process by which a part is removed from one piece of equipment and installed on another in order to make the other operational. Cannibalization is generally prohibited by various Navy instructions unless approved by the appropriate authority. [Ref (b)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur. Cannibalization was verbally approved by NECC N43 IAW Reference (bh), Volume VI, Chapter 14 which provides the TYCOM authority, guidance and policy on cannibalization and reference (bi), COMNECC’s policy on cannibalization. NECC N43 verbal approval was followed by appropriate message traffic. [Encls (136), (303)]

VI.A. Pre-Deployment Readiness

VI.A.1. (U) The 2012 re-alignment of Coastal Riverine Forces due to budget constraints and organizational changes (emerging technology and capability) while maintaining a deployment cycle created a cascading negative effect on Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE’s disestablishment from Yorktown and their subsequent Fleet Response Training Plan for the 2015 deployment. [FF (II.A.2)-(II.A.9), (II.A.14), (II.A.15), (II.B.6), (II.B.7), (II.C.1), (II.C.2), (II.D.7), (II.F.5), (II.H.5), (II.J.1)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. The disestablishment and reorganization was not germane to the RCB 802 and 805 training and preparation for their deployment. Realignment was successfully
managed by respective Coastal Riverine Group Commanders, resulting in certified and effective force generation. In 2012, Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) merged with the Riverine Force to create the Coastal Riverine Force (CRF). This merger resulted in an overall increase in maritime security capacity by employing manpower, previously used only for riverine missions, for maritime security missions. In POM-15, each AC Coastal Riverine Squadron (3 total) was reduced from four companies to three. Those three companies were reconstituted in the RC, creating three RC squadrons with four companies, while the fourth RC squadron remained at a three company level. Additionally, CRF HQ/TEU force structure was reduced. Resultant AC force structure reduction had no impact to CRS-3’s ability to meet current deployment requirements in FIFTH Fleet. With regard to CRS-3, this was their second deployment since merger. Per GFMAP there have been 11 total deployments since the merger (5 Active, and 6 Reserve) to the FIFTH Fleet AOR. [Encls (106), (304) - (310)]

VI.A.2. (U) The “disestablishment” (UIC change) vice “homeport shift” of personnel caused a negative effect (fit/fill) on the proper manning of CRS-3. [FF (II.A.15), (II.B.1)-(II.B.7), (II.C.1), (II.C.2), (II.C.5)-(II.C.11), (II.C.18)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. The 12 June 2015 Fleet Manpower Document (FMD) implementation is what changed the fit/fill from [p](1) E.O. 13523 T.4(a) with CRS-3 manning (II.C.18). Fill remained at [ ] prior to deployment in August 2015. This was the first manpower study since the merger/reorganization, and it resulted in changes in the billet requirements. The main factors in the reduction of fit was a decrease in apprentice pay band (E1-E4) of [ ] and increases in the journeyman/supervisor pay bands (E5-E6)/(E7-E9) of [ ]

Even though the FMD implementation changed the payband structure for the Squadrons, the individual certifications and qualifications remained the same. [Encl (211)]

VI.A.3. (U) The disestablishment of CRS-3 plus the removal of one company of billets (142) created a false indication of adequate manning to Higher Headquarters on the fit/fill of CRS-3 from the beginning of its training cycle and continuing through the 2015-2016 deployment. [FF (II.A.15), (II.B.1)-(II.B.7), (II.C.1)-(II.C.4), (II.C.5)-(II.C.11), (II.C.18), (II.K.11)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. The disestablishment and reorganization was not germane to the RCB 802 and 805 training and preparation for their deployment. Merger approved in FY12 and implemented by OPNAVNOTE(s) in FY13 and subsequent AC force structure reduction mandated in POM-15, were well understood at Echelon I-IV. Fill for CRS-3 fell from [ ] only after the 12 June 2015 Fleet Manpower Document (FMD) implementation. Fill remained at [ ]. CRS-3 was on track to deploy in August 2015 prior to release of the updated FMD. Despite the drop in fit, CRS-3 had the proper skill sets to successfully execute their deployment. The CRSs have successfully deployed for the past three years under the prior manning construct. CRS-3 completed their FEP and Integrated Exercise, and was manned and trained for their deployment. NECC will continue to monitor FMD billet pay band changes and ensure qualifications are sustained through future detailing cycles. [Encls (106), (304)-(306)]
VI.A.4. (U) The 2014 disestablishment of Yorktown Detachment ("D Company") exacerbated the lack of Coastal Riverine experience within CRS-3 and Coastal Riverine Group ONE, while Coastal Riverine Force missions increased. [FF (II.A.15), (II.B.3), (II.B.4), (II.B.6), (II.B.7), (II.C.1), (II.C.2), II.C.12), (II.C.19), (II.D.7)-(II.D.11)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. "D Company" was utilized for Riverine-only (brown water) missions, not maritime security operations. The disestablishment and reorganization was not germane to the RCB 802 and 805 training and preparation for their deployment. Realignment was successfully managed by respective Coastal Riverine Group Commanders, resulting in certified and effective force generation. In 2012, Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) merged with the Riverine Force to create the Coastal Riverine Force (CRF). This merger resulted in an overall increase in maritime security capacity by employing manpower, previously used for riverine-only missions, for maritime security missions. In POM-15, each AC Coastal Riverine Squadron (3 total) was reduced from four companies to three. These companies were reconstituted in the RC, creating three RC squadrons with four companies, while the fourth RC squadron remained at a three company level. Additionally, CRF HQ/TEU force structure was reduced. Resultant AC force structure reduction had no impact to CRS-3's ability to meet current deployment requirements in FIFTH Fleet. With regard to CRS-3, this was their second deployment since merger. Per GP/MS there have been deployments since merger. [Encs (106), (304)-(310)]

VI.A.5. (U) There were not enough properly trained personnel assigned to Coastal Riverine Group ONE Training Evaluation Unit to adequately train and assess the crewmembers of RCB 802 and 805. [FF (II.D.5)-(II.D.11), (II.F.6), (II.F.9)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. All instructors were qualified utilizing COMNECCINST 1500.3, COMNECC/COMNECCPAC 3502.1B and OPNAVINST 1500.75. Although, current CORIVGRU ONE TEU manpower and manning precludes the ability to train more than one company simultaneously, CORIVGRU ONE TEU ensured adherence to all standards, measures of performance, and references by cross training all instructors/assessors in multiple mission areas and crafts. [Refs (c), (bj), (bk); Encs (311)-(320)]

VI.A.6. (U) The CRS-3 training program was ineffective for RCB operations, including operations in the FIFTH Fleet AOR. [FF (II.E.4)-(II.E.6), (II.F.4), (II.F.6), (II.F.7), (II.F.9), (II.F.12), (II.F.14), (II.G.5), (II.G.9), (II.H.4), (II.H.5), (II.J.1)-(II.J.3), (II.J.9), (II.J.11), (II.J.12), (II.K.8)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. IAW COMTHIRDRELT RMG 060038Z AUG 2015, RCB 802 and 805 were fully trained to ROC and IAW missions identified by CTF-56 in RMG 181535Z JUL 2015 and FTN 1150C0653522. Refer to our previous replies to the following FF: II.F.5, II.F.7, II.F.8, II.F.9, II.F.10, II.F.14, IIL.G.5, II.G.9, II.H.4, II.I.4, II.J.12, II.K.9, IV.A.33, IV.A.42, IV.A.44, IV.A.45. [Ref (p); Encs (133), (142), (148)]

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VI.A.7. (U) During the individual skills training period, operational commitments prohibited crewmembers from RCB 802 and 805 from attending the required schools necessary to begin the unit training phase. [FF (II.E.1), (II.E.3), (II.E.4)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. There was one MARSOC event that 7 of 10 RCB 802 and RCB 805 crewmembers participated in from 11-14 April 2015 during the basic phase (and no conflicting events during the individual skills period). This event reinforced necessary Coastal Riverine skills and did not prevent the crews from attending required schools or completing necessary training. [Encls (220), (321)]

VI.A.8. (U) Coastal Riverine Group ONE and CRS-3 failed to provide adequate navigation training for the crews of RCB 802 and 805 to meet basic requirements and skills for effective navigation, to include operations in the FIFTH Fleet area of operations. [FF (II.D.1), (II.D.5), (II.F.4), (II.F.5), (II.F.8), (II.F.12)-(II.F.16), (II.G.5)-(II.G.8), (II.H.40), (IV.A.22), (IV.A.25), (IV.A.26), (IV.A.32)-(IV.A.36), (IV.A.4), (IV.C.3), (IV.F.1), (IV.F.7), (IV.F.9)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. Throughout the FRTP, all 10 members of RCB crews 802 and 805 completed multiple navigation and COGENT training events from March to June 2015. Members of both RCB crews received an additional 26.5 hours of navigation specific underway hands-on training and 176 total hours of RCB underway training from March to June 2015. Eight of 10 participated in portions of the navigation specific training and 10 of 10 participated in portions of the total underway time. See reply to II.F.8. [Encls (225), (229), (282), (283), (286)-(289), (293), (294), (298)]

VI.A.9. (U) RCB 802 and 805 crewmembers were not prepared to execute the full spectrum of missions expected by CTF-56. [FF (II.F.5)-(II.F.7), (II.F.9), (II.F.12)-(II.F.14), (II.G.1)-(II.G.5), (II.H.2)-(II.H.5), (II.J.1), (II.J.2), (II.J.12), (II.K.4), (II.K.6)-(II.K.10), (III.D.3)-(III.D.8), (III.F.1), (III.F.2), (III.G.3), (III.G.4), (III.G.17), (III.G.21)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. IAW COMTHIRDFLT RMG 060038ZAUG15, RCB 802 and 805 were fully trained to ROC and IAW missions identified by CTF-56 in RMG 181535ZJUL15 and FTN 1150C063552. Refer to our reply to the following FF: II.F.5, II.F.7, II.F.8, II.F.9, II.F.10, II.F.14, II.G.5, II.G.9, II.H.4, II.I.4, II.J.12, II.K.9, IV.A.33, IV.A.42, IV.A.44, IV.A.45. [Ref (p); Encls (133), (142), (148)]

VI.A.11. (U) There is not an effective process for training the Headquarters Element to command and control Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE blue water and green water operations. [FF (II.I.1)-(II.I.5), (II.G.5), (II.H.2)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. IAW Advanced Integrated Phase Training outlined above, CRS-3 personnel received Naval Staff Planning I (26-30 January 2015), Naval Staff Planning II
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(18-22 May 2015), and participated in NECC integrated Exercise 15-1 (01-12 June 2015), where CRS-3 was assessed to be within standards. [Encls (281), (322)-(324)]

VI.A.12. (U) Navy Expeditionary Combat Command lacked RCB-specific schools similar to riverine brown water operations schools. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command did not realign its training pipeline to match the Coastal Riverine Force’s new mission set following the disestablishment and merger of CRS-3. [FF (II.A.3), (II.A.5), (II.A.10), (II.A.15), (II.A.17), (II.B.4), (II.C.12), (II.C.15), (II.D.9)]

Reply: (U/FOUO) Non-concur. As stated in our replies to II.F.5 and II.F.7 above, “CRF maritime tactics are not platform specific; therefore crews are trained and assessed to the mission capabilities and not platforms.” In December 2013 NECC and the Center for Security Forces (CSF) conducted a Human Performance Requirements Review (HPRR) of all pipeline individual skill schools to modify training requirements for the re-aligned CRF. Through the HPRR, process new/revised individual skill-sets have been approved, however resources required to execute the changes to curriculum, facilities, and equipment have not been allocated and remain an unfunded requirement. See complete replies to II.F.5 and II.F.7 above. [Refs (f), (bd); Encl (325)]

VI.A.15. (U) CRS-3 lacked a properly functioning Training Department (N7), which resulted in poor oversight over RCB 802 and 805’s training qualifications. This was highlighted by the failure to detect numerous training deficiencies within the crews of RCB 802 and 805, to include the RCB 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader’s failure of his most recent navigation “Rules of the Road” test. [FF (II.E.5)-(II.E.8), (II.F.3), (II.F.4), (II.F.14), (II.H.4), (II.J.3)-(II.J.11), (IV.A.41), (IV.A.42)]

Reply: (U/FOUO) Concur with the exception of “the RCB 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader’s failure of his most recent navigation ‘Rules of the Road’ test.” Per reply to IV.A.42 above which states in part “RCB 805 Boat Captain passed his most recent test prior to deployment with a score of 92% on 03 March 2015.”

VI.A.16. (U) The CRS-3 Commanding Officer’s Interim Qualification letters issued to crewmembers of RCB 802 and 805 were driven by Unit Level Training Readiness Assessment (ULTRA) and Final Evaluation Problem (FEP) requirements and did not reflect the crewmembers’ true competencies. [FF (II.B.7), (II.F.3), (II.F.4), (II.F.6), (II.J.3)]

Reply: (U/FOUO) Non-concur. CRS-3 crewmembers demonstrated proficiency during ULTRA and FEP through successful completion of MOPs IAW certification guidelines. [Ref (bf); Encl (284)]

VI.A.17. (U) The use of Interim Qualification letters in the training cycle led Sailors to assume that each had earned final qualification on his or her watchstation by satisfactorily completing the training cycle. [FF (II.B.7), (II.F.3), (II.F.4), (II.F.6), (II.H.3), (II.J.3)-(II.J.11), (II.K.1)]
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Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. Interim qualification letters delineate the temporary nature and suspension date of the interim qualification. CRS-3 Commanding Officer failed to properly track and provide oversight on interim qualifications IAW CORIVFORINST 3500.1. In this instance there was a lack of follow up on Interim Qualifications by the Commanding Officer of CRS-3. [Ref (b); Encls (326)-(330)]

VI.A.18. (U) Commander, U.S. THIRD Fleet’s standard for deployment certification of CRS-3 did not adequately meet all the operational requirements for the RCB platform and associated crews in the FIFTH Fleet area of operations. [FF (II.K.5)-(II.K.7), (II.K.9), (II.K.10)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-Concur. Per COMUSFLTFORCOM/COMPACFLTINST 3501.3D w/change 1 (Fleet Training Continuum) specified Force Tracking Numbers were listed as references in all request for certification messages from Echelon V up through Echelon III with final certification approval from COMTHIRDFLT RMG 060038Z AUG 2015. [Ref (b); Encl (133)]

VI.A.19. (U) FIFTH Fleet/CTF-56 did not communicate all of its real-time operational requirements of the RCB platform and crew to the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. [FF (II.K.4), (II.K.5)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur. Units of actions are trained and certified to the Required Operation Capabilities (ROC). Any exceptions are clearly identified in the certification message. Capabilities desired by the Operational Commander that are not listed in the ROC should be clearly identified and articulated to the TYCOM through CFFC/CPF in order to allow analysis of the capability gap, evaluate supportability, and assess risk. [Ref (p); Encl (133)]

VI.B.1. (U) CRS-3 was not fully manned to meet FIFTH Fleet Force Tracking Number (FTN) requirements. [FF (IV.Q.9)-(IV.Q.11)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur. However, there is no correlation between total sourcing of FTN requirements and any mission degradation in FIFTH Fleet by CRS-3. Specifically, the FTN delineating the FIFTH Fleet RCB requirement, FTN 1150C063552, [b](1) E.O. 13525 1.4(a) [FF (IV.Q.9)-(IV.Q.11)] [FF corrected to (II.K.9)-(II.K.11)] [Encls (131), (133), (146), (148), (309)]

VI.B.5. (U) CTG 56-7/CRS-3’s lack of a sustainment training plan inhibited its ability to assess proficiency levels during deployment. [FF (III.A.17)-(III.A.18)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur.

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VI.B.6 (U) CTG-56.7/CRS-3 and subordinate unit's (including RCB 802 and 805 crewmembers) failure to oversee and conduct sustainment training resulted in readiness degradation over the course of the deployment. [FF (III.A.12), (III.A.17)-(III.A.18)]

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur.

ACCOUNTABILITY

VI.K.3. (U//FOUO) Accountability action will be remanded to Commander, Coastal Riverine Group ONE (CRG-1) as a matter under his cognizance, in order to determine whether or not any administrative or disciplinary action is warranted for Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE Commanding Officer due to his overall poor execution of his duties in command of CRS-3;

VI.K.4. (U//FOUO) Accountability action will be remanded to Commander, Coastal Riverine Group ONE (CRG-1) as a matter under his cognizance, in order to determine whether or not any administrative or disciplinary action is warranted for the Coastal Riverine Squadron THREE Executive Officer due to his overall poor execution of his duties as Executive Officer of CRS-3;

VI.K.5. (U//FOUO) Accountability action will be remanded to Commander, Coastal Riverine Group ONE (CRG-1) as a matter under his cognizance, in order to determine whether or not any administrative or disciplinary action is warranted for the Kuwait Officer-in-Charge for his lack of oversight, his lack of judgment, and his overall lack of competency as an Officer-in-Charge;

VI.K.6. (U//FOUO) Accountability action will be remanded to Commander, Coastal Riverine Group ONE (CRG-1) as a matter under his cognizance, in order to determine whether or not any administrative or disciplinary action is warranted for the RCB 802 Boat Captain;

VI.K.7. (U//FOUO) Accountability action will be remanded to Commander, Coastal Riverine Group ONE (CRG-1) as a matter under his cognizance, in order to determine whether or not any administrative or disciplinary action is warranted for the RCB 805 Boat Captain/Patrol Leader;

VI.K.8. (U//FOUO) Accountability action will be remanded to Commander, Coastal Riverine Group ONE (CRG-1) as a matter under his cognizance, in order to determine whether or not any administrative or disciplinary action is warranted for the RCB 802 Coxswain.

VI.K.9. (U//FOUO) Accountability action will be remanded to Commander, Coastal Riverine Group ONE (CRG-1) as a matter under his cognizance, in order to determine whether or not any administrative or disciplinary action is warranted for the RCBs Leading Chief Petty Officer for
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failure to support CTU56.7.4 OIC, failure to foster an environment and culture of adherence to standards, failure to provide forceful back-up to CRS-3 leadership, and failure to set an example as a patrol leader.

VI. M Training and Readiness Recommendations

VI.M.2. (U) I recommend forwarding this command investigation to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command for a deep-dive review into Navigation requirements, training, procedures, and standards as it pertain to green and blue water operations.

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur. Immediately after the 12 January 2016 incident, I directed both CRG Commanders to conduct an initial review to determine if this was an isolated incident or if there were gaps in FRTP training/standards, specifically: navigation; code of conduct; rules of the road; and mission planning. Subsequently, on 12 February 2016 I directed my force to conduct immediate actions and a navigation stand-down focused on a lack of procedural compliance with mandated navigation procedures. This review verified adherence to navigation standards. Additionally, I have directed a follow on navigation deep-dive encompassing the force. [Encl (331)]

VI.M.3. (U) I recommend forwarding this command investigation to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command for a deep-dive review and readiness kill chain assessment specifically for Coastal Riverine Force platforms.

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur. Previous RKC was for whole CRF and not specific to CRF Platforms. [Encl (332)]

VI.M.4. (U) I recommend forwarding this command investigation to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to evaluate the curriculum of the Riverine school pipeline in order to modify the curriculum to encompass Coastal Riverine operations (support to Maritime Component Commanders) vice exclusively brown water operations (support to Land Component Commanders).

Reply: (U//FOUO) Non-concur. In December 2013 NECC and the Center for Security Forces (CSF) conducted a Human Performance Requirements Review (HPPR) of all pipeline individual skill schools to modify training requirements for the re-aligned CRF. Through the HPPR process new/revised individual skill-sets have been approved, however resources required to execute the changes to curriculum, facilities, and equipment have not been allocated and remain an unfunded requirement. [Encl (325)]
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VI.M.5. (U) I recommend forwarding this investigation to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to implement an Expeditionary Warfare indoctrination and leadership course for all Officers detailed to the CRF to attend before reporting aboard Coastal Riverine Squadrons.

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur. Leadership continuums for Officers and Senior Enlisted Sailors across the Navy Expeditionary Combat Force (NECF) are in the process of execution and development, either within the NETC or NECC domains. EXWDC is developing a command Triad Leadership and Indoctrination course of instruction for Echelon IV and V commands focusing on warfighting readiness and combat effectiveness. Large portions of course content will be piloted at the Force Commander’s Conference in May 2016, with the Echelon IV course commencing in September 2016, and Echelon V course commencing early FY17.

VI.M.6. (U) I recommend forwarding this investigation to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to explore the development of a career track tailored specifically for the competitive selection and detailing of Post-Department Head Surface Warfare Officers to Officer-in-Charge billets at the Coastal Riverine Squadrons.

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur. Previous to this incident, NECC was working this action with PERS-41. As of 5 January 2016, seven days prior to the 12 January incident, PERS-41 implemented new detailing business rules for CRF Department Heads and Division Officers. CRF platoon leaders/company commanders are now post division officer/department head sea tours. Expect the first officers to arrive in this sequence in January 2017. [Encls (333), (334)]

VI.M.7 (U) I recommend forwarding this investigation to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to explore synthetic scenario training options specific to Coastal Riverine Force maritime operating environment, similar to Judgment-Based Engagement Training for ground forces or Full Mission “Cockpit” Simulators for surface forces.

Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur. Furthermore, NECC has a simulator strategy plan for CRF as well as other expeditionary units of action. This has been identified in the Surface Expeditionary Warfare Training Continuum and Expeditionary Warfare Improvement Program processes for implementation and sustainment, which will improve upon the delivery of education and training. Synthetic multi-craft training initiatives have remained unfunded.

VI.N.8 (modified by Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command): (U) I concur but modify the recommendation to eliminate a distinction between the various operating environments (blue, green, or brown water) to read as follows: (U) Coastal Riverine boat crews, due to the diverse operational environments in the Central Command area of operations, will all be designated as “High Risk of Isolation” and require those crews complete High Risk of Isolation training prior to deployment.
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Reply: (U//FOUO) Concur with designating CRF boat crews operating in the Central Command AOR as High Risk of Isolation and implementing High Risk of Isolation training in the FRTP prior to deployment. COMNECC has directed High Risk of Isolation training for CRF boat crews in the FRTP for all COCOM AORs.

(U//FOUO) In conclusion, after a thorough review of the investigation, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s FIRST ENDORSEMENT, and training documentation from CORIVGRU ONE, it is my judgment that CRS-3 was properly trained and certified in preparation for their FIFTHFLT deployment. It is apparent the investigating officer did not capture all of the facets of the FRTP in his investigation, and therefore provided Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command an incomplete analysis of CRS-3’s FRTP. The above-listed replies to the original investigation’s Findings of Fact, Opinions, and Recommendations support my judgment that the primary causal factors of this incident were poor leadership, complacency, and lack of oversight while CRS-3 was deployed and not “ineffective pre-deployment training.”

F. A. MORNEAU

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